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Author SHA1 Message Date
Michael Tokarev 9027aa6395 Update version for 9.2.3 release
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
2025-03-26 12:13:22 +03:00
Steven Lee b1efa5c236 hw/intc/aspeed: Fix IRQ handler mask check
Updated the IRQ handler mask check to AND with select variable.
This ensures that the interrupt service routine is correctly triggered
for the interrupts within the same irq group.

For example, both `eth0` and the debug UART are handled in `GICINT132`.
Without this fix, the debug console may hang if the `eth0` ISR is not
handled.

Signed-off-by: Steven Lee <steven_lee@aspeedtech.com>
Change-Id: Ic3609eb72218dfd68be6057d78b8953b18828709
Reviewed-by: Cédric Le Goater <clg@redhat.com>
Fixes: d831c5fd86 ("aspeed/intc: Add AST2700 support")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/qemu-devel/20250320092543.4040672-2-steven_lee@aspeedtech.com
Signed-off-by: Cédric Le Goater <clg@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 7b8cbe5162)
(Mjt: update for before v9.2.0-2466-g5824e8bf6beb
 "hw/intc/aspeed: Introduce IRQ handler function to reduce code duplication")
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
2025-03-24 23:59:53 +03:00
Jamin Lin df9168b019 hw/misc/aspeed_hace: Fix buffer overflow in has_padding function
The maximum padding size is either 64 or 128 bytes and should always be smaller
than "req_len". If "padding_size" exceeds "req_len", then
"req_len - padding_size" underflows due to "uint32_t" data type, leading to a
large incorrect value (e.g., `0xFFXXXXXX`). This causes an out-of-bounds memory
access, potentially leading to a buffer overflow.

Added a check to ensure "padding_size" does not exceed "req_len" before
computing "pad_offset". This prevents "req_len - padding_size" from underflowing
and avoids accessing invalid memory.

Signed-off-by: Jamin Lin <jamin_lin@aspeedtech.com>
Reviewed-by: Cédric Le Goater <clg@redhat.com>
Fixes: 5cd7d8564a ("aspeed/hace: Support AST2600 HACE ")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/qemu-devel/20250321092623.2097234-3-jamin_lin@aspeedtech.com
Signed-off-by: Cédric Le Goater <clg@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 78877b2e06)
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
2025-03-24 23:49:55 +03:00
Chao Liu 3cdd1f45aa target/riscv: fix handling of nop for vstart >= vl in some vector instruction
Recently, when I was writing a RISCV test, I found that when VL is set to 0, the
instruction should be nop, but when I tested it, I found that QEMU will treat
all elements as tail elements, and in the case of VTA=1, write all elements
to 1.

After troubleshooting, it was found that the vext_vx_rm_1 function was called in
the vext_vx_rm_2, and then the vext_set_elems_1s function was called to process
the tail element, but only VSTART >= vl was checked in the vext_vx_rm_1
function, which caused the tail element to still be processed even if it was
returned in advance.

So I've made the following change:

Put VSTART_CHECK_EARLY_EXIT(env) at the beginning of the vext_vx_rm_2 function,
so that the VSTART register is checked correctly.

Fixes: df4252b2ec ("target/riscv/vector_helpers: do early exit when
vstart >= vl")
Signed-off-by: Chao Liu <lc00631@tecorigin.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Henrique Barboza <dbarboza@ventanamicro.com>
Message-ID: <b2649f14915150be4c602d63cd3ea4adf47e9d75.1741573286.git.lc00631@tecorigin.com>
Signed-off-by: Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@wdc.com>
(cherry picked from commit 4e9e2478df)
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
2025-03-24 14:21:24 +03:00
Chao Liu 7f5f3e5acd target/riscv: refactor VSTART_CHECK_EARLY_EXIT() to accept vl as a parameter
Some vector instructions are special, such as the vlm.v instruction,
where setting its vl actually sets evl = (vl + 7) >> 3. To improve
maintainability, we will uniformly use VSTART_CHECK_EARLY_EXIT() to
check for the condition vstart >= vl. This function will also handle
cases involving evl.

Fixes: df4252b2ec ("target/riscv/vector_helpers: do early exit when
vstart >= vl")
Signed-off-by: Chao Liu <lc00631@tecorigin.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Henrique Barboza <dbarboza@ventanamicro.com>
Message-ID: <f575979874e323a9e0da7796aa391c7d87e56f88.1741573286.git.lc00631@tecorigin.com>
Signed-off-by: Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@wdc.com>
(cherry picked from commit e83845316a)
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
2025-03-24 14:21:24 +03:00
Michael Tokarev 154ed561b3 Makefile: "make dist" generates a .xz, not .bz2
Fixes: 9bc9e95119 (make-release: switch to .xz format by default)
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@linaro.org>
(cherry picked from commit 14fb6dbbc5)
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
2025-03-24 08:03:28 +03:00
Nicholas Piggin 3e7d8d2233 target/ppc: Fix e200 duplicate SPRs
DSRR0/1 registers are in the BookE ISA not e200 specific, so
remove the duplicate e200 register definitions.

Cc: Roman Kapl <rka@sysgo.com>
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Resolves: https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/issues/2768
Fixes: 0e3bf48909 ("ppc: add DBCR based debugging")
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
(cherry picked from commit 73c0c904fc)
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
2025-03-24 07:57:58 +03:00
Nicholas Piggin 6726d4874b target/ppc: Fix facility interrupt checks for VSX
Facility interrupt checks in general should come after the ISA version
check, because the facility interrupt and facility type themselves are
ISA dependent and should not appear on CPUs where the instruction does
not exist at all.

This resolves a QEMU crash booting NetBSD/macppc due to

  qemu: fatal: Raised an exception without defined vector 94

Resolves: https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/issues/2741
Cc: Chinmay Rath <rathc@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Debugged-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Fixes: aa0f34ec3f ("target/ppc: implement vrlq")
Fixes: 7419dc5b2b ("target/ppc: Move VSX vector storage access insns to decodetree.")
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
(cherry picked from commit 8defe9da08)
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
2025-03-24 07:57:27 +03:00
Harsh Prateek Bora 64e16e3886 ppc/spapr: fix default cpu for pre-9.0 machines.
When POWER10 CPU was made as default, we missed keeping POWER9 as
default for older pseries releases (pre-9.0) at that time.
This caused breakge in default cpu evaluation for older pseries
machines and hence this fix.

Fixes: 51113013f3 ("ppc/spapr: change pseries machine default to POWER10 CPU")
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Signed-off-by: Harsh Prateek Bora <harshpb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@linaro.org>
Message-ID: <20250313094705.2361997-1-harshpb@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
(cherry picked from commit 1490d0bcdf)
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
2025-03-24 07:56:48 +03:00
Yao Zi 73768dae4a host/include/loongarch64: Fix inline assembly compatibility with Clang
Clang on LoongArch only accepts fp register names in the dollar-prefixed
form, while GCC allows omitting the dollar. Change registers in ASM
clobbers to the dollar-prefixed form to make user emulators buildable
with Clang on loongarch64. No functional change invovled.

Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Fixes: adc8467e69 ("host/include/loongarch64: Add atomic16 load and store")
Signed-off-by: Yao Zi <ziyao@disroot.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Bibo Mao <maobibo@loongson.cn>
Signed-off-by: Bibo Mao <maobibo@loongson.cn>
(cherry picked from commit ca2737d6ec)
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
2025-03-24 07:53:41 +03:00
Richard Henderson d83b61f59c linux-user/riscv: Fix handling of cpu mask in riscv_hwprobe syscall
The third argument of the syscall contains the size of the
cpu mask in bytes, not bits.  Nor is the size rounded up to
a multiple of sizeof(abi_ulong).

Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Reported-by: Andreas Schwab <schwab@suse.de>
Fixes: 9e1c7d982d ("linux-user/riscv: Add syscall riscv_hwprobe")
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@wdc.com>
Message-ID: <20250308225902.1208237-3-richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@wdc.com>
(cherry picked from commit 1a010d22b7)
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
2025-03-24 07:49:26 +03:00
Deepak Gupta 803a6864ef target/riscv: fixes a bug against ssamoswap behavior in M-mode
Commit f06bfe3dc3 ("target/riscv: implement zicfiss instructions") adds
`ssamoswap` instruction. `ssamoswap` takes the code-point from existing
reserved encoding (and not a zimop like other shadow stack instructions).
If shadow stack is not enabled (via xenvcfg.SSE) and effective priv is
less than M then `ssamoswap` must result in an illegal instruction
exception. However if effective priv is M, then `ssamoswap` results in
store/AMO access fault. See Section "22.2.3. Shadow Stack Memory
Protection" of priv spec.

Fixes: f06bfe3dc3 ("target/riscv: implement zicfiss instructions")

Reported-by: Ved Shanbhogue <ved@rivosinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Deepak Gupta <debug@rivosinc.com>
Reviewed-by: Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@wdc.com>
Message-ID: <20250306064636.452396-2-debug@rivosinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@wdc.com>
(cherry picked from commit d2c5759c8d)
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
2025-03-24 07:46:14 +03:00
Deepak Gupta 68a90134c0 target/riscv: fix access permission checks for CSR_SSP
Commit:8205bc1 ("target/riscv: introduce ssp and enabling controls for
zicfiss") introduced CSR_SSP but it mis-interpreted the spec on access
to CSR_SSP in M-mode. Gated to CSR_SSP is not gated via `xSSE`. But
rather rules clearly specified in section "22.2.1. Shadow Stack Pointer
(ssp) CSR access contr" in the priv spec.

Fixes: 8205bc127a ("target/riscv: introduce ssp and enabling controls
for zicfiss". Thanks to Adam Zabrocki for bringing this to attention.

Reported-by: Adam Zabrocki <azabrocki@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Deepak Gupta <debug@rivosinc.com>
Reviewed-by: Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@wdc.com>
Message-ID: <20250306064636.452396-1-debug@rivosinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@wdc.com>
(cherry picked from commit 86c78b2806)
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
2025-03-24 07:46:14 +03:00
Santiago Monserrat Campanello 9c3273c16e docs/about/emulation: Fix broken link
semihosting link to risc-v changed

Signed-off-by: Santiago Monserrat Campanello <santimonserr@gmail.com>
Resolves: https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/issues/2717
Reviewed-by: Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@wdc.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Message-ID: <20250305102632.91376-1-santimonserr@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@wdc.com>
(cherry picked from commit 672cb29d1e)
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
2025-03-24 07:44:59 +03:00
Konstantin Shkolnyy bcf9282f53 vdpa: Allow vDPA to work on big-endian machine
Add .set_vnet_le() function that always returns success, assuming that
vDPA h/w always implements LE data format. Otherwise, QEMU disables vDPA and
outputs the message:
"backend does not support LE vnet headers; falling back on userspace virtio"

Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Eugenio Pérez <eperezma@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Shkolnyy <kshk@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit b027f55a99)
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
2025-03-18 09:02:48 +03:00
Konstantin Shkolnyy cda37a6bd7 vdpa: Fix endian bugs in shadow virtqueue
VDPA didn't work on a big-endian machine due to missing/incorrect
CPU<->LE data format conversions.

Signed-off-by: Konstantin Shkolnyy <kshk@linux.ibm.com>
Message-Id: <20250212164923.1971538-1-kshk@linux.ibm.com>
Fixes: 10857ec0ad ("vhost: Add VhostShadowVirtqueue")
Acked-by: Eugenio Pérez <eperezma@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Lei Yang <leiyang@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 50e9754149)
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
2025-03-18 09:02:48 +03:00
Guo Hongyu bb50cc9e75 target/loongarch: Fix vldi inst
Refer to the link below for a description of the vldi instructions:
https://jia.je/unofficial-loongarch-intrinsics-guide/lsx/misc/#synopsis_88
Fixed errors in vldi instruction implementation.

Signed-off-by: Guo Hongyu <guohongyu24@mails.ucas.ac.cn>
Tested-by: Xianglai Li <lixianglai@loongson.cn>
Signed-off-by: Xianglai Li <lixianglai@loongson.cn>
Reviewed-by: Bibo Mao <maobibo@loongson.cn>
Signed-off-by: Bibo Mao <maobibo@loongson.cn>
(cherry picked from commit 02ce6cea71)
Resolves: https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/issues/2865
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
2025-03-18 09:02:48 +03:00
Richard Henderson d08e538de8 target/arm: Simplify pstate_sm check in sve_access_check
In StreamingMode, fp_access_checked is handled already.
We cannot fall through to fp_access_check lest we fall
foul of the double-check assertion.

Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Fixes: 285b1d5fce ("target/arm: Handle SME in sve_access_check")
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Message-id: 20250307190415.982049-3-richard.henderson@linaro.org
Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
[PMM: move declaration of 'ret' to top of block]
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
(cherry picked from commit cc7abc35df)
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
2025-03-18 09:02:48 +03:00
Richard Henderson a75e415ca5 target/arm: Make DisasContext.{fp, sve}_access_checked tristate
The check for fp_excp_el in assert_fp_access_checked is
incorrect.  For SME, with StreamingMode enabled, the access
is really against the streaming mode vectors, and access
to the normal fp registers is allowed to be disabled.
C.f. sme_enabled_check.

Convert sve_access_checked to match, even though we don't
currently check the exception state.

Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Fixes: 3d74825f4d ("target/arm: Add SME enablement checks")
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Message-id: 20250307190415.982049-2-richard.henderson@linaro.org
Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
(cherry picked from commit 298a04998f)
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
2025-03-18 09:02:48 +03:00
Joe Komlodi cf8bd64d4f util/cacheflush: Make first DSB unconditional on aarch64
On ARM hosts with CTR_EL0.DIC and CTR_EL0.IDC set, this would only cause
an ISB to be executed during cache maintenance, which could lead to QEMU
executing TBs containing garbage instructions.

This seems to be because the ISB finishes executing instructions and
flushes the pipeline, but the ISB doesn't guarantee that writes from the
executed instructions are committed. If a small enough TB is created, it's
possible that the writes setting up the TB aren't committed by the time the
TB is executed.

This function is intended to be a port of the gcc implementation
(https://github.com/gcc-mirror/gcc/blob/85b46d0795ac76bc192cb8f88b646a647acf98c1/libgcc/config/aarch64/sync-cache.c#L67)
which makes the first DSB unconditional, so we can fix the synchronization
issue by doing that as well.

Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Fixes: 664a79735e ("util: Specialize flush_idcache_range for aarch64")
Signed-off-by: Joe Komlodi <komlodi@google.com>
Message-id: 20250310203622.1827940-2-komlodi@google.com
Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
(cherry picked from commit e6c38d2ab5)
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
2025-03-18 09:02:48 +03:00
Greg Kurz 0c85c9746f docs: Rename default-configs to configs
This was missed at the time.

Fixes: 812b31d3f9 ("configs: rename default-configs to configs and reorganise")
Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@linaro.org>
Message-ID: <20250306174113.427116-1-groug@kaod.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 48170c2d86)
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
2025-03-18 09:02:48 +03:00
Kevin Wolf 490c737bc7 block: Zero block driver state before reopening
Block drivers assume in their .bdrv_open() implementation that their
state in bs->opaque has been zeroed; it is initially allocated with
g_malloc0() in bdrv_open_driver().

bdrv_snapshot_goto() needs to make sure that it is zeroed again before
calling drv->bdrv_open() to avoid that block drivers use stale values.

One symptom of this bug is VMDK running into a double free when the user
tries to apply an internal snapshot like 'qemu-img snapshot -a test
test.vmdk'. This should be a graceful error because VMDK doesn't support
internal snapshots.

==25507== Invalid free() / delete / delete[] / realloc()
==25507==    at 0x484B347: realloc (vg_replace_malloc.c:1801)
==25507==    by 0x54B592A: g_realloc (gmem.c:171)
==25507==    by 0x1B221D: vmdk_add_extent (../block/vmdk.c:570)
==25507==    by 0x1B1084: vmdk_open_sparse (../block/vmdk.c:1059)
==25507==    by 0x1AF3D8: vmdk_open (../block/vmdk.c:1371)
==25507==    by 0x1A2AE0: bdrv_snapshot_goto (../block/snapshot.c:299)
==25507==    by 0x205C77: img_snapshot (../qemu-img.c:3500)
==25507==    by 0x58FA087: (below main) (libc_start_call_main.h:58)
==25507==  Address 0x832f3e0 is 0 bytes inside a block of size 272 free'd
==25507==    at 0x4846B83: free (vg_replace_malloc.c:989)
==25507==    by 0x54AEAC4: g_free (gmem.c:208)
==25507==    by 0x1AF629: vmdk_close (../block/vmdk.c:2889)
==25507==    by 0x1A2A9C: bdrv_snapshot_goto (../block/snapshot.c:290)
==25507==    by 0x205C77: img_snapshot (../qemu-img.c:3500)
==25507==    by 0x58FA087: (below main) (libc_start_call_main.h:58)

This error was discovered by fuzzing qemu-img.

Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Closes: https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/issues/2853
Closes: https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/issues/2851
Reported-by: Denis Rastyogin <gerben@altlinux.org>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
Message-ID: <20250310104858.28221-1-kwolf@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit b75c5f9879)
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
2025-03-18 09:02:48 +03:00
Philippe Mathieu-Daudé 704eaf8219 hw/xen/hvm: Fix Aarch64 typo
There is no TARGET_ARM_64 definition. Luckily enough,
when TARGET_AARCH64 is defined, TARGET_ARM also is.

Fixes: 733766cd37 ("hw/arm: introduce xenpvh machine")
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Pierrick Bouvier <pierrick.bouvier@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Message-Id: <20250305153929.43687-2-philmd@linaro.org>
(cherry picked from commit 3a11b653a6)
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
2025-03-18 09:02:48 +03:00
Peter Maydell 6620335418 hw/net/smc91c111: Don't allow data register access to overrun buffer
For accesses to the 91c111 data register, the address within the
packet's data frame is determined by a combination of the pointer
register and the offset used to access the data register, so that you
can access data at effectively wider than byte width.  The pointer
register's pointer field is 11 bits wide, which is exactly the size
to index a 2048-byte data frame.

We weren't quite getting the logic right for ensuring that we end up
with a pointer value to use in the s->data[][] array that isn't out
of bounds:

 * we correctly mask when getting the initial pointer value
 * for the "autoincrement the pointer register" case, we
   correctly mask after adding 1 so that the pointer register
   wraps back around at the 2048 byte mark
 * but for the non-autoincrement case where we have to add the
   low 2 bits of the data register offset, we don't account
   for the possibility that the pointer register is 0x7ff
   and the addition should wrap

Fix this bug by factoring out the "get the p value to use as an array
index" into a function, making it use FIELD macro names rather than
hard-coded constants, and having a utility function that does "add a
value and wrap it" that we can use both for the "autoincrement" and
"add the offset bits" codepaths.

Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Resolves: https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/issues/2758
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@linaro.org>
Message-ID: <20250228191652.1957208-1-peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@linaro.org>
(cherry picked from commit 700d3d6dd4)
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
2025-03-18 09:02:48 +03:00
Peter Maydell e8fd97fc1e hw/net/smc91c111: Sanitize packet length on tx
When the smc91c111 transmits a packet, it must read a control byte
which is at the end of the data area and CRC.  However, we don't
sanitize the length field in the packet buffer, so if the guest sets
the length field to something large we will try to read past the end
of the packet data buffer when we access the control byte.

As usual, the datasheet says nothing about the behaviour of the
hardware if the guest misprograms it in this way.  It says only that
the maximum valid length is 2048 bytes.  We choose to log the guest
error and silently drop the packet.

This requires us to factor out the "mark the tx packet as complete"
logic, so we can call it for this "drop packet" case as well as at
the end of the loop when we send a valid packet.

Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Resolves: https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/issues/2742
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@linaro.org>
Message-ID: <20250228174802.1945417-3-peter.maydell@linaro.org>
[PMD: Update smc91c111_do_tx() as len > MAX_PACKET_SIZE]
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@linaro.org>
(cherry picked from commit aad6f264ad)
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
2025-03-18 09:02:48 +03:00
Peter Maydell e9f6c32339 hw/net/smc91c111: Sanitize packet numbers
The smc91c111 uses packet numbers as an index into its internal
s->data[][] array. Valid packet numbers are between 0 and 3, but
the code does not generally check this, and there are various
places where the guest can hand us an arbitrary packet number
and cause an out-of-bounds access to the data array.

Add validation of packet numbers. The datasheet is not very
helpful about how guest errors like this should be handled:
it says nothing on the subject, and none of the documented
error conditions are relevant. We choose to log the situation
with LOG_GUEST_ERROR and silently ignore the attempted operation.

In the places where we are about to access the data[][] array
using a packet number and we know the number is valid because
we got it from somewhere that has already validated, we add
an assert() to document that belief.

Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@linaro.org>
Message-ID: <20250228174802.1945417-2-peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@linaro.org>
(cherry picked from commit 2fa3a5b946)
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
2025-03-18 09:02:48 +03:00
Nicholas Piggin f3da6934cd ppc/pnv/occ: Fix common area sensor offsets
The commit to fix the OCC common area sensor mappings didn't update the
register offsets to match.

Before this change, skiboot reports:

[    0.347100086,3] OCC: Chip 0 sensor data invalid

Afterward, there is no error and the sensor_groups directory appears
under /sys/firmware/opal/.

The SLW_IMAGE_BASE address looks like a workaround to intercept firmware
memory accesses, but that does not seem to be required now (and would
have been broken by the OCC common area region mapping change anyway).
So it can be removed.

Fixes: 3a1b70b66b ("ppc/pnv: Fix OCC common area region mapping")
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
(cherry picked from commit 29c041ca7f)
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
2025-03-18 09:02:48 +03:00
Stefano Stabellini c96b8c0e39 xen: No need to flush the mapcache for grants
On IOREQ_TYPE_INVALIDATE we need to invalidate the mapcache for regular
mappings. Since recently we started reusing the mapcache also to keep
track of grants mappings. However, there is no need to remove grant
mappings on IOREQ_TYPE_INVALIDATE requests, we shouldn't do that. So
remove the function call.

Fixes: 9ecdd4bf08 (xen: mapcache: Add support for grant mappings)
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Reported-by: Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de>
Reviewed-by: Edgar E. Iglesias <edgar.iglesias@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Edgar E. Iglesias <edgar.iglesias@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@vates.tech>
Message-Id: <20250206194915.3357743-2-edgar.iglesias@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@vates.tech>
(cherry picked from commit 68adcc784b)
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
2025-03-18 09:02:48 +03:00
Eugenio Pérez aeade0a251 net: move backend cleanup to NIC cleanup
Commit a0d7215e33 ("vhost-vdpa: do not cleanup the vdpa/vhost-net
structures if peer nic is present") effectively delayed the backend
cleanup, allowing the frontend or the guest to access it resources as
long as the frontend is still visible to the guest.

However it does not clean up the resources until the qemu process is
over.  This causes an effective leak if the device is deleted with
device_del, as there is no way to close the vdpa device.  This makes
impossible to re-add that device to this or other QEMU instances until
the first instance of QEMU is finished.

Move the cleanup from qemu_cleanup to the NIC deletion and to
net_cleanup.

Fixes: a0d7215e33 ("vhost-vdpa: do not cleanup the vdpa/vhost-net structures if peer nic is present")
Reported-by: Lei Yang <leiyang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eugenio Pérez <eperezma@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jonah Palmer <jonah.palmer@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit e7891c575f)
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
2025-03-18 09:02:48 +03:00
Eugenio Pérez 9e00d74a9a net: parameterize the removing client from nc list
This change is used in later commits so we can avoid the removal of the
netclient if it is delayed.

No functional change intended.

Reviewed-by: Si-Wei Liu <si-wei.liu@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eugenio Pérez <eperezma@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit db0d4017f9)
(Mjt: pick this one up for the following change,
 "net: move backend cleanup to NIC cleanup")
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
2025-03-18 09:02:48 +03:00
Peter Maydell 5cf3b48094 util/qemu-timer.c: Don't warp timer from timerlist_rearm()
Currently we call icount_start_warp_timer() from timerlist_rearm().
This produces incorrect behaviour, because timerlist_rearm() is
called, for instance, when a timer callback modifies its timer.  We
cannot decide here to warp the timer forwards to the next timer
deadline merely because all_cpu_threads_idle() is true, because the
timer callback we were called from (or some other callback later in
the list of callbacks being invoked) may be about to raise a CPU
interrupt and move a CPU from idle to ready.

The only valid place to choose to warp the timer forward is from the
main loop, when we know we have no outstanding IO or timer callbacks
that might be about to wake up a CPU.

For Arm guests, this bug was mostly latent until the refactoring
commit f6fc36deef ("target/arm/helper: Implement
CNTHCTL_EL2.CNT[VP]MASK"), which exposed it because it refactored a
timer callback so that it happened to call timer_mod() first and
raise the interrupt second, when it had previously raised the
interrupt first and called timer_mod() afterwards.

This call seems to have originally derived from the
pre-record-and-replay icount code, which (as of e.g.  commit
db1a49726c in 2010) in this location did a call to
qemu_notify_event(), necessary to get the icount code in the vCPU
round-robin thread to stop and recalculate the icount deadline when a
timer was reprogrammed from the IO thread.  In current QEMU,
everything is done on the vCPU thread when we are in icount mode, so
there's no need to try to notify another thread here.

I suspect that the other reason why this call was doing icount timer
warping is that it pre-dates commit efab87cf79 from 2015, which
added a call to icount_start_warp_timer() to main_loop_wait().  Once
the call in timerlist_rearm() has been removed, if the timer
callbacks don't cause any CPU to be woken up then we will end up
calling icount_start_warp_timer() from main_loop_wait() when the rr
main loop code calls rr_wait_io_event().

Remove the incorrect call from timerlist_rearm().

Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Resolves: https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/issues/2703
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Message-id: 20250210135804.3526943-1-peter.maydell@linaro.org
(cherry picked from commit 02ae315467)
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
2025-03-18 09:02:48 +03:00
Peter Maydell ec36d522ce target/arm: Correct STRD atomicity
Our STRD implementation doesn't correctly implement the requirement:
 * if the address is 8-aligned the access must be a 64-bit
   single-copy atomic access, not two 32-bit accesses

Rewrite the handling of STRD to use a single tcg_gen_qemu_st_i64()
of a value produced by concatenating the two 32 bit source registers.
This allows us to get the atomicity right.

As with the LDRD change, now that we don't update 'addr' in the
course of performing the store we need to adjust the offset
we pass to op_addr_ri_post() and op_addr_rr_post().

Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Message-id: 20250227142746.1698904-3-peter.maydell@linaro.org
(cherry picked from commit ee786ca115)
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
2025-03-18 09:02:48 +03:00
Peter Maydell f72e697f24 target/arm: Correct LDRD atomicity and fault behaviour
Our LDRD implementation is wrong in two respects:

 * if the address is 4-aligned and the load crosses a page boundary
   and the second load faults and the first load was to the
   base register (as in cases like "ldrd r2, r3, [r2]", then we
   must not update the base register before taking the fault
 * if the address is 8-aligned the access must be a 64-bit
   single-copy atomic access, not two 32-bit accesses

Rewrite the handling of the loads in LDRD to use a single
tcg_gen_qemu_ld_i64() and split the result into the destination
registers. This allows us to get the atomicity requirements
right, and also implicitly means that we won't update the
base register too early for the page-crossing case.

Note that because we no longer increment 'addr' by 4 in the course of
performing the LDRD we must change the adjustment value we pass to
op_addr_ri_post() and op_addr_rr_post(): it no longer needs to
subtract 4 to get the correct value to use if doing base register
writeback.

STRD has the same problem with not getting the atomicity right;
we will deal with that in the following commit.

Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Reported-by: Stu Grossman <stu.grossman@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Message-id: 20250227142746.1698904-2-peter.maydell@linaro.org
(cherry picked from commit cde3247651)
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
2025-03-18 09:02:48 +03:00
Alex Bennée 3c84a63e2c hw/arm: enable secure EL2 timers for sbsa machine
Signed-off-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Message-id: 20250204125009.2281315-10-peter.maydell@linaro.org
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
(cherry picked from commit 9a9d9e8209)
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
2025-03-18 09:02:48 +03:00
Alex Bennée 472a420761 hw/arm: enable secure EL2 timers for virt machine
Signed-off-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Message-id: 20250204125009.2281315-9-peter.maydell@linaro.org
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
(cherry picked from commit 5dcaea8bcd)
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
2025-03-18 09:02:48 +03:00
Alex Bennée ab37d6bd89 target/arm: Implement SEL2 physical and virtual timers
When FEAT_SEL2 was implemented the SEL2 timers were missed. This
shows up when building the latest Hafnium with SPMC_AT_EL=2. The
actual implementation utilises the same logic as the rest of the
timers so all we need to do is:

  - define the timers and their access functions
  - conditionally add the correct system registers
  - create a new accessfn as the rules are subtly different to the
    existing secure timer

Fixes: e9152ee91c (target/arm: add ARMv8.4-SEL2 system registers)
Signed-off-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Message-id: 20250204125009.2281315-7-peter.maydell@linaro.org
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Cc: Andrei Homescu <ahomescu@google.com>
Cc: Arve Hjønnevåg <arve@google.com>
Cc: Rémi Denis-Courmont <remi.denis.courmont@huawei.com>
[PMM: CP_ACCESS_TRAP_UNCATEGORIZED -> CP_ACCESS_UNDEFINED;
 offset logic now in gt_{indirect,direct}_access_timer_offset() ]
Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
(cherry picked from commit f9f99d7ca5)
(Mjt: CP_ACCESS_UNDEFINED -> CP_ACCESS_TRAP_UNCATEGORIZED)
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
2025-03-18 09:02:48 +03:00
Peter Maydell 739dabb1ad target/arm: Refactor handling of timer offset for direct register accesses
When reading or writing the timer registers, sometimes we need to
apply one of the timer offsets.  Specifically, this happens for
direct reads of the counter registers CNTPCT_EL0 and CNTVCT_EL0 (and
their self-synchronized variants CNTVCTSS_EL0 and CNTPCTSS_EL0).  It
also applies for direct reads and writes of the CNT*_TVAL_EL*
registers that provide the 32-bit downcounting view of each timer.

We currently do this with duplicated code in gt_tval_read() and
gt_tval_write() and a special-case in gt_virt_cnt_read() and
gt_cnt_read().  Refactor this so that we handle it all in a single
function gt_direct_access_timer_offset(), to parallel how we handle
the offset for indirect accesses.

The call in the WFIT helper previously to gt_virt_cnt_offset() is
now to gt_direct_access_timer_offset(); this is the correct
behaviour, but it's not immediately obvious that it shouldn't be
considered an indirect access, so we add an explanatory comment.

This commit should make no behavioural changes.

(Cc to stable because the following bugfix commit will
depend on this one.)

Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Message-id: 20250204125009.2281315-6-peter.maydell@linaro.org
(cherry picked from commit 02c648a0a1)
(Mjt: context fix in target/arm/internals.h)
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
2025-03-18 09:02:48 +03:00
Peter Maydell 69b4ed0259 target/arm: Always apply CNTVOFF_EL2 for CNTV_TVAL_EL02 accesses
Currently we handle CNTV_TVAL_EL02 by calling gt_tval_read() for the
EL1 virt timer.  This is almost correct, but the underlying
CNTV_TVAL_EL0 register behaves slightly differently.  CNTV_TVAL_EL02
always applies the CNTVOFF_EL2 offset; CNTV_TVAL_EL0 doesn't do so if
we're at EL2 and HCR_EL2.E2H is 1.

We were getting this wrong, because we ended up in
gt_virt_cnt_offset() and did the E2H check.

Factor out the tval read/write calculation from the selection of the
offset, so that we can special case gt_virt_tval_read() and
gt_virt_tval_write() to unconditionally pass CNTVOFF_EL2.

Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Message-id: 20250204125009.2281315-5-peter.maydell@linaro.org
(cherry picked from commit 4aecd4b442)
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
2025-03-18 09:02:48 +03:00
Peter Maydell b692aea803 target/arm: Make CNTPS_* UNDEF from Secure EL1 when Secure EL2 is enabled
When we added Secure EL2 support, we missed that this needs an update
to the access code for the EL3 physical timer registers.  These are
supposed to UNDEF from Secure EL1 when Secure EL2 is enabled.

(Note for stable backporting: for backports to branches where
CP_ACCESS_UNDEFINED is not defined, the old name to use instead
is CP_ACCESS_TRAP_UNCATEGORIZED.)

Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Message-id: 20250204125009.2281315-4-peter.maydell@linaro.org
(cherry picked from commit bdd641541f)
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
2025-03-18 09:02:48 +03:00
Peter Maydell 033367d0af target/arm: Don't apply CNTVOFF_EL2 for EL2_VIRT timer
The CNTVOFF_EL2 offset register should only be applied for accessses
to CNTVCT_EL0 and for the EL1 virtual timer (CNTV_*).  We were
incorrectly applying it for the EL2 virtual timer (CNTHV_*).

Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Message-id: 20250204125009.2281315-3-peter.maydell@linaro.org
(cherry picked from commit 5709038aa8)
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
2025-03-18 09:02:47 +03:00
Peter Maydell cefb009762 target/arm: Apply correct timer offset when calculating deadlines
When we are calculating timer deadlines, the correct definition of
whether or not to apply an offset to the physical count is described
in the Arm ARM DDI4087 rev L.a section D12.2.4.1.  This is different
from when the offset should be applied for a direct read of the
counter sysreg.

We got this right for the EL1 physical timer and for the EL1 virtual
timer, but got all the rest wrong: they should be using a zero offset
always.

Factor the offset calculation out into a function that has a comment
documenting exactly which offset it is calculating and which gets the
HYP, SEC, and HYPVIRT cases right.

Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Message-id: 20250204125009.2281315-2-peter.maydell@linaro.org
(cherry picked from commit db6c219283)
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
2025-03-18 09:02:47 +03:00
Patrick Venture 413f7ba6a8 hw/gpio: npcm7xx: fixup out-of-bounds access
The reg isn't validated to be a possible register before
it's dereferenced for one case.  The mmio space registered
for the gpio device is 4KiB but there aren't that many
registers in the struct.

Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Fixes: 526dbbe087 ("hw/gpio: Add GPIO model for Nuvoton NPCM7xx")
Signed-off-by: Patrick Venture <venture@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@linaro.org>
Message-id: 20250226024603.493148-1-venture@google.com
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
(cherry picked from commit 3b2e22c0bb)
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
2025-03-18 09:02:47 +03:00
Markus Armbruster 80f66f3d22 docs/about/build-platforms: Correct minimum supported Python version
Fixes: ca056f4499 (Python: Drop support for Python 3.7)
Signed-off-by: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>
Message-ID: <20250227080757.3978333-2-armbru@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 87c8b4fc3c)
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
2025-03-18 09:02:47 +03:00
Denis Rastyogin 007ea6d6ed block/qed: fix use-after-free by nullifying timer pointer after free
This error was discovered by fuzzing qemu-img.

In the QED block driver, the need_check_timer timer is freed in
bdrv_qed_detach_aio_context, but the pointer to the timer is not
set to NULL. This can lead to a use-after-free scenario
in bdrv_qed_drain_begin().

The need_check_timer pointer is set to NULL after freeing the timer.
Which helps catch this condition when checking in bdrv_qed_drain_begin().

Closes: https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/issues/2852
Signed-off-by: Denis Rastyogin <gerben@altlinux.org>
Message-ID: <20250304083927.37681-1-gerben@altlinux.org>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 2ad638a3d1)
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
2025-03-18 09:02:47 +03:00
Rodrigo Dias Correa 56e190d73e goldfish_rtc: Fix tick_offset migration
Instead of migrating the raw tick_offset, goldfish_rtc migrates a
recalculated value based on QEMU_CLOCK_VIRTUAL. As QEMU_CLOCK_VIRTUAL
stands still across a save-and-restore cycle, the guest RTC becomes out
of sync with the host RTC when the VM is restored.

As described in the bug description, it looks like this calculation was
copied from pl031 RTC, which had its tick_offset migration fixed by
Commit 032cfe6a79 ("pl031: Correctly migrate state when using -rtc
clock=host").

Migrate the tick_offset directly, adding it as a version-dependent field
to VMState. Keep the old behavior when migrating from previous versions.

Resolves: https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/issues/2033
Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Dias Correa <r@drigo.nl>
Reviewed-by: Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@wdc.com>
Message-ID: <20250114212150.228241-1-r@drigo.nl>
Signed-off-by: Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@wdc.com>
(cherry picked from commit 3521f9cadc)
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
2025-03-18 09:02:47 +03:00
Daniel Henrique Barboza 426beec96a target/riscv: throw debug exception before page fault
In the RISC-V privileged ISA section 3.1.15 table 15, it is determined
that a debug exception that is triggered from a load/store has a higher
priority than a possible fault that this access might trigger.

This is not the case ATM as shown in [1]. Adding a breakpoint in an
address that deliberately will fault is causing a load page fault
instead of a debug exception. The reason is that we're throwing in the
page fault as soon as the fault occurs (end of riscv_cpu_tlb_fill(),
raise_mmu_exception()), not allowing the installed watchpoints to
trigger.

Call cpu_check_watchpoint() in the page fault path to search and execute
any watchpoints that might exist for the address, never returning back
to the fault path. If no watchpoints are found cpu_check_watchpoint()
will return and we'll fall-through the regular path to
raise_mmu_exception().

[1] https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/issues/2627

Resolves: https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/issues/2627
Signed-off-by: Daniel Henrique Barboza <dbarboza@ventanamicro.com>
Reviewed-by: Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@wdc.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Message-ID: <20250121170626.1992570-3-dbarboza@ventanamicro.com>
Signed-off-by: Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@wdc.com>
(cherry picked from commit c86edc5476)
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
2025-03-18 09:02:47 +03:00
Daniel Henrique Barboza 1408266d1c target/riscv/debug.c: use wp size = 4 for 32-bit CPUs
The mcontrol select bit (19) is always zero, meaning our triggers will
always match virtual addresses. In this condition, if the user does not
specify a size for the trigger, the access size defaults to XLEN.

At this moment we're using def_size = 8 regardless of CPU XLEN. Use
def_size = 4 in case we're running 32 bits.

Fixes: 95799e36c1 ("target/riscv: Add initial support for the Sdtrig extension")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Henrique Barboza <dbarboza@ventanamicro.com>
Reviewed-by: Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@wdc.com>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@linaro.org>
Message-ID: <20250121170626.1992570-2-dbarboza@ventanamicro.com>
Signed-off-by: Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@wdc.com>
(cherry picked from commit 3fba76e61c)
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
2025-03-18 09:02:47 +03:00
Max Chou 1fc0a58a98 target/riscv: rvv: Fix incorrect vlen comparison in prop_vlen_set
In prop_vlen_set function, there is an incorrect comparison between
vlen(bit) and vlenb(byte).
This will cause unexpected error when user applies the `vlen=1024` cpu
option with a vendor predefined cpu type that the default vlen is
1024(vlenb=128).

Fixes: 4f6d036ccc ("target/riscv/cpu.c: remove cpu->cfg.vlen")
Signed-off-by: Max Chou <max.chou@sifive.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Henrique Barboza <dbarboza@ventanamicro.com>
Message-ID: <20250124090539.2506448-1-max.chou@sifive.com>
Signed-off-by: Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@wdc.com>
(cherry picked from commit bf3adf93f1)
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
2025-03-18 09:02:47 +03:00
Max Chou 39408f6f14 target/riscv: rvv: Fix unexpected behavior of vector reduction instructions when vl is 0
According to the Vector Reduction Operations section in the RISC-V "V"
Vector Extension spec,
"If vl=0, no operation is performed and the destination register is not
updated."

The vd should be updated when vl is larger than 0.

Fixes: fe5c9ab1fc ("target/riscv: vector single-width integer reduction instructions")
Fixes: f714361ed7 ("target/riscv: rvv-1.0: implement vstart CSR")
Signed-off-by: Max Chou <max.chou@sifive.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Henrique Barboza <dbarboza@ventanamicro.com>
Message-ID: <20250124101452.2519171-1-max.chou@sifive.com>
Signed-off-by: Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@wdc.com>
(cherry picked from commit ffd455963f)
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
2025-03-18 09:02:47 +03:00
Joelle van Dyne 16549930bb target/arm/hvf: sign extend the data for a load operation when SSE=1
In the syndrome value for a data abort, bit 21 is SSE, which is
set to indicate that the abort was on a sign-extending load. When
we handle the data abort from the guest via address_space_read(),
we forgot to handle this and so would return the wrong value if
the guest did a sign-extending load to an MMIO region. Add the
sign-extension of the returned data.

Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Signed-off-by: Joelle van Dyne <j@getutm.app>
Message-id: 20250224184123.50780-1-j@getutm.app
[PMM: Drop an unnecessary check on 'len'; expand commit message]
Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
(cherry picked from commit 12c365315a)
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
2025-03-18 09:02:47 +03:00
Joelle van Dyne 576338eea1 target/arm/hvf: Disable SME feature
macOS 15.2's Hypervisor.framework exposes SME feature on M4 Macs.
However, QEMU's hvf accelerator code does not properly support it
yet, causing QEMU to fail to start when hvf accelerator is used on
these systems, with the error message:

  qemu-aarch64-softmmu: cannot disable sme4224
  All SME vector lengths are disabled.
  With SME enabled, at least one vector length must be enabled.

Ideally we would have SME support on these hosts; however, until that
point, we must suppress the SME feature in the ID registers, so that
users can at least run non-SME guests.

Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Resolves: https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/issues/2665
Signed-off-by: Joelle van Dyne <j@getutm.app>
Message-id: 20250224165735.36792-1-j@getutm.app
Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
[PMM: expanded commit message, comment]
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
(cherry picked from commit fd207677a8)
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
2025-03-18 09:02:47 +03:00
Paolo Bonzini 44a7e0aaf7 physmem: replace assertion with error
It is possible to start QEMU with a confidential-guest-support object
even in TCG mode.  While there is already a check in qemu_machine_creation_done:

    if (machine->cgs && !machine->cgs->ready) {
        error_setg(errp, "accelerator does not support confidential guest %s",
                   object_get_typename(OBJECT(machine->cgs)));
        exit(1);
    }

the creation of RAMBlocks happens earlier, in qemu_init_board(), if
the command line does not override the default memory backend with
-M memdev.  Then the RAMBlock will try to use guest_memfd (because
machine_require_guest_memfd correctly returns true; at least correctly
according to the current implementation) and trigger the assertion
failure for kvm_enabled().  This happend with a command line as
simple as the following:

    qemu-system-x86_64 -m 512 -nographic -object sev-snp-guest,reduced-phys-bits=48,id=sev0 \
       -M q35,kernel-irqchip=split,confidential-guest-support=sev0
    qemu-system-x86_64: ../system/physmem.c:1871: ram_block_add: Assertion `kvm_enabled()' failed.

Cc: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250217120812.396522-1-pbonzini@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 6debfb2cb1)
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
2025-03-18 09:02:47 +03:00
Bibo Mao 7f667fc7fe target/loongarch/gdbstub: Fix gdbstub incorrectly handling some registers
Write operation with R32 (orig_a0) and R34 (CSR_BADV) is discarded on
gdbstub implementation for LoongArch system. And return value should
be register size rather than 0, since it is used to calculate offset of
next register such as R33 (PC) in function handle_write_all_regs().

Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Fixes: ca61e75071 ("target/loongarch: Add gdb support.")
Signed-off-by: Bibo Mao <maobibo@loongson.cn>
Reviewed-by: Bibo Mao <maobibo@loongson.cn>
(cherry picked from commit 7bd4eaa847)
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
2025-03-18 09:02:47 +03:00
Matias Ezequiel Vara Larsen dc203a5987 vhost-user-snd: correct the calculation of config_size
Use virtio_get_config_size() rather than sizeof(struct
virtio_snd_config) for the config_size in the vhost-user-snd frontend.
The frontend shall rely on device features for the size of the device
configuration space. The presence of `controls` in the config space
depends on VIRTIO_SND_F_CTLS according to the specification (v1.3):
`
5.14.4 Device Configuration Layout
...

controls
(driver-read-only) indicates a total number of all available control
elements if VIRTIO_SND_F_CTLS has been negotiated.
`
This fixes an issue introduced by commit ab0c7fb2 ("linux-headers:
update to current kvm/next") in which the optional field `controls` is
added to the virtio_snd_config structure. This breaks vhost-user-device
backends that do not implement the `controls` field.

Fixes: ab0c7fb22b ("linux-headers: update to current kvm/next")
Resolves: https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/issues/2805
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@linaro.org>
Suggested-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Matias Ezequiel Vara Larsen <mvaralar@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20250217131255.829892-1-mvaralar@redhat.com>
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Reviewed-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Dorinda Bassey <dbassey@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit e87b6efb11)
(Mjt: context fix for 9.2)
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
2025-03-18 09:02:47 +03:00
Alexander Graf 298340c152 hw/virtio/virtio-nsm: Respond with correct length
When we return a response packet from NSM, we need to indicate its
length according to the content of the response. Prior to this patch, we
returned the length of the source buffer, which may confuse guest code
that relies on the response size.

Fix it by returning the response payload size instead.

Fixes: bb154e3e0c ("device/virtio-nsm: Support for Nitro Secure Module device")
Reported-by: Vikrant Garg <vikrant1garg@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Graf <graf@amazon.com>
Message-Id: <20250213114541.67515-1-graf@amazon.com>
Reviewed-by: Dorjoy Chowdhury <dorjoychy111@gmail.com>
Fixes: bb154e3e0c (&quot;device/virtio-nsm: Support for Nitro Secure Module device&quot;)<br>
Reported-by: Vikrant Garg <vikrant1garg@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Graf <graf@amazon.com>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Vikrant Garg <vikrant1garg@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 131fe64e63)
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
2025-03-18 09:02:47 +03:00
Stefano Garzarella 9b878bd927 cryptodev/vhost: allocate CryptoDevBackendVhost using g_mem0()
The function `vhost_dev_init()` expects the `struct vhost_dev`
(passed as a parameter) to be fully initialized. This is important
because some parts of the code check whether `vhost_dev->config_ops`
is NULL to determine if it has been set (e.g. later via
`vhost_dev_set_config_notifier`).

To ensure this initialization, it’s better to allocate the entire
`CryptoDevBackendVhost` structure (which includes `vhost_dev`) using
`g_mem0()`, following the same approach used for other vhost devices,
such as in `vhost_net_init()`.

Fixes: 042cea274c ("cryptodev: add vhost-user as a new cryptodev backend")
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Reported-by: myluo24@m.fudan.edu.cn
Signed-off-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20250211135523.101203-1-sgarzare@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 83cb18ac45)
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
2025-02-25 12:29:14 +03:00
Sairaj Kodilkar d1b8423fb8 amd_iommu: Use correct bitmask to set capability BAR
AMD IOMMU provides the base address of control registers through
IVRS table and PCI capability. Since this base address is of 64 bit,
use 32 bits mask (instead of 16 bits) to set BAR low and high.

Fixes: d29a09ca68 ("hw/i386: Introduce AMD IOMMU")
Signed-off-by: Sairaj Kodilkar <sarunkod@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Vasant Hegde <vasant.hegde@amd.com>
Message-Id: <20250207045354.27329-3-sarunkod@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 3684717b74)
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
2025-02-25 09:51:32 +03:00
Sairaj Kodilkar 84858471e6 amd_iommu: Use correct DTE field for interrupt passthrough
Interrupt passthrough is determine by the bits 191,190,187-184.
These bits are part of the 3rd quad word (i.e. index 2) in DTE. Hence
replace dte[3] by dte[2].

Fixes: b44159fe0 ("x86_iommu/amd: Add interrupt remap support when VAPIC is not enabled")
Signed-off-by: Sairaj Kodilkar <sarunkod@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Vasant Hegde <vasant.hegde@amd.com>
Message-Id: <20250207045354.27329-2-sarunkod@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 63dc0b8647)
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
2025-02-25 09:51:32 +03:00
Thomas Huth ecaf555439 hw/i386/microvm: Fix crash that occurs when introspecting the microvm machine
QEMU currently crashes when you try to inspect the properties of the
microvm machine:

 $ echo '{ "execute": "qmp_capabilities" }
         { "execute": "qom-list-properties","arguments":
           { "typename": "microvm-machine"}}' | \
   ./qemu-system-x86_64 -qmp stdio
 {"QMP": {"version": {"qemu": {"micro": 50, "minor": 2, "major": 9},
  "package": "v9.2.0-1072-g60af367187-dirty"}, "capabilities": ["oob"]}}
 {"return": {}}
 qemu-system-x86_64: ../qemu/hw/i386/acpi-microvm.c:250:
  void acpi_setup_microvm(MicrovmMachineState *):
   Assertion `x86ms->fw_cfg' failed.
 Aborted (core dumped)

This happens because the microvm machine adds a machine_done (and a
powerdown_req) notifier in their instance_init function - however, the
instance_init of machines are not only called for machines that are
realized, but also for machines that are introspected, so in this case
the listener is added for a microvm machine that is never realized. And
since there is already a running machine, the listener function is
triggered immediately, causing a crash since it was not for the right
machine it was meant for.

Such listener functions must never be installed from an instance_init
function. Let's do it from microvm_machine_state_init() instead - this
function is the MachineClass->init() function instead, i.e. guaranteed
to be only called once in the lifetime of a QEMU process.

Since the microvm_machine_done() and microvm_powerdown_req() were
defined quite late in the microvm.c file, we have to move them now
also earlier, so that we can get their function pointers from
microvm_machine_state_init() without having to introduce a separate
prototype for those functions earlier.

Reviewed-by: Sergio Lopez <slp@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20250123204708.1560305-1-thuth@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Akihiko Odaki <akihiko.odaki@daynix.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 38ef383073)
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
2025-02-25 09:50:03 +03:00
Thomas Huth 1e4ce3dd87 hw/i386/pc: Fix crash that occurs when introspecting TYPE_PC_MACHINE machines
QEMU currently crashes when you try to inspect the machines based on
TYPE_PC_MACHINE for their properties:

 $ echo '{ "execute": "qmp_capabilities" }
         { "execute": "qom-list-properties","arguments":
                      { "typename": "pc-q35-10.0-machine"}}' \
   | ./qemu-system-x86_64 -M pc -qmp stdio
 {"QMP": {"version": {"qemu": {"micro": 50, "minor": 2, "major": 9},
  "package": "v9.2.0-1070-g87e115c122-dirty"}, "capabilities": ["oob"]}}
 {"return": {}}
 Segmentation fault (core dumped)

This happens because TYPE_PC_MACHINE machines add a machine_init-
done_notifier in their instance_init function - but instance_init
of machines are not only called for machines that are realized,
but also for machines that are introspected, so in this case the
listener is added for a q35 machine that is never realized. But
since there is already a running pc machine, the listener function
is triggered immediately, causing a crash since it was not for the
right machine it was meant for.

Such listener functions must never be installed from an instance_init
function. Let's do it from pc_basic_device_init() instead - this
function is called from the MachineClass->init() function instead,
i.e. guaranteed to be only called once in the lifetime of a QEMU
process.

Resolves: https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/issues/2779
Signed-off-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20250117192106.471029-1-thuth@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Akihiko Odaki <akihiko.odaki@daynix.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit de538288e4)
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
2025-02-25 09:49:04 +03:00
Akihiko Odaki 4f5adbe697 hw/net: Fix NULL dereference with software RSS
When an eBPF program cannot be attached, virtio_net_load_ebpf() returns
false, and virtio_net_device_realize() enters the code path to handle
errors because of this, but it causes NULL dereference because no error
is generated.

Change virtio_net_load_ebpf() to return false only when a fatal error
occurred.

Fixes: b5900dff14 ("hw/net: report errors from failing to use eBPF RSS FDs")
Signed-off-by: Akihiko Odaki <akihiko.odaki@daynix.com>
Message-Id: <20250116-software-v1-1-9e5161b534d8@daynix.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit bc82af6b0d)
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
2025-02-25 09:45:46 +03:00
Bernhard Beschow 437999ae81 Kconfig: Extract CONFIG_USB_CHIPIDEA from CONFIG_IMX
TYPE_CHIPIDEA models an IP block which is also used in TYPE_ZYNQ_MACHINE which
itself is not an IMX device. CONFIG_ZYNQ selects CONFIG_USB_EHCI_SYSBUS while
TYPE_CHIPIDEA is a separate compilation unit, so only works by accident if
CONFIG_IMX is given. Fix that by extracting CONFIG_USB_CHIPIDEA from CONFIG_IMX.

cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Fixes: 616ec12d0f "hw/arm/xilinx_zynq: Fix USB port instantiation"
Signed-off-by: Bernhard Beschow <shentey@gmail.com>
Message-id: 20250209103604.29545-1-shentey@gmail.com
Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
(cherry picked from commit 464ce71a96)
(Mjt: context fixup due to missing
 v9.2.0-1303-g1b326f278d05 "hw/pci-host/designware: Expose MSI IRQ")
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
2025-02-25 09:38:01 +03:00
Peter Maydell 3ffbdc3e12 target/arm: Correct errors in WFI/WFE trapping
The code for WFI/WFE trapping has several errors:
 * it wasn't using arm_sctlr(), so it would look at SCTLR_EL1
   even if the CPU was in the EL2&0 translation regime
 * it was raising UNDEF, not Monitor Trap, for traps to
   AArch32 EL3 because of SCR.{TWE,TWI}
 * it was not honouring SCR.{TWE,TWI} when running in
   AArch32 at EL3 not in Monitor mode
 * it checked SCR.{TWE,TWI} even on v7 CPUs which don't have
   those bits

Fix these bugs.

Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Fixes: b1eced713d ("target-arm: Add WFx instruction trap support")
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Message-id: 20250130182309.717346-15-peter.maydell@linaro.org
(cherry picked from commit 2b95a2d01b)
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
2025-02-25 09:24:18 +03:00
Peter Maydell 37600704dd target/arm: Honour SDCR.TDCC and SCR.TERR in AArch32 EL3 non-Monitor modes
There are not many traps in AArch32 which should trap to Monitor
mode, but these trap bits should trap not just lower ELs to Monitor
mode but also the non-Monitor modes running at EL3 (i.e.  Secure
System, Secure Undef, etc).

We get this wrong because the relevant access functions implement the
AArch64-style logic of
   if (el < 3 && trap_bit_set) {
       return CP_ACCESS_TRAP_EL3;
   }
which won't trap the non-Monitor modes at EL3.

Correct this error by using arm_is_el3_or_mon() instead, which
returns true when the CPU is at AArch64 EL3 or AArch32 Monitor mode.
(Since the new callsites are compiled also for the linux-user mode,
we need to provide a dummy implementation for CONFIG_USER_ONLY.)

This affects only:
 * trapping of ERRIDR via SCR.TERR
 * trapping of the debug channel registers via SDCR.TDCC
 * trapping of GICv3 registers via SCR.IRQ and SCR.FIQ
   (which we already used arm_is_el3_or_mon() for)

This patch changes the handling of SCR.TERR and SDCR.TDCC. This
patch only changes guest-visible behaviour for "-cpu max" on
the qemu-system-arm binary, because SCR.TERR
and SDCR.TDCC (and indeed the entire SDCR register) only arrived
in Armv8, and the only guest CPU we support which has any v8
features and also starts in AArch32 EL3 is the 32-bit 'max'.

Other uses of CP_ACCESS_TRAP_EL3 don't need changing:

 * uses in code paths that can't happen when EL3 is AArch32:
   access_trap_aa32s_el1, cpacr_access, cptr_access, nsacr_access
 * uses which are in accessfns for AArch64-only registers:
   gt_stimer_access, gt_cntpoff_access, access_hxen, access_tpidr2,
   access_smpri, access_smprimap, access_lor_ns, access_pauth,
   access_mte, access_tfsr_el2, access_scxtnum, access_fgt
 * trap bits which exist only in the AArch64 version of the
   trap register, not the AArch32 one:
   access_tpm, pmreg_access, access_dbgvcr32, access_tdra,
   access_tda, access_tdosa (TPM, TDA and TDOSA exist only in
   MDCR_EL3, not in SDCR, and we enforce this in sdcr_write())

Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Message-id: 20250130182309.717346-8-peter.maydell@linaro.org
(cherry picked from commit 4d436fb05c)
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
2025-02-25 09:12:51 +03:00
Peter Maydell 7a9fa39856 hw/intc/arm_gicv3_cpuif: Don't downgrade monitor traps for AArch32 EL3
In the gicv3_{irq,fiq,irqfiq}_access() functions, there is a check
which downgrades a CP_ACCESS_TRAP_EL3 to CP_ACCESS_TRAP if EL3 is not
AArch64.  This has been there since the GIC was first implemented,
but it isn't right: if we are trapping because of SCR.IRQ or SCR.FIQ
then we definitely want to be going to EL3 (doing
AArch32.TakeMonitorTrapException() in pseudocode terms).  We might
want to not take a trap at all, but we don't ever want to go to the
default target EL, because that would mean, for instance, taking a
trap to Hyp mode if the trapped access was made from Hyp mode.

(This might have been an attempt to work around our failure to
properly implement Monitor Traps.)

Remove the bogus check.

Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Fixes: 359fbe65e0 ("hw/intc/arm_gicv3: Implement GICv3 CPU interface registers")
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Message-id: 20250130182309.717346-7-peter.maydell@linaro.org
(cherry picked from commit d04c6c3c00)
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
2025-02-25 09:12:24 +03:00
Peter Maydell 68b115ddae target/arm: Make CP_ACCESS_TRAPs to AArch32 EL3 be Monitor traps
In system register access pseudocode the common pattern for
AArch32 registers with access traps to EL3 is:

at EL1 and EL2:
  if HaveEL(EL3) && !ELUsingAArch32(EL3) && (SCR_EL3.TERR == 1) then
     AArch64.AArch32SystemAccessTrap(EL3, 0x03);
  elsif HaveEL(EL3) && ELUsingAArch32(EL3) && (SCR.TERR == 1) then
     AArch32.TakeMonitorTrapException();
at EL3:
  if (PSTATE.M != M32_Monitor) && (SCR.TERR == 1) then
     AArch32.TakeMonitorTrapException();

(taking as an example the ERRIDR access pseudocode).

This implements the behaviour of (in this case) SCR.TERR that
"Accesses to the specified registers from modes other than Monitor
mode generate a Monitor Trap exception" and of SCR_EL3.TERR that
"Accesses of the specified Error Record registers at EL2 and EL1
are trapped to EL3, unless the instruction generates a higher
priority exception".

In QEMU we don't implement this pattern correctly in two ways:
 * in access_check_cp_reg() we turn the CP_ACCESS_TRAP_EL3 into
   an UNDEF, not a trap to Monitor mode
 * in the access functions, we check trap bits like SCR.TERR
   only when arm_current_el(env) < 3 -- this is correct for
   AArch64 EL3, but misses the "trap non-Monitor-mode execution
   at EL3 into Monitor mode" case for AArch32 EL3

In this commit we fix the first of these two issues, by
making access_check_cp_reg() handle CP_ACCESS_TRAP_EL3
as a Monitor trap. This is a kind of exception that we haven't
yet implemented(!), so we need a new EXCP_MON_TRAP for it.

This diverges from the pseudocode approach, where every access check
function explicitly checks for "if EL3 is AArch32" and takes a
monitor trap; if we wanted to be closer to the pseudocode we could
add a new CP_ACCESS_TRAP_MONITOR and make all the accessfns use it
when appropriate.  But because there are no non-standard cases in the
pseudocode (i.e.  where either it raises a Monitor trap that doesn't
correspond to an AArch64 SystemAccessTrap or where it raises a
SystemAccessTrap that doesn't correspond to a Monitor trap), handling
this all in one place seems less likely to result in future bugs
where we forgot again about this special case when writing an
accessor.

(The cc of stable here is because "hw/intc/arm_gicv3_cpuif: Don't
downgrade monitor traps for AArch32 EL3" which is also cc:stable
will implicitly use the new EXCP_MON_TRAP code path.)

Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Message-id: 20250130182309.717346-6-peter.maydell@linaro.org
(cherry picked from commit 4cf4948651)
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
2025-02-25 00:13:02 +03:00
Peter Maydell a98c7cee17 target/arm: Report correct syndrome for UNDEFINED LOR sysregs when NS=0
The pseudocode for the accessors for the LOR sysregs says they
are UNDEFINED if SCR_EL3.NS is 0. We were reporting the wrong
syndrome value here; use CP_ACCESS_TRAP_UNCATEGORIZED.

Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Fixes: 2d7137c10f ("target/arm: Implement the ARMv8.1-LOR extension")
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Message-id: 20250130182309.717346-5-peter.maydell@linaro.org
(cherry picked from commit 707d478ed8)
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
2025-02-25 00:12:31 +03:00
Peter Maydell 41945c6bbb target/arm: Report correct syndrome for UNDEFINED S1E2 AT ops at EL3
The pseudocode for AT S1E2R and AT S1E2W says that they should be
UNDEFINED if executed at EL3 when EL2 is not enabled. We were
incorrectly using CP_ACCESS_TRAP and reporting the wrong exception
syndrome as a result. Use CP_ACCESS_TRAP_UNCATEGORIZED.

Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Fixes: 2a47df9532 ("target-arm: Wire up AArch64 EL2 and EL3 address translation ops")
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Message-id: 20250130182309.717346-4-peter.maydell@linaro.org
(cherry picked from commit ccda792945)
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
2025-02-25 00:12:17 +03:00
Peter Maydell 7988e7c6ba target/arm: Report correct syndrome for UNDEFINED AT ops with wrong NSE, NS
R_NYXTL says that these AT insns should be UNDEFINED if they
would operate on an EL lower than EL3 and SCR_EL3.{NSE,NS} is
set to the Reserved {1, 0}. We were incorrectly reporting
them with the wrong syndrome; use CP_ACCESS_TRAP_UNCATEGORIZED
so they are reported as UNDEFINED.

Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Fixes: 1acd00ef14 ("target/arm/helper: Check SCR_EL3.{NSE, NS} encoding for AT instructions")
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Message-id: 20250130182309.717346-3-peter.maydell@linaro.org
(cherry picked from commit 1960d9701e)
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
2025-02-25 00:11:58 +03:00
Peter Maydell 4a4426275b target/arm: Report correct syndrome for UNDEFINED CNTPS_*_EL1 from EL2 and NS EL1
The access pseudocode for the CNTPS_TVAL_EL1, CNTPS_CTL_EL1 and
CNTPS_CVAL_EL1 secure timer registers says that they are UNDEFINED
from EL2 or NS EL1.  We incorrectly return CP_ACCESS_TRAP from the
access function in these cases, which means that we report the wrong
syndrome value to the target EL.

Use CP_ACCESS_TRAP_UNCATEGORIZED, which reports the correct syndrome
value for an UNDEFINED instruction.

Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Fixes: b4d3978c2f ("target-arm: Add the AArch64 view of the Secure physical timer")
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Message-id: 20250130182309.717346-2-peter.maydell@linaro.org
(cherry picked from commit b819fd6994)
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
2025-02-25 00:11:31 +03:00
68 changed files with 988 additions and 482 deletions
+3 -3
View File
@@ -207,10 +207,10 @@ clean: recurse-clean
VERSION = $(shell cat $(SRC_PATH)/VERSION)
dist: qemu-$(VERSION).tar.bz2
dist: qemu-$(VERSION).tar.xz
qemu-%.tar.bz2:
$(SRC_PATH)/scripts/make-release "$(SRC_PATH)" "$(patsubst qemu-%.tar.bz2,%,$@)"
qemu-%.tar.xz:
$(SRC_PATH)/scripts/make-release "$(SRC_PATH)" "$(patsubst qemu-%.tar.xz,%,$@)"
distclean: clean recurse-distclean
-$(quiet-@)test -f build.ninja && $(NINJA) $(NINJAFLAGS) -t clean -g || :
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1 +1 @@
9.2.2
9.2.3
+1 -1
View File
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ cryptodev_vhost_init(
CryptoDevBackendVhost *crypto;
Error *local_err = NULL;
crypto = g_new(CryptoDevBackendVhost, 1);
crypto = g_new0(CryptoDevBackendVhost, 1);
crypto->dev.max_queues = 1;
crypto->dev.nvqs = 1;
crypto->dev.vqs = crypto->vqs;
+1
View File
@@ -353,6 +353,7 @@ static void bdrv_qed_detach_aio_context(BlockDriverState *bs)
qed_cancel_need_check_timer(s);
timer_free(s->need_check_timer);
s->need_check_timer = NULL;
}
static void bdrv_qed_attach_aio_context(BlockDriverState *bs,
+1
View File
@@ -296,6 +296,7 @@ int bdrv_snapshot_goto(BlockDriverState *bs,
bdrv_graph_wrunlock();
ret = bdrv_snapshot_goto(fallback_bs, snapshot_id, errp);
memset(bs->opaque, 0, drv->instance_size);
open_ret = drv->bdrv_open(bs, options, bs->open_flags, &local_err);
qobject_unref(options);
if (open_ret < 0) {
+1 -1
View File
@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ Python runtime
option of the ``configure`` script to point QEMU to a supported
version of the Python runtime.
As of QEMU |version|, the minimum supported version of Python is 3.7.
As of QEMU |version|, the minimum supported version of Python is 3.8.
Python build dependencies
Some of QEMU's build dependencies are written in Python. Usually these
+1 -1
View File
@@ -171,7 +171,7 @@ for that architecture.
- Unified Hosting Interface (MD01069)
* - RISC-V
- System and User-mode
- https://github.com/riscv/riscv-semihosting-spec/blob/main/riscv-semihosting-spec.adoc
- https://github.com/riscv-non-isa/riscv-semihosting/blob/main/riscv-semihosting.adoc
* - Xtensa
- System
- Tensilica ISS SIMCALL
+5 -5
View File
@@ -260,7 +260,7 @@ Target-dependent emulator sourcesets:
Each emulator also includes sources for files in the ``hw/`` and ``target/``
subdirectories. The subdirectory used for each emulator comes
from the target's definition of ``TARGET_BASE_ARCH`` or (if missing)
``TARGET_ARCH``, as found in ``default-configs/targets/*.mak``.
``TARGET_ARCH``, as found in ``configs/targets/*.mak``.
Each subdirectory in ``hw/`` adds one sourceset to the ``hw_arch`` dictionary,
for example::
@@ -317,8 +317,8 @@ Utility sourcesets:
The following files concur in the definition of which files are linked
into each emulator:
``default-configs/devices/*.mak``
The files under ``default-configs/devices/`` control the boards and devices
``configs/devices/*.mak``
The files under ``configs/devices/`` control the boards and devices
that are built into each QEMU system emulation targets. They merely contain
a list of config variable definitions such as::
@@ -327,11 +327,11 @@ into each emulator:
CONFIG_XLNX_VERSAL=y
``*/Kconfig``
These files are processed together with ``default-configs/devices/*.mak`` and
These files are processed together with ``configs/devices/*.mak`` and
describe the dependencies between various features, subsystems and
device models. They are described in :ref:`kconfig`
``default-configs/targets/*.mak``
``configs/targets/*.mak``
These files mostly define symbols that appear in the ``*-config-target.h``
file for each emulator\ [#cfgtarget]_. However, the ``TARGET_ARCH``
and ``TARGET_BASE_ARCH`` will also be used to select the ``hw/`` and
+8 -8
View File
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ originated in the Linux kernel, though it was heavily simplified and
the handling of dependencies is stricter in QEMU.
Unlike Linux, there is no user interface to edit the configuration, which
is instead specified in per-target files under the ``default-configs/``
is instead specified in per-target files under the ``configs/``
directory of the QEMU source tree. This is because, unlike Linux,
configuration and dependencies can be treated as a black box when building
QEMU; the default configuration that QEMU ships with should be okay in
@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ directives can be included:
**default value**: ``default <value> [if <expr>]``
Default values are assigned to the config symbol if no other value was
set by the user via ``default-configs/*.mak`` files, and only if
set by the user via ``configs/*.mak`` files, and only if
``select`` or ``depends on`` directives do not force the value to true
or false respectively. ``<value>`` can be ``y`` or ``n``; it cannot
be an arbitrary Boolean expression. However, a condition for applying
@@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ directives can be included:
This is similar to ``select`` as it applies a lower limit of ``y``
to another symbol. However, the lower limit is only a default
and the "implied" symbol's value may still be set to ``n`` from a
``default-configs/*.mak`` files. The following two examples are
``configs/*.mak`` files. The following two examples are
equivalent::
config FOO
@@ -146,7 +146,7 @@ declares its dependencies in different ways:
bool
Subsystems always default to false (they have no ``default`` directive)
and are never visible in ``default-configs/*.mak`` files. It's
and are never visible in ``configs/*.mak`` files. It's
up to other symbols to ``select`` whatever subsystems they require.
They sometimes have ``select`` directives to bring in other required
@@ -238,7 +238,7 @@ declares its dependencies in different ways:
include libraries (such as ``FDT``) or ``TARGET_BIG_ENDIAN``
(possibly negated).
Boards are listed for convenience in the ``default-configs/*.mak``
Boards are listed for convenience in the ``configs/*.mak``
for the target they apply to.
**internal elements**
@@ -251,18 +251,18 @@ declares its dependencies in different ways:
Internal elements group code that is useful in several boards or
devices. They are usually enabled with ``select`` and in turn select
other elements; they are never visible in ``default-configs/*.mak``
other elements; they are never visible in ``configs/*.mak``
files, and often not even in the Makefile.
Writing and modifying default configurations
--------------------------------------------
In addition to the Kconfig files under hw/, each target also includes
a file called ``default-configs/TARGETNAME-softmmu.mak``. These files
a file called ``configs/TARGETNAME-softmmu.mak``. These files
initialize some Kconfig variables to non-default values and provide the
starting point to turn on devices and subsystems.
A file in ``default-configs/`` looks like the following example::
A file in ``configs/`` looks like the following example::
# Default configuration for alpha-softmmu
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ static inline Int128 atomic16_read_ro(const Int128 *ptr)
asm("vld $vr0, %2, 0\n\t"
"vpickve2gr.d %0, $vr0, 0\n\t"
"vpickve2gr.d %1, $vr0, 1"
: "=r"(l), "=r"(h) : "r"(ptr), "m"(*ptr) : "f0");
: "=r"(l), "=r"(h) : "r"(ptr), "m"(*ptr) : "$f0");
return int128_make128(l, h);
}
@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ static inline void atomic16_set(Int128 *ptr, Int128 val)
asm("vinsgr2vr.d $vr0, %1, 0\n\t"
"vinsgr2vr.d $vr0, %2, 1\n\t"
"vst $vr0, %3, 0"
: "=m"(*ptr) : "r"(l), "r"(h), "r"(ptr) : "f0");
: "=m"(*ptr) : "r"(l), "r"(h), "r"(ptr) : "$f0");
}
#endif /* LOONGARCH_ATOMIC128_LDST_H */
@@ -61,7 +61,8 @@ static bool buffer_is_zero_lsx(const void *buf, size_t len)
"2:"
: "=&r"(ret), "+r"(p)
: "r"(buf), "r"(e), "r"(l)
: "f0", "f1", "f2", "f3", "f4", "f5", "f6", "f7", "f8", "fcc0");
: "$f0", "$f1", "$f2", "$f3", "$f4", "$f5", "$f6", "$f7", "$f8",
"$fcc0");
return ret;
}
@@ -119,7 +120,8 @@ static bool buffer_is_zero_lasx(const void *buf, size_t len)
"3:"
: "=&r"(ret), "+r"(p)
: "r"(buf), "r"(e), "r"(l)
: "f0", "f1", "f2", "f3", "f4", "f5", "f6", "f7", "f8", "fcc0");
: "$f0", "$f1", "$f2", "$f3", "$f4", "$f5", "$f6", "$f7", "$f8",
"$fcc0");
return ret;
}
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ static inline uint64_t load_atom_extract_al16_or_al8(void *pv, int s)
asm("vld $vr0, %2, 0\n\t"
"vpickve2gr.d %0, $vr0, 0\n\t"
"vpickve2gr.d %1, $vr0, 1"
: "=r"(l), "=r"(h) : "r"(ptr_align), "m"(*ptr_align) : "f0");
: "=r"(l), "=r"(h) : "r"(ptr_align), "m"(*ptr_align) : "$f0");
return (l >> shr) | (h << (-shr & 63));
}
+5 -1
View File
@@ -303,7 +303,7 @@ config ZYNQ
select PL330
select SDHCI
select SSI_M25P80
select USB_EHCI_SYSBUS
select USB_CHIPIDEA
select XILINX # UART
select XILINX_AXI
select XILINX_SPI
@@ -489,6 +489,7 @@ config FSL_IMX25
select IMX
select IMX_FEC
select IMX_I2C
select USB_CHIPIDEA
select WDT_IMX2
select SDHCI
@@ -516,6 +517,7 @@ config FSL_IMX6
select PL310 # cache controller
select PCI_EXPRESS_DESIGNWARE
select SDHCI
select USB_CHIPIDEA
config ASPEED_SOC
bool
@@ -574,6 +576,7 @@ config FSL_IMX7
select PCI_EXPRESS_DESIGNWARE
select SDHCI
select UNIMP
select USB_CHIPIDEA
config ARM_SMMUV3
bool
@@ -589,6 +592,7 @@ config FSL_IMX6UL
select IMX_I2C
select WDT_IMX2
select SDHCI
select USB_CHIPIDEA
select UNIMP
config MICROBIT
+2
View File
@@ -484,6 +484,8 @@ static void create_gic(SBSAMachineState *sms, MemoryRegion *mem)
[GTIMER_HYP] = ARCH_TIMER_NS_EL2_IRQ,
[GTIMER_SEC] = ARCH_TIMER_S_EL1_IRQ,
[GTIMER_HYPVIRT] = ARCH_TIMER_NS_EL2_VIRT_IRQ,
[GTIMER_S_EL2_PHYS] = ARCH_TIMER_S_EL2_IRQ,
[GTIMER_S_EL2_VIRT] = ARCH_TIMER_S_EL2_VIRT_IRQ,
};
for (irq = 0; irq < ARRAY_SIZE(timer_irq); irq++) {
+2
View File
@@ -873,6 +873,8 @@ static void create_gic(VirtMachineState *vms, MemoryRegion *mem)
[GTIMER_HYP] = ARCH_TIMER_NS_EL2_IRQ,
[GTIMER_SEC] = ARCH_TIMER_S_EL1_IRQ,
[GTIMER_HYPVIRT] = ARCH_TIMER_NS_EL2_VIRT_IRQ,
[GTIMER_S_EL2_PHYS] = ARCH_TIMER_S_EL2_IRQ,
[GTIMER_S_EL2_VIRT] = ARCH_TIMER_S_EL2_VIRT_IRQ,
};
for (unsigned irq = 0; irq < ARRAY_SIZE(timer_irq); irq++) {
+1 -2
View File
@@ -220,8 +220,6 @@ static void npcm7xx_gpio_regs_write(void *opaque, hwaddr addr, uint64_t v,
return;
}
diff = s->regs[reg] ^ value;
switch (reg) {
case NPCM7XX_GPIO_TLOCK1:
case NPCM7XX_GPIO_TLOCK2:
@@ -242,6 +240,7 @@ static void npcm7xx_gpio_regs_write(void *opaque, hwaddr addr, uint64_t v,
case NPCM7XX_GPIO_PU:
case NPCM7XX_GPIO_PD:
case NPCM7XX_GPIO_IEM:
diff = s->regs[reg] ^ value;
s->regs[reg] = value;
npcm7xx_gpio_update_pins(s, diff);
break;
+5 -5
View File
@@ -1309,15 +1309,15 @@ static int amdvi_int_remap_msi(AMDVIState *iommu,
ret = -AMDVI_IR_ERR;
break;
case AMDVI_IOAPIC_INT_TYPE_NMI:
pass = dte[3] & AMDVI_DEV_NMI_PASS_MASK;
pass = dte[2] & AMDVI_DEV_NMI_PASS_MASK;
trace_amdvi_ir_delivery_mode("nmi");
break;
case AMDVI_IOAPIC_INT_TYPE_INIT:
pass = dte[3] & AMDVI_DEV_INT_PASS_MASK;
pass = dte[2] & AMDVI_DEV_INT_PASS_MASK;
trace_amdvi_ir_delivery_mode("init");
break;
case AMDVI_IOAPIC_INT_TYPE_EINT:
pass = dte[3] & AMDVI_DEV_EINT_PASS_MASK;
pass = dte[2] & AMDVI_DEV_EINT_PASS_MASK;
trace_amdvi_ir_delivery_mode("eint");
break;
default:
@@ -1593,9 +1593,9 @@ static void amdvi_pci_realize(PCIDevice *pdev, Error **errp)
/* reset AMDVI specific capabilities, all r/o */
pci_set_long(pdev->config + s->capab_offset, AMDVI_CAPAB_FEATURES);
pci_set_long(pdev->config + s->capab_offset + AMDVI_CAPAB_BAR_LOW,
AMDVI_BASE_ADDR & ~(0xffff0000));
AMDVI_BASE_ADDR & MAKE_64BIT_MASK(14, 18));
pci_set_long(pdev->config + s->capab_offset + AMDVI_CAPAB_BAR_HIGH,
(AMDVI_BASE_ADDR & ~(0xffff)) >> 16);
AMDVI_BASE_ADDR >> 32);
pci_set_long(pdev->config + s->capab_offset + AMDVI_CAPAB_RANGE,
0xff000000);
pci_set_long(pdev->config + s->capab_offset + AMDVI_CAPAB_MISC, 0);
+1 -1
View File
@@ -187,7 +187,7 @@
AMDVI_CAPAB_FLAG_HTTUNNEL | AMDVI_CAPAB_EFR_SUP)
/* AMDVI default address */
#define AMDVI_BASE_ADDR 0xfed80000
#define AMDVI_BASE_ADDR 0xfed80000ULL
/* page management constants */
#define AMDVI_PAGE_SHIFT 12
+33 -33
View File
@@ -451,11 +451,44 @@ static HotplugHandler *microvm_get_hotplug_handler(MachineState *machine,
return NULL;
}
static void microvm_machine_done(Notifier *notifier, void *data)
{
MicrovmMachineState *mms = container_of(notifier, MicrovmMachineState,
machine_done);
X86MachineState *x86ms = X86_MACHINE(mms);
acpi_setup_microvm(mms);
dt_setup_microvm(mms);
fw_cfg_add_e820(x86ms->fw_cfg);
}
static void microvm_powerdown_req(Notifier *notifier, void *data)
{
MicrovmMachineState *mms = container_of(notifier, MicrovmMachineState,
powerdown_req);
X86MachineState *x86ms = X86_MACHINE(mms);
if (x86ms->acpi_dev) {
Object *obj = OBJECT(x86ms->acpi_dev);
AcpiDeviceIfClass *adevc = ACPI_DEVICE_IF_GET_CLASS(obj);
adevc->send_event(ACPI_DEVICE_IF(x86ms->acpi_dev),
ACPI_POWER_DOWN_STATUS);
}
}
static void microvm_machine_state_init(MachineState *machine)
{
MicrovmMachineState *mms = MICROVM_MACHINE(machine);
X86MachineState *x86ms = X86_MACHINE(machine);
/* State */
mms->kernel_cmdline_fixed = false;
mms->machine_done.notify = microvm_machine_done;
qemu_add_machine_init_done_notifier(&mms->machine_done);
mms->powerdown_req.notify = microvm_powerdown_req;
qemu_register_powerdown_notifier(&mms->powerdown_req);
microvm_memory_init(mms);
x86_cpus_init(x86ms, CPU_VERSION_LATEST);
@@ -581,31 +614,6 @@ static void microvm_machine_set_auto_kernel_cmdline(Object *obj, bool value,
mms->auto_kernel_cmdline = value;
}
static void microvm_machine_done(Notifier *notifier, void *data)
{
MicrovmMachineState *mms = container_of(notifier, MicrovmMachineState,
machine_done);
X86MachineState *x86ms = X86_MACHINE(mms);
acpi_setup_microvm(mms);
dt_setup_microvm(mms);
fw_cfg_add_e820(x86ms->fw_cfg);
}
static void microvm_powerdown_req(Notifier *notifier, void *data)
{
MicrovmMachineState *mms = container_of(notifier, MicrovmMachineState,
powerdown_req);
X86MachineState *x86ms = X86_MACHINE(mms);
if (x86ms->acpi_dev) {
Object *obj = OBJECT(x86ms->acpi_dev);
AcpiDeviceIfClass *adevc = ACPI_DEVICE_IF_GET_CLASS(obj);
adevc->send_event(ACPI_DEVICE_IF(x86ms->acpi_dev),
ACPI_POWER_DOWN_STATUS);
}
}
static void microvm_machine_initfn(Object *obj)
{
MicrovmMachineState *mms = MICROVM_MACHINE(obj);
@@ -617,14 +625,6 @@ static void microvm_machine_initfn(Object *obj)
mms->isa_serial = true;
mms->option_roms = true;
mms->auto_kernel_cmdline = true;
/* State */
mms->kernel_cmdline_fixed = false;
mms->machine_done.notify = microvm_machine_done;
qemu_add_machine_init_done_notifier(&mms->machine_done);
mms->powerdown_req.notify = microvm_powerdown_req;
qemu_register_powerdown_notifier(&mms->powerdown_req);
}
GlobalProperty microvm_properties[] = {
+3 -3
View File
@@ -1236,6 +1236,9 @@ void pc_basic_device_init(struct PCMachineState *pcms,
/* Super I/O */
pc_superio_init(isa_bus, create_fdctrl, pcms->i8042_enabled,
pcms->vmport != ON_OFF_AUTO_ON, &error_fatal);
pcms->machine_done.notify = pc_machine_done;
qemu_add_machine_init_done_notifier(&pcms->machine_done);
}
void pc_nic_init(PCMachineClass *pcmc, ISABus *isa_bus, PCIBus *pci_bus)
@@ -1709,9 +1712,6 @@ static void pc_machine_initfn(Object *obj)
if (pcmc->pci_enabled) {
cxl_machine_init(obj, &pcms->cxl_devices_state);
}
pcms->machine_done.notify = pc_machine_done;
qemu_add_machine_init_done_notifier(&pcms->machine_done);
}
static void pc_machine_reset(MachineState *machine, ResetType type)
-9
View File
@@ -2300,9 +2300,6 @@ static CPAccessResult gicv3_irqfiq_access(CPUARMState *env,
}
}
if (r == CP_ACCESS_TRAP_EL3 && !arm_el_is_aa64(env, 3)) {
r = CP_ACCESS_TRAP;
}
return r;
}
@@ -2365,9 +2362,6 @@ static CPAccessResult gicv3_fiq_access(CPUARMState *env,
}
}
if (r == CP_ACCESS_TRAP_EL3 && !arm_el_is_aa64(env, 3)) {
r = CP_ACCESS_TRAP;
}
return r;
}
@@ -2404,9 +2398,6 @@ static CPAccessResult gicv3_irq_access(CPUARMState *env,
}
}
if (r == CP_ACCESS_TRAP_EL3 && !arm_el_is_aa64(env, 3)) {
r = CP_ACCESS_TRAP;
}
return r;
}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ static void aspeed_intc_set_irq(void *opaque, int irq, int level)
trace_aspeed_intc_select(select);
if (s->mask[irq] || s->regs[status_addr]) {
if ((s->mask[irq] & select) || (s->regs[status_addr] & select)) {
/*
* a. mask is not 0 means in ISR mode
* sources interrupt routine are executing.
+5
View File
@@ -124,6 +124,11 @@ static bool has_padding(AspeedHACEState *s, struct iovec *iov,
if (*total_msg_len <= s->total_req_len) {
uint32_t padding_size = s->total_req_len - *total_msg_len;
uint8_t *padding = iov->iov_base;
if (padding_size > req_len) {
return false;
}
*pad_offset = req_len - padding_size;
if (padding[*pad_offset] == 0x80) {
return true;
+125 -15
View File
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
#include "net/net.h"
#include "hw/irq.h"
#include "hw/net/smc91c111.h"
#include "hw/registerfields.h"
#include "hw/qdev-properties.h"
#include "qapi/error.h"
#include "qemu/log.h"
@@ -22,6 +23,13 @@
/* Number of 2k memory pages available. */
#define NUM_PACKETS 4
/*
* Maximum size of a data frame, including the leading status word
* and byte count fields and the trailing CRC, last data byte
* and control byte (per figure 8-1 in the Microchip Technology
* LAN91C111 datasheet).
*/
#define MAX_PACKET_SIZE 2048
#define TYPE_SMC91C111 "smc91c111"
OBJECT_DECLARE_SIMPLE_TYPE(smc91c111_state, SMC91C111)
@@ -118,6 +126,18 @@ static const VMStateDescription vmstate_smc91c111 = {
#define RS_TOOSHORT 0x0400
#define RS_MULTICAST 0x0001
FIELD(PTR, PTR, 0, 11)
FIELD(PTR, NOT_EMPTY, 11, 1)
FIELD(PTR, RESERVED, 12, 1)
FIELD(PTR, READ, 13, 1)
FIELD(PTR, AUTOINCR, 14, 1)
FIELD(PTR, RCV, 15, 1)
static inline bool packetnum_valid(int packet_num)
{
return packet_num >= 0 && packet_num < NUM_PACKETS;
}
/* Update interrupt status. */
static void smc91c111_update(smc91c111_state *s)
{
@@ -218,12 +238,33 @@ static void smc91c111_pop_tx_fifo_done(smc91c111_state *s)
/* Release the memory allocated to a packet. */
static void smc91c111_release_packet(smc91c111_state *s, int packet)
{
if (!packetnum_valid(packet)) {
/*
* Data sheet doesn't document behaviour in this guest error
* case, and there is no error status register to report it.
* Log and ignore the attempt.
*/
qemu_log_mask(LOG_GUEST_ERROR,
"smc91c111: attempt to release invalid packet %d\n",
packet);
return;
}
s->allocated &= ~(1 << packet);
if (s->tx_alloc == 0x80)
smc91c111_tx_alloc(s);
smc91c111_flush_queued_packets(s);
}
static void smc91c111_complete_tx_packet(smc91c111_state *s, int packetnum)
{
if (s->ctr & CTR_AUTO_RELEASE) {
/* Race? */
smc91c111_release_packet(s, packetnum);
} else if (s->tx_fifo_done_len < NUM_PACKETS) {
s->tx_fifo_done[s->tx_fifo_done_len++] = packetnum;
}
}
/* Flush the TX FIFO. */
static void smc91c111_do_tx(smc91c111_state *s)
{
@@ -239,12 +280,25 @@ static void smc91c111_do_tx(smc91c111_state *s)
return;
for (i = 0; i < s->tx_fifo_len; i++) {
packetnum = s->tx_fifo[i];
/* queue_tx checked the packet number was valid */
assert(packetnum_valid(packetnum));
p = &s->data[packetnum][0];
/* Set status word. */
*(p++) = 0x01;
*(p++) = 0x40;
len = *(p++);
len |= ((int)*(p++)) << 8;
if (len > MAX_PACKET_SIZE) {
/*
* Datasheet doesn't say what to do here, and there is no
* relevant tx error condition listed. Log, and drop the packet.
*/
qemu_log_mask(LOG_GUEST_ERROR,
"smc91c111: tx packet with bad length %d, dropping\n",
len);
smc91c111_complete_tx_packet(s, packetnum);
continue;
}
len -= 6;
control = p[len + 1];
if (control & 0x20)
@@ -273,11 +327,7 @@ static void smc91c111_do_tx(smc91c111_state *s)
}
}
#endif
if (s->ctr & CTR_AUTO_RELEASE)
/* Race? */
smc91c111_release_packet(s, packetnum);
else if (s->tx_fifo_done_len < NUM_PACKETS)
s->tx_fifo_done[s->tx_fifo_done_len++] = packetnum;
smc91c111_complete_tx_packet(s, packetnum);
qemu_send_packet(qemu_get_queue(s->nic), p, len);
}
s->tx_fifo_len = 0;
@@ -287,6 +337,17 @@ static void smc91c111_do_tx(smc91c111_state *s)
/* Add a packet to the TX FIFO. */
static void smc91c111_queue_tx(smc91c111_state *s, int packet)
{
if (!packetnum_valid(packet)) {
/*
* Datasheet doesn't document behaviour in this error case, and
* there's no error status register we could report it in.
* Log and ignore.
*/
qemu_log_mask(LOG_GUEST_ERROR,
"smc91c111: attempt to queue invalid packet %d\n",
packet);
return;
}
if (s->tx_fifo_len == NUM_PACKETS)
return;
s->tx_fifo[s->tx_fifo_len++] = packet;
@@ -318,6 +379,49 @@ static void smc91c111_reset(DeviceState *dev)
#define SET_LOW(name, val) s->name = (s->name & 0xff00) | val
#define SET_HIGH(name, val) s->name = (s->name & 0xff) | (val << 8)
/*
* The pointer register's pointer is an 11 bit value (so it exactly
* indexes a 2048-byte data frame). Add the specified offset to it,
* wrapping around at the 2048 byte mark, and return the resulting
* wrapped value. There are flag bits in the top part of the register,
* but we can ignore them here as the mask will mask them out.
*/
static int ptr_reg_add(smc91c111_state *s, int offset)
{
return (s->ptr + offset) & R_PTR_PTR_MASK;
}
/*
* For an access to the Data Register at @offset, return the
* required offset into the packet's data frame. This will
* perform the pointer register autoincrement if required, and
* guarantees to return an in-bounds offset.
*/
static int data_reg_ptr(smc91c111_state *s, int offset)
{
int p;
if (s->ptr & R_PTR_AUTOINCR_MASK) {
/*
* Autoincrement: use the current pointer value, and
* increment the pointer register's pointer field.
*/
p = FIELD_EX32(s->ptr, PTR, PTR);
s->ptr = FIELD_DP32(s->ptr, PTR, PTR, ptr_reg_add(s, 1));
} else {
/*
* No autoincrement: register offset determines which
* byte we're addressing. Setting the pointer to the top
* of the data buffer and then using the pointer wrapping
* to read the bottom byte of the buffer is not something
* sensible guest software will do, but the datasheet
* doesn't say what the behaviour is, so we don't forbid it.
*/
p = ptr_reg_add(s, offset & 3);
}
return p;
}
static void smc91c111_writeb(void *opaque, hwaddr offset,
uint32_t value)
{
@@ -457,12 +561,14 @@ static void smc91c111_writeb(void *opaque, hwaddr offset,
n = s->rx_fifo[0];
else
n = s->packet_num;
p = s->ptr & 0x07ff;
if (s->ptr & 0x4000) {
s->ptr = (s->ptr & 0xf800) | ((s->ptr + 1) & 0x7ff);
} else {
p += (offset & 3);
if (!packetnum_valid(n)) {
/* Datasheet doesn't document what to do here */
qemu_log_mask(LOG_GUEST_ERROR,
"smc91c111: attempt to write data to invalid packet %d\n",
n);
return;
}
p = data_reg_ptr(s, offset);
s->data[n][p] = value;
}
return;
@@ -605,12 +711,14 @@ static uint32_t smc91c111_readb(void *opaque, hwaddr offset)
n = s->rx_fifo[0];
else
n = s->packet_num;
p = s->ptr & 0x07ff;
if (s->ptr & 0x4000) {
s->ptr = (s->ptr & 0xf800) | ((s->ptr + 1) & 0x07ff);
} else {
p += (offset & 3);
if (!packetnum_valid(n)) {
/* Datasheet doesn't document what to do here */
qemu_log_mask(LOG_GUEST_ERROR,
"smc91c111: attempt to read data from invalid packet %d\n",
n);
return 0;
}
p = data_reg_ptr(s, offset);
return s->data[n][p];
}
case 12: /* Interrupt status. */
@@ -713,6 +821,8 @@ static ssize_t smc91c111_receive(NetClientState *nc, const uint8_t *buf, size_t
return -1;
s->rx_fifo[s->rx_fifo_len++] = packetnum;
/* allocate_packet() will not hand us back an invalid packet number */
assert(packetnum_valid(packetnum));
p = &s->data[packetnum][0];
/* ??? Multicast packets? */
status = 0;
+18 -27
View File
@@ -1352,18 +1352,25 @@ exit:
static bool virtio_net_load_ebpf(VirtIONet *n, Error **errp)
{
bool ret = false;
if (virtio_net_attach_ebpf_to_backend(n->nic, -1)) {
trace_virtio_net_rss_load(n, n->nr_ebpf_rss_fds, n->ebpf_rss_fds);
if (n->ebpf_rss_fds) {
ret = virtio_net_load_ebpf_fds(n, errp);
} else {
ret = ebpf_rss_load(&n->ebpf_rss, errp);
}
if (!virtio_net_attach_ebpf_to_backend(n->nic, -1)) {
return true;
}
return ret;
trace_virtio_net_rss_load(n, n->nr_ebpf_rss_fds, n->ebpf_rss_fds);
/*
* If user explicitly gave QEMU RSS FDs to use, then
* failing to use them must be considered a fatal
* error. If no RSS FDs were provided, QEMU is trying
* eBPF on a "best effort" basis only, so report a
* warning and allow fallback to software RSS.
*/
if (n->ebpf_rss_fds) {
return virtio_net_load_ebpf_fds(n, errp);
}
ebpf_rss_load(&n->ebpf_rss, &error_warn);
return true;
}
static void virtio_net_unload_ebpf(VirtIONet *n)
@@ -3801,23 +3808,7 @@ static void virtio_net_device_realize(DeviceState *dev, Error **errp)
net_rx_pkt_init(&n->rx_pkt);
if (virtio_has_feature(n->host_features, VIRTIO_NET_F_RSS)) {
Error *err = NULL;
if (!virtio_net_load_ebpf(n, &err)) {
/*
* If user explicitly gave QEMU RSS FDs to use, then
* failing to use them must be considered a fatal
* error. If no RSS FDs were provided, QEMU is trying
* eBPF on a "best effort" basis only, so report a
* warning and allow fallback to software RSS.
*/
if (n->ebpf_rss_fds) {
error_propagate(errp, err);
} else {
warn_report("unable to load eBPF RSS: %s",
error_get_pretty(err));
error_free(err);
}
}
virtio_net_load_ebpf(n, errp);
}
}
+15 -18
View File
@@ -32,22 +32,21 @@
#define OCB_OCI_OCCMISC_OR 0x4022
/* OCC sensors */
#define OCC_SENSOR_DATA_BLOCK_OFFSET 0x580000
#define OCC_SENSOR_DATA_VALID 0x580001
#define OCC_SENSOR_DATA_VERSION 0x580002
#define OCC_SENSOR_DATA_READING_VERSION 0x580004
#define OCC_SENSOR_DATA_NR_SENSORS 0x580008
#define OCC_SENSOR_DATA_NAMES_OFFSET 0x580010
#define OCC_SENSOR_DATA_READING_PING_OFFSET 0x580014
#define OCC_SENSOR_DATA_READING_PONG_OFFSET 0x58000c
#define OCC_SENSOR_DATA_NAME_LENGTH 0x58000d
#define OCC_SENSOR_NAME_STRUCTURE_TYPE 0x580023
#define OCC_SENSOR_LOC_CORE 0x580022
#define OCC_SENSOR_LOC_GPU 0x580020
#define OCC_SENSOR_TYPE_POWER 0x580003
#define OCC_SENSOR_NAME 0x580005
#define HWMON_SENSORS_MASK 0x58001e
#define SLW_IMAGE_BASE 0x0
#define OCC_SENSOR_DATA_BLOCK_OFFSET 0x0000
#define OCC_SENSOR_DATA_VALID 0x0001
#define OCC_SENSOR_DATA_VERSION 0x0002
#define OCC_SENSOR_DATA_READING_VERSION 0x0004
#define OCC_SENSOR_DATA_NR_SENSORS 0x0008
#define OCC_SENSOR_DATA_NAMES_OFFSET 0x0010
#define OCC_SENSOR_DATA_READING_PING_OFFSET 0x0014
#define OCC_SENSOR_DATA_READING_PONG_OFFSET 0x000c
#define OCC_SENSOR_DATA_NAME_LENGTH 0x000d
#define OCC_SENSOR_NAME_STRUCTURE_TYPE 0x0023
#define OCC_SENSOR_LOC_CORE 0x0022
#define OCC_SENSOR_LOC_GPU 0x0020
#define OCC_SENSOR_TYPE_POWER 0x0003
#define OCC_SENSOR_NAME 0x0005
#define HWMON_SENSORS_MASK 0x001e
static void pnv_occ_set_misc(PnvOCC *occ, uint64_t val)
{
@@ -129,8 +128,6 @@ static uint64_t pnv_occ_common_area_read(void *opaque, hwaddr addr,
case HWMON_SENSORS_MASK:
case OCC_SENSOR_LOC_GPU:
return 0x8e00;
case SLW_IMAGE_BASE:
return 0x1000000000000000;
}
return 0;
}
+1
View File
@@ -4771,6 +4771,7 @@ static void spapr_machine_8_2_class_options(MachineClass *mc)
{
spapr_machine_9_0_class_options(mc);
compat_props_add(mc->compat_props, hw_compat_8_2, hw_compat_8_2_len);
mc->default_cpu_type = POWERPC_CPU_TYPE_NAME("power9_v2.2");
}
DEFINE_SPAPR_MACHINE(8, 2);
+13 -30
View File
@@ -178,38 +178,21 @@ static void goldfish_rtc_write(void *opaque, hwaddr offset,
trace_goldfish_rtc_write(offset, value);
}
static int goldfish_rtc_pre_save(void *opaque)
{
uint64_t delta;
GoldfishRTCState *s = opaque;
/*
* We want to migrate this offset, which sounds straightforward.
* Unfortunately, we cannot directly pass tick_offset because
* rtc_clock on destination Host might not be same source Host.
*
* To tackle, this we pass tick_offset relative to vm_clock from
* source Host and make it relative to rtc_clock at destination Host.
*/
delta = qemu_clock_get_ns(rtc_clock) -
qemu_clock_get_ns(QEMU_CLOCK_VIRTUAL);
s->tick_offset_vmstate = s->tick_offset + delta;
return 0;
}
static int goldfish_rtc_post_load(void *opaque, int version_id)
{
uint64_t delta;
GoldfishRTCState *s = opaque;
/*
* We extract tick_offset from tick_offset_vmstate by doing
* reverse math compared to pre_save() function.
*/
delta = qemu_clock_get_ns(rtc_clock) -
qemu_clock_get_ns(QEMU_CLOCK_VIRTUAL);
s->tick_offset = s->tick_offset_vmstate - delta;
if (version_id < 3) {
/*
* Previous versions didn't migrate tick_offset directly. Instead, they
* migrated tick_offset_vmstate, which is a recalculation based on
* QEMU_CLOCK_VIRTUAL. We use tick_offset_vmstate when migrating from
* older versions.
*/
uint64_t delta = qemu_clock_get_ns(rtc_clock) -
qemu_clock_get_ns(QEMU_CLOCK_VIRTUAL);
s->tick_offset = s->tick_offset_vmstate - delta;
}
goldfish_rtc_set_alarm(s);
@@ -239,8 +222,7 @@ static const MemoryRegionOps goldfish_rtc_ops[2] = {
static const VMStateDescription goldfish_rtc_vmstate = {
.name = TYPE_GOLDFISH_RTC,
.version_id = 2,
.pre_save = goldfish_rtc_pre_save,
.version_id = 3,
.post_load = goldfish_rtc_post_load,
.fields = (const VMStateField[]) {
VMSTATE_UINT64(tick_offset_vmstate, GoldfishRTCState),
@@ -249,6 +231,7 @@ static const VMStateDescription goldfish_rtc_vmstate = {
VMSTATE_UINT32(irq_pending, GoldfishRTCState),
VMSTATE_UINT32(irq_enabled, GoldfishRTCState),
VMSTATE_UINT32(time_high, GoldfishRTCState),
VMSTATE_UINT64_V(tick_offset, GoldfishRTCState, 3),
VMSTATE_END_OF_LIST()
}
};
+4
View File
@@ -143,3 +143,7 @@ config USB_DWC3
config XLNX_USB_SUBSYS
bool
select USB_DWC3
config USB_CHIPIDEA
bool
select USB_EHCI_SYSBUS
+1 -1
View File
@@ -25,8 +25,8 @@ system_ss.add(when: 'CONFIG_USB_XHCI_SYSBUS', if_true: files('hcd-xhci-sysbus.c'
system_ss.add(when: 'CONFIG_USB_XHCI_NEC', if_true: files('hcd-xhci-nec.c'))
system_ss.add(when: 'CONFIG_USB_DWC2', if_true: files('hcd-dwc2.c'))
system_ss.add(when: 'CONFIG_USB_DWC3', if_true: files('hcd-dwc3.c'))
system_ss.add(when: 'CONFIG_USB_CHIPIDEA', if_true: files('chipidea.c'))
system_ss.add(when: 'CONFIG_IMX', if_true: files('chipidea.c'))
system_ss.add(when: 'CONFIG_IMX_USBPHY', if_true: files('imx-usb-phy.c'))
system_ss.add(when: 'CONFIG_VT82C686', if_true: files('vt82c686-uhci-pci.c'))
system_ss.add(when: 'CONFIG_XLNX_VERSAL', if_true: files('xlnx-versal-usb2-ctrl-regs.c'))
+10 -8
View File
@@ -165,10 +165,10 @@ static bool vhost_svq_vring_write_descs(VhostShadowVirtqueue *svq, hwaddr *sg,
descs[i].len = cpu_to_le32(iovec[n].iov_len);
last = i;
i = cpu_to_le16(svq->desc_next[i]);
i = svq->desc_next[i];
}
svq->free_head = le16_to_cpu(svq->desc_next[last]);
svq->free_head = svq->desc_next[last];
return true;
}
@@ -228,10 +228,12 @@ static void vhost_svq_kick(VhostShadowVirtqueue *svq)
smp_mb();
if (virtio_vdev_has_feature(svq->vdev, VIRTIO_RING_F_EVENT_IDX)) {
uint16_t avail_event = *(uint16_t *)(&svq->vring.used->ring[svq->vring.num]);
uint16_t avail_event = le16_to_cpu(
*(uint16_t *)(&svq->vring.used->ring[svq->vring.num]));
needs_kick = vring_need_event(avail_event, svq->shadow_avail_idx, svq->shadow_avail_idx - 1);
} else {
needs_kick = !(svq->vring.used->flags & VRING_USED_F_NO_NOTIFY);
needs_kick =
!(svq->vring.used->flags & cpu_to_le16(VRING_USED_F_NO_NOTIFY));
}
if (!needs_kick) {
@@ -365,7 +367,7 @@ static bool vhost_svq_more_used(VhostShadowVirtqueue *svq)
return true;
}
svq->shadow_used_idx = cpu_to_le16(*(volatile uint16_t *)used_idx);
svq->shadow_used_idx = le16_to_cpu(*(volatile uint16_t *)used_idx);
return svq->last_used_idx != svq->shadow_used_idx;
}
@@ -383,7 +385,7 @@ static bool vhost_svq_enable_notification(VhostShadowVirtqueue *svq)
{
if (virtio_vdev_has_feature(svq->vdev, VIRTIO_RING_F_EVENT_IDX)) {
uint16_t *used_event = (uint16_t *)&svq->vring.avail->ring[svq->vring.num];
*used_event = svq->shadow_used_idx;
*used_event = cpu_to_le16(svq->shadow_used_idx);
} else {
svq->vring.avail->flags &= ~cpu_to_le16(VRING_AVAIL_F_NO_INTERRUPT);
}
@@ -408,7 +410,7 @@ static uint16_t vhost_svq_last_desc_of_chain(const VhostShadowVirtqueue *svq,
uint16_t num, uint16_t i)
{
for (uint16_t j = 0; j < (num - 1); ++j) {
i = le16_to_cpu(svq->desc_next[i]);
i = svq->desc_next[i];
}
return i;
@@ -683,7 +685,7 @@ void vhost_svq_start(VhostShadowVirtqueue *svq, VirtIODevice *vdev,
svq->desc_state = g_new0(SVQDescState, svq->vring.num);
svq->desc_next = g_new0(uint16_t, svq->vring.num);
for (unsigned i = 0; i < svq->vring.num - 1; i++) {
svq->desc_next[i] = cpu_to_le16(i + 1);
svq->desc_next[i] = i + 1;
}
}
+17 -1
View File
@@ -16,6 +16,18 @@
#include "standard-headers/linux/virtio_ids.h"
#include "standard-headers/linux/virtio_snd.h"
static const VirtIOFeature feature_sizes[] = {
{.flags = 1ULL << VIRTIO_SND_F_CTLS,
.end = endof(struct virtio_snd_config, controls)},
{}
};
static const VirtIOConfigSizeParams cfg_size_params = {
.min_size = endof(struct virtio_snd_config, chmaps),
.max_size = sizeof(struct virtio_snd_config),
.feature_sizes = feature_sizes
};
static const VMStateDescription vu_snd_vmstate = {
.name = "vhost-user-snd",
.unmigratable = 1,
@@ -23,6 +35,8 @@ static const VMStateDescription vu_snd_vmstate = {
static Property vsnd_properties[] = {
DEFINE_PROP_CHR("chardev", VHostUserBase, chardev),
DEFINE_PROP_BIT64("controls", VHostUserBase,
parent_obj.host_features, VIRTIO_SND_F_CTLS, false),
DEFINE_PROP_END_OF_LIST(),
};
@@ -30,10 +44,12 @@ static void vu_snd_base_realize(DeviceState *dev, Error **errp)
{
VHostUserBase *vub = VHOST_USER_BASE(dev);
VHostUserBaseClass *vubs = VHOST_USER_BASE_GET_CLASS(dev);
VirtIODevice *vdev = &vub->parent_obj;
vub->virtio_id = VIRTIO_ID_SOUND;
vub->num_vqs = 4;
vub->config_size = sizeof(struct virtio_snd_config);
vub->config_size = virtio_get_config_size(&cfg_size_params,
vdev->host_features);
vub->vq_size = 64;
vubs->parent_realize(dev, errp);
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1589,7 +1589,7 @@ static void handle_input(VirtIODevice *vdev, VirtQueue *vq)
g_free(req.iov_base);
g_free(res.iov_base);
virtqueue_push(vq, out_elem, 0);
virtqueue_push(vq, in_elem, in_elem->in_sg->iov_len);
virtqueue_push(vq, in_elem, sz);
virtio_notify(vdev, vq);
return;
-1
View File
@@ -700,7 +700,6 @@ void xen_invalidate_map_cache(void)
bdrv_drain_all();
xen_invalidate_map_cache_single(mapcache);
xen_invalidate_map_cache_single(mapcache_grants);
}
static uint8_t *xen_replace_cache_entry_unlocked(MapCache *mc,
+2
View File
@@ -22,6 +22,8 @@
#define QEMU_ARM_BSA_H
/* These are architectural INTID values */
#define ARCH_TIMER_S_EL2_VIRT_IRQ 19
#define ARCH_TIMER_S_EL2_IRQ 20
#define VIRTUAL_PMU_IRQ 23
#define ARCH_GIC_MAINT_IRQ 25
#define ARCH_TIMER_NS_EL2_IRQ 26
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
#if defined(TARGET_I386) || defined(TARGET_X86_64)
#include "hw/i386/xen_arch_hvm.h"
#elif defined(TARGET_ARM) || defined(TARGET_ARM_64)
#elif defined(TARGET_ARM) || defined(TARGET_AARCH64)
#include "hw/arm/xen_arch_hvm.h"
#endif
+29 -26
View File
@@ -9097,35 +9097,38 @@ static void risc_hwprobe_fill_pairs(CPURISCVState *env,
}
}
static int cpu_set_valid(abi_long arg3, abi_long arg4)
/*
* If the cpumask_t of (target_cpus, cpusetsize) cannot be read: -EFAULT.
* If the cpumast_t has no bits set: -EINVAL.
* Otherwise the cpumask_t contains some bit set: 0.
* Unlike the kernel, we do not mask cpumask_t by the set of online cpus,
* nor bound the search by cpumask_size().
*/
static int nonempty_cpu_set(abi_ulong cpusetsize, abi_ptr target_cpus)
{
int ret, i, tmp;
size_t host_mask_size, target_mask_size;
unsigned long *host_mask;
unsigned char *p = lock_user(VERIFY_READ, target_cpus, cpusetsize, 1);
int ret = -TARGET_EFAULT;
/*
* cpu_set_t represent CPU masks as bit masks of type unsigned long *.
* arg3 contains the cpu count.
*/
tmp = (8 * sizeof(abi_ulong));
target_mask_size = ((arg3 + tmp - 1) / tmp) * sizeof(abi_ulong);
host_mask_size = (target_mask_size + (sizeof(*host_mask) - 1)) &
~(sizeof(*host_mask) - 1);
host_mask = alloca(host_mask_size);
ret = target_to_host_cpu_mask(host_mask, host_mask_size,
arg4, target_mask_size);
if (ret != 0) {
return ret;
}
for (i = 0 ; i < host_mask_size / sizeof(*host_mask); i++) {
if (host_mask[i] != 0) {
return 0;
if (p) {
ret = -TARGET_EINVAL;
/*
* Since we only care about the empty/non-empty state of the cpumask_t
* not the individual bits, we do not need to repartition the bits
* from target abi_ulong to host unsigned long.
*
* Note that the kernel does not round up cpusetsize to a multiple of
* sizeof(abi_ulong). After bounding cpusetsize by cpumask_size(),
* it copies exactly cpusetsize bytes into a zeroed buffer.
*/
for (abi_ulong i = 0; i < cpusetsize; ++i) {
if (p[i]) {
ret = 0;
break;
}
}
unlock_user(p, target_cpus, 0);
}
return -TARGET_EINVAL;
return ret;
}
static abi_long do_riscv_hwprobe(CPUArchState *cpu_env, abi_long arg1,
@@ -9142,7 +9145,7 @@ static abi_long do_riscv_hwprobe(CPUArchState *cpu_env, abi_long arg1,
/* check cpu_set */
if (arg3 != 0) {
ret = cpu_set_valid(arg3, arg4);
ret = nonempty_cpu_set(arg3, arg4);
if (ret != 0) {
return ret;
}
+34 -10
View File
@@ -381,9 +381,12 @@ NetClientState *qemu_get_peer(NetClientState *nc, int queue_index)
return ncs->peer;
}
static void qemu_cleanup_net_client(NetClientState *nc)
static void qemu_cleanup_net_client(NetClientState *nc,
bool remove_from_net_clients)
{
QTAILQ_REMOVE(&net_clients, nc, next);
if (remove_from_net_clients) {
QTAILQ_REMOVE(&net_clients, nc, next);
}
if (nc->info->cleanup) {
nc->info->cleanup(nc);
@@ -425,7 +428,13 @@ void qemu_del_net_client(NetClientState *nc)
object_unparent(OBJECT(nf));
}
/* If there is a peer NIC, delete and cleanup client, but do not free. */
/*
* If there is a peer NIC, transfer ownership to it. Delete the client
* from net_client list but do not cleanup nor free. This way NIC can
* still access to members of the backend.
*
* The cleanup and free will be done when the NIC is free.
*/
if (nc->peer && nc->peer->info->type == NET_CLIENT_DRIVER_NIC) {
NICState *nic = qemu_get_nic(nc->peer);
if (nic->peer_deleted) {
@@ -435,21 +444,18 @@ void qemu_del_net_client(NetClientState *nc)
for (i = 0; i < queues; i++) {
ncs[i]->peer->link_down = true;
QTAILQ_REMOVE(&net_clients, ncs[i], next);
}
if (nc->peer->info->link_status_changed) {
nc->peer->info->link_status_changed(nc->peer);
}
for (i = 0; i < queues; i++) {
qemu_cleanup_net_client(ncs[i]);
}
return;
}
for (i = 0; i < queues; i++) {
qemu_cleanup_net_client(ncs[i]);
qemu_cleanup_net_client(ncs[i], true);
qemu_free_net_client(ncs[i]);
}
}
@@ -462,8 +468,12 @@ void qemu_del_nic(NICState *nic)
for (i = 0; i < queues; i++) {
NetClientState *nc = qemu_get_subqueue(nic, i);
/* If this is a peer NIC and peer has already been deleted, free it now. */
/*
* If this is a peer NIC and peer has already been deleted, clean it up
* and free it now.
*/
if (nic->peer_deleted) {
qemu_cleanup_net_client(nc->peer, false);
qemu_free_net_client(nc->peer);
} else if (nc->peer) {
/* if there are RX packets pending, complete them */
@@ -474,7 +484,7 @@ void qemu_del_nic(NICState *nic)
for (i = queues - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
NetClientState *nc = qemu_get_subqueue(nic, i);
qemu_cleanup_net_client(nc);
qemu_cleanup_net_client(nc, true);
qemu_free_net_client(nc);
}
@@ -1678,6 +1688,9 @@ void net_cleanup(void)
* of the latest NET_CLIENT_DRIVER_NIC, and operate on *p as we walk
* the list.
*
* However, the NIC may have peers that trust to be clean beyond this
* point. For example, if they have been removed with device_del.
*
* The 'nc' variable isn't part of the list traversal; it's purely
* for convenience as too much '(*p)->' has a tendency to make the
* readers' eyes bleed.
@@ -1685,6 +1698,17 @@ void net_cleanup(void)
while (*p) {
nc = *p;
if (nc->info->type == NET_CLIENT_DRIVER_NIC) {
NICState *nic = qemu_get_nic(nc);
if (nic->peer_deleted) {
int queues = MAX(nic->conf->peers.queues, 1);
for (int i = 0; i < queues; i++) {
nc = qemu_get_subqueue(nic, i);
qemu_cleanup_net_client(nc->peer, false);
}
}
/* Skip NET_CLIENT_DRIVER_NIC entries */
p = &QTAILQ_NEXT(nc, next);
} else {
+13 -8
View File
@@ -224,14 +224,6 @@ static void vhost_vdpa_cleanup(NetClientState *nc)
{
VhostVDPAState *s = DO_UPCAST(VhostVDPAState, nc, nc);
/*
* If a peer NIC is attached, do not cleanup anything.
* Cleanup will happen as a part of qemu_cleanup() -> net_cleanup()
* when the guest is shutting down.
*/
if (nc->peer && nc->peer->info->type == NET_CLIENT_DRIVER_NIC) {
return;
}
munmap(s->cvq_cmd_out_buffer, vhost_vdpa_net_cvq_cmd_page_len());
munmap(s->status, vhost_vdpa_net_cvq_cmd_page_len());
if (s->vhost_net) {
@@ -270,6 +262,18 @@ static bool vhost_vdpa_has_ufo(NetClientState *nc)
}
/*
* FIXME: vhost_vdpa doesn't have an API to "set h/w endianness". But it's
* reasonable to assume that h/w is LE by default, because LE is what
* virtio 1.0 and later ask for. So, this function just says "yes, the h/w is
* LE". Otherwise, on a BE machine, higher-level code would mistakely think
* the h/w is BE and can't support VDPA for a virtio 1.0 client.
*/
static int vhost_vdpa_set_vnet_le(NetClientState *nc, bool enable)
{
return 0;
}
static bool vhost_vdpa_check_peer_type(NetClientState *nc, ObjectClass *oc,
Error **errp)
{
@@ -437,6 +441,7 @@ static NetClientInfo net_vhost_vdpa_info = {
.cleanup = vhost_vdpa_cleanup,
.has_vnet_hdr = vhost_vdpa_has_vnet_hdr,
.has_ufo = vhost_vdpa_has_ufo,
.set_vnet_le = vhost_vdpa_set_vnet_le,
.check_peer_type = vhost_vdpa_check_peer_type,
.set_steering_ebpf = vhost_vdpa_set_steering_ebpf,
};
+5 -1
View File
@@ -1868,7 +1868,11 @@ static void ram_block_add(RAMBlock *new_block, Error **errp)
if (new_block->flags & RAM_GUEST_MEMFD) {
int ret;
assert(kvm_enabled());
if (!kvm_enabled()) {
error_setg(errp, "cannot set up private guest memory for %s: KVM required",
object_get_typename(OBJECT(current_machine->cgs)));
goto out_free;
}
assert(new_block->guest_memfd < 0);
ret = ram_block_discard_require(true);
+4
View File
@@ -2078,6 +2078,10 @@ static void arm_cpu_realizefn(DeviceState *dev, Error **errp)
arm_gt_stimer_cb, cpu);
cpu->gt_timer[GTIMER_HYPVIRT] = timer_new(QEMU_CLOCK_VIRTUAL, scale,
arm_gt_hvtimer_cb, cpu);
cpu->gt_timer[GTIMER_S_EL2_PHYS] = timer_new(QEMU_CLOCK_VIRTUAL, scale,
arm_gt_sel2timer_cb, cpu);
cpu->gt_timer[GTIMER_S_EL2_VIRT] = timer_new(QEMU_CLOCK_VIRTUAL, scale,
arm_gt_sel2vtimer_cb, cpu);
}
#endif
+8
View File
@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@
#define EXCP_NMI 26
#define EXCP_VINMI 27
#define EXCP_VFNMI 28
#define EXCP_MON_TRAP 29 /* AArch32 trap to Monitor mode */
/* NB: add new EXCP_ defines to the array in arm_log_exception() too */
#define ARMV7M_EXCP_RESET 1
@@ -1139,6 +1140,8 @@ void arm_gt_vtimer_cb(void *opaque);
void arm_gt_htimer_cb(void *opaque);
void arm_gt_stimer_cb(void *opaque);
void arm_gt_hvtimer_cb(void *opaque);
void arm_gt_sel2timer_cb(void *opaque);
void arm_gt_sel2vtimer_cb(void *opaque);
unsigned int gt_cntfrq_period_ns(ARMCPU *cpu);
void gt_rme_post_el_change(ARMCPU *cpu, void *opaque);
@@ -2561,6 +2564,11 @@ static inline bool arm_is_secure_below_el3(CPUARMState *env)
return false;
}
static inline bool arm_is_el3_or_mon(CPUARMState *env)
{
return false;
}
static inline ARMSecuritySpace arm_security_space(CPUARMState *env)
{
return ARMSS_NonSecure;
+2 -1
View File
@@ -880,7 +880,8 @@ static CPAccessResult access_tdcc(CPUARMState *env, const ARMCPRegInfo *ri,
if (el < 2 && (mdcr_el2_tda || mdcr_el2_tdcc)) {
return CP_ACCESS_TRAP_EL2;
}
if (el < 3 && ((env->cp15.mdcr_el3 & MDCR_TDA) || mdcr_el3_tdcc)) {
if (!arm_is_el3_or_mon(env) &&
((env->cp15.mdcr_el3 & MDCR_TDA) || mdcr_el3_tdcc)) {
return CP_ACCESS_TRAP_EL3;
}
return CP_ACCESS_OK;
+3 -1
View File
@@ -15,7 +15,9 @@ enum {
GTIMER_HYP = 2,
GTIMER_SEC = 3,
GTIMER_HYPVIRT = 4,
#define NUM_GTIMERS 5
GTIMER_S_EL2_PHYS = 5, /* CNTHPS_* ; only if FEAT_SEL2 */
GTIMER_S_EL2_VIRT = 6, /* CNTHVS_* ; only if FEAT_SEL2 */
#define NUM_GTIMERS 7
};
#endif
+284 -65
View File
@@ -2652,7 +2652,10 @@ static CPAccessResult gt_stimer_access(CPUARMState *env,
switch (arm_current_el(env)) {
case 1:
if (!arm_is_secure(env)) {
return CP_ACCESS_TRAP;
return CP_ACCESS_TRAP_UNCATEGORIZED;
}
if (arm_is_el2_enabled(env)) {
return CP_ACCESS_TRAP_UNCATEGORIZED;
}
if (!(env->cp15.scr_el3 & SCR_ST)) {
return CP_ACCESS_TRAP_EL3;
@@ -2660,7 +2663,7 @@ static CPAccessResult gt_stimer_access(CPUARMState *env,
return CP_ACCESS_OK;
case 0:
case 2:
return CP_ACCESS_TRAP;
return CP_ACCESS_TRAP_UNCATEGORIZED;
case 3:
return CP_ACCESS_OK;
default:
@@ -2668,6 +2671,45 @@ static CPAccessResult gt_stimer_access(CPUARMState *env,
}
}
static CPAccessResult gt_sel2timer_access(CPUARMState *env,
const ARMCPRegInfo *ri,
bool isread)
{
/*
* The AArch64 register view of the secure EL2 timers are mostly
* accessible from EL3 and EL2 although can also be trapped to EL2
* from EL1 depending on nested virt config.
*/
switch (arm_current_el(env)) {
case 0: /* UNDEFINED */
return CP_ACCESS_TRAP_UNCATEGORIZED;
case 1:
if (!arm_is_secure(env)) {
/* UNDEFINED */
return CP_ACCESS_TRAP_UNCATEGORIZED;
} else if (arm_hcr_el2_eff(env) & HCR_NV) {
/* Aarch64.SystemAccessTrap(EL2, 0x18) */
return CP_ACCESS_TRAP_EL2;
}
/* UNDEFINED */
return CP_ACCESS_TRAP_UNCATEGORIZED;
case 2:
if (!arm_is_secure(env)) {
/* UNDEFINED */
return CP_ACCESS_TRAP_UNCATEGORIZED;
}
return CP_ACCESS_OK;
case 3:
if (env->cp15.scr_el3 & SCR_EEL2) {
return CP_ACCESS_OK;
} else {
return CP_ACCESS_TRAP_UNCATEGORIZED;
}
default:
g_assert_not_reached();
}
}
uint64_t gt_get_countervalue(CPUARMState *env)
{
ARMCPU *cpu = env_archcpu(env);
@@ -2719,12 +2761,80 @@ static uint64_t gt_phys_raw_cnt_offset(CPUARMState *env)
return 0;
}
static uint64_t gt_phys_cnt_offset(CPUARMState *env)
static uint64_t gt_indirect_access_timer_offset(CPUARMState *env, int timeridx)
{
if (arm_current_el(env) >= 2) {
/*
* Return the timer offset to use for indirect accesses to the timer.
* This is the Offset value as defined in D12.2.4.1 "Operation of the
* CompareValue views of the timers".
*
* The condition here is not always the same as the condition for
* whether to apply an offset register when doing a direct read of
* the counter sysreg; those conditions are described in the
* access pseudocode for each counter register.
*/
switch (timeridx) {
case GTIMER_PHYS:
return gt_phys_raw_cnt_offset(env);
case GTIMER_VIRT:
return env->cp15.cntvoff_el2;
case GTIMER_HYP:
case GTIMER_SEC:
case GTIMER_HYPVIRT:
case GTIMER_S_EL2_PHYS:
case GTIMER_S_EL2_VIRT:
return 0;
default:
g_assert_not_reached();
}
}
uint64_t gt_direct_access_timer_offset(CPUARMState *env, int timeridx)
{
/*
* Return the timer offset to use for direct accesses to the
* counter registers CNTPCT and CNTVCT, and for direct accesses
* to the CNT*_TVAL registers.
*
* This isn't exactly the same as the indirect-access offset,
* because here we also care about what EL the register access
* is being made from.
*
* This corresponds to the access pseudocode for the registers.
*/
uint64_t hcr;
switch (timeridx) {
case GTIMER_PHYS:
if (arm_current_el(env) >= 2) {
return 0;
}
return gt_phys_raw_cnt_offset(env);
case GTIMER_VIRT:
switch (arm_current_el(env)) {
case 2:
hcr = arm_hcr_el2_eff(env);
if (hcr & HCR_E2H) {
return 0;
}
break;
case 0:
hcr = arm_hcr_el2_eff(env);
if ((hcr & (HCR_E2H | HCR_TGE)) == (HCR_E2H | HCR_TGE)) {
return 0;
}
break;
}
return env->cp15.cntvoff_el2;
case GTIMER_HYP:
case GTIMER_SEC:
case GTIMER_HYPVIRT:
case GTIMER_S_EL2_PHYS:
case GTIMER_S_EL2_VIRT:
return 0;
default:
g_assert_not_reached();
}
return gt_phys_raw_cnt_offset(env);
}
static void gt_recalc_timer(ARMCPU *cpu, int timeridx)
@@ -2736,8 +2846,7 @@ static void gt_recalc_timer(ARMCPU *cpu, int timeridx)
* Timer enabled: calculate and set current ISTATUS, irq, and
* reset timer to when ISTATUS next has to change
*/
uint64_t offset = timeridx == GTIMER_VIRT ?
cpu->env.cp15.cntvoff_el2 : gt_phys_raw_cnt_offset(&cpu->env);
uint64_t offset = gt_indirect_access_timer_offset(&cpu->env, timeridx);
uint64_t count = gt_get_countervalue(&cpu->env);
/* Note that this must be unsigned 64 bit arithmetic: */
int istatus = count - offset >= gt->cval;
@@ -2800,34 +2909,14 @@ static void gt_timer_reset(CPUARMState *env, const ARMCPRegInfo *ri,
static uint64_t gt_cnt_read(CPUARMState *env, const ARMCPRegInfo *ri)
{
return gt_get_countervalue(env) - gt_phys_cnt_offset(env);
}
uint64_t gt_virt_cnt_offset(CPUARMState *env)
{
uint64_t hcr;
switch (arm_current_el(env)) {
case 2:
hcr = arm_hcr_el2_eff(env);
if (hcr & HCR_E2H) {
return 0;
}
break;
case 0:
hcr = arm_hcr_el2_eff(env);
if ((hcr & (HCR_E2H | HCR_TGE)) == (HCR_E2H | HCR_TGE)) {
return 0;
}
break;
}
return env->cp15.cntvoff_el2;
uint64_t offset = gt_direct_access_timer_offset(env, GTIMER_PHYS);
return gt_get_countervalue(env) - offset;
}
static uint64_t gt_virt_cnt_read(CPUARMState *env, const ARMCPRegInfo *ri)
{
return gt_get_countervalue(env) - gt_virt_cnt_offset(env);
uint64_t offset = gt_direct_access_timer_offset(env, GTIMER_VIRT);
return gt_get_countervalue(env) - offset;
}
static void gt_cval_write(CPUARMState *env, const ARMCPRegInfo *ri,
@@ -2839,45 +2928,36 @@ static void gt_cval_write(CPUARMState *env, const ARMCPRegInfo *ri,
gt_recalc_timer(env_archcpu(env), timeridx);
}
static uint64_t do_tval_read(CPUARMState *env, int timeridx, uint64_t offset)
{
return (uint32_t)(env->cp15.c14_timer[timeridx].cval -
(gt_get_countervalue(env) - offset));
}
static uint64_t gt_tval_read(CPUARMState *env, const ARMCPRegInfo *ri,
int timeridx)
{
uint64_t offset = 0;
uint64_t offset = gt_direct_access_timer_offset(env, timeridx);
switch (timeridx) {
case GTIMER_VIRT:
case GTIMER_HYPVIRT:
offset = gt_virt_cnt_offset(env);
break;
case GTIMER_PHYS:
offset = gt_phys_cnt_offset(env);
break;
}
return do_tval_read(env, timeridx, offset);
}
return (uint32_t)(env->cp15.c14_timer[timeridx].cval -
(gt_get_countervalue(env) - offset));
static void do_tval_write(CPUARMState *env, int timeridx, uint64_t value,
uint64_t offset)
{
trace_arm_gt_tval_write(timeridx, value);
env->cp15.c14_timer[timeridx].cval = gt_get_countervalue(env) - offset +
sextract64(value, 0, 32);
gt_recalc_timer(env_archcpu(env), timeridx);
}
static void gt_tval_write(CPUARMState *env, const ARMCPRegInfo *ri,
int timeridx,
uint64_t value)
{
uint64_t offset = 0;
uint64_t offset = gt_direct_access_timer_offset(env, timeridx);
switch (timeridx) {
case GTIMER_VIRT:
case GTIMER_HYPVIRT:
offset = gt_virt_cnt_offset(env);
break;
case GTIMER_PHYS:
offset = gt_phys_cnt_offset(env);
break;
}
trace_arm_gt_tval_write(timeridx, value);
env->cp15.c14_timer[timeridx].cval = gt_get_countervalue(env) - offset +
sextract64(value, 0, 32);
gt_recalc_timer(env_archcpu(env), timeridx);
do_tval_write(env, timeridx, value, offset);
}
static void gt_ctl_write(CPUARMState *env, const ARMCPRegInfo *ri,
@@ -3009,13 +3089,21 @@ static void gt_virt_cval_write(CPUARMState *env, const ARMCPRegInfo *ri,
static uint64_t gt_virt_tval_read(CPUARMState *env, const ARMCPRegInfo *ri)
{
return gt_tval_read(env, ri, GTIMER_VIRT);
/*
* This is CNTV_TVAL_EL02; unlike the underlying CNTV_TVAL_EL0
* we always apply CNTVOFF_EL2. Special case that here rather
* than going into the generic gt_tval_read() and then having
* to re-detect that it's this register.
* Note that the accessfn/perms mean we know we're at EL2 or EL3 here.
*/
return do_tval_read(env, GTIMER_VIRT, env->cp15.cntvoff_el2);
}
static void gt_virt_tval_write(CPUARMState *env, const ARMCPRegInfo *ri,
uint64_t value)
{
gt_tval_write(env, ri, GTIMER_VIRT, value);
/* Similarly for writes to CNTV_TVAL_EL02 */
do_tval_write(env, GTIMER_VIRT, value, env->cp15.cntvoff_el2);
}
static void gt_virt_ctl_write(CPUARMState *env, const ARMCPRegInfo *ri,
@@ -3175,6 +3263,62 @@ static void gt_sec_ctl_write(CPUARMState *env, const ARMCPRegInfo *ri,
gt_ctl_write(env, ri, GTIMER_SEC, value);
}
static void gt_sec_pel2_timer_reset(CPUARMState *env, const ARMCPRegInfo *ri)
{
gt_timer_reset(env, ri, GTIMER_S_EL2_PHYS);
}
static void gt_sec_pel2_cval_write(CPUARMState *env, const ARMCPRegInfo *ri,
uint64_t value)
{
gt_cval_write(env, ri, GTIMER_S_EL2_PHYS, value);
}
static uint64_t gt_sec_pel2_tval_read(CPUARMState *env, const ARMCPRegInfo *ri)
{
return gt_tval_read(env, ri, GTIMER_S_EL2_PHYS);
}
static void gt_sec_pel2_tval_write(CPUARMState *env, const ARMCPRegInfo *ri,
uint64_t value)
{
gt_tval_write(env, ri, GTIMER_S_EL2_PHYS, value);
}
static void gt_sec_pel2_ctl_write(CPUARMState *env, const ARMCPRegInfo *ri,
uint64_t value)
{
gt_ctl_write(env, ri, GTIMER_S_EL2_PHYS, value);
}
static void gt_sec_vel2_timer_reset(CPUARMState *env, const ARMCPRegInfo *ri)
{
gt_timer_reset(env, ri, GTIMER_S_EL2_VIRT);
}
static void gt_sec_vel2_cval_write(CPUARMState *env, const ARMCPRegInfo *ri,
uint64_t value)
{
gt_cval_write(env, ri, GTIMER_S_EL2_VIRT, value);
}
static uint64_t gt_sec_vel2_tval_read(CPUARMState *env, const ARMCPRegInfo *ri)
{
return gt_tval_read(env, ri, GTIMER_S_EL2_VIRT);
}
static void gt_sec_vel2_tval_write(CPUARMState *env, const ARMCPRegInfo *ri,
uint64_t value)
{
gt_tval_write(env, ri, GTIMER_S_EL2_VIRT, value);
}
static void gt_sec_vel2_ctl_write(CPUARMState *env, const ARMCPRegInfo *ri,
uint64_t value)
{
gt_ctl_write(env, ri, GTIMER_S_EL2_VIRT, value);
}
static void gt_hv_timer_reset(CPUARMState *env, const ARMCPRegInfo *ri)
{
gt_timer_reset(env, ri, GTIMER_HYPVIRT);
@@ -3231,6 +3375,20 @@ void arm_gt_stimer_cb(void *opaque)
gt_recalc_timer(cpu, GTIMER_SEC);
}
void arm_gt_sel2timer_cb(void *opaque)
{
ARMCPU *cpu = opaque;
gt_recalc_timer(cpu, GTIMER_S_EL2_PHYS);
}
void arm_gt_sel2vtimer_cb(void *opaque)
{
ARMCPU *cpu = opaque;
gt_recalc_timer(cpu, GTIMER_S_EL2_VIRT);
}
void arm_gt_hvtimer_cb(void *opaque)
{
ARMCPU *cpu = opaque;
@@ -3868,7 +4026,7 @@ static CPAccessResult at_e012_access(CPUARMState *env, const ARMCPRegInfo *ri,
* scr_write() ensures that the NSE bit is not set otherwise.
*/
if ((env->cp15.scr_el3 & (SCR_NSE | SCR_NS)) == SCR_NSE) {
return CP_ACCESS_TRAP;
return CP_ACCESS_TRAP_UNCATEGORIZED;
}
return CP_ACCESS_OK;
}
@@ -3878,7 +4036,7 @@ static CPAccessResult at_s1e2_access(CPUARMState *env, const ARMCPRegInfo *ri,
{
if (arm_current_el(env) == 3 &&
!(env->cp15.scr_el3 & (SCR_NS | SCR_EEL2))) {
return CP_ACCESS_TRAP;
return CP_ACCESS_TRAP_UNCATEGORIZED;
}
return at_e012_access(env, ri, isread);
}
@@ -6613,6 +6771,56 @@ static const ARMCPRegInfo el2_sec_cp_reginfo[] = {
.access = PL2_RW, .accessfn = sel2_access,
.nv2_redirect_offset = 0x48,
.fieldoffset = offsetof(CPUARMState, cp15.vstcr_el2) },
#ifndef CONFIG_USER_ONLY
/* Secure EL2 Physical Timer */
{ .name = "CNTHPS_TVAL_EL2", .state = ARM_CP_STATE_AA64,
.opc0 = 3, .opc1 = 4, .crn = 14, .crm = 5, .opc2 = 0,
.type = ARM_CP_NO_RAW | ARM_CP_IO, .access = PL2_RW,
.accessfn = gt_sel2timer_access,
.readfn = gt_sec_pel2_tval_read,
.writefn = gt_sec_pel2_tval_write,
.resetfn = gt_sec_pel2_timer_reset,
},
{ .name = "CNTHPS_CTL_EL2", .state = ARM_CP_STATE_AA64,
.opc0 = 3, .opc1 = 4, .crn = 14, .crm = 5, .opc2 = 1,
.type = ARM_CP_IO, .access = PL2_RW,
.accessfn = gt_sel2timer_access,
.fieldoffset = offsetof(CPUARMState, cp15.c14_timer[GTIMER_S_EL2_PHYS].ctl),
.resetvalue = 0,
.writefn = gt_sec_pel2_ctl_write, .raw_writefn = raw_write,
},
{ .name = "CNTHPS_CVAL_EL2", .state = ARM_CP_STATE_AA64,
.opc0 = 3, .opc1 = 4, .crn = 14, .crm = 5, .opc2 = 2,
.type = ARM_CP_IO, .access = PL2_RW,
.accessfn = gt_sel2timer_access,
.fieldoffset = offsetof(CPUARMState, cp15.c14_timer[GTIMER_S_EL2_PHYS].cval),
.writefn = gt_sec_pel2_cval_write, .raw_writefn = raw_write,
},
/* Secure EL2 Virtual Timer */
{ .name = "CNTHVS_TVAL_EL2", .state = ARM_CP_STATE_AA64,
.opc0 = 3, .opc1 = 4, .crn = 14, .crm = 4, .opc2 = 0,
.type = ARM_CP_NO_RAW | ARM_CP_IO, .access = PL2_RW,
.accessfn = gt_sel2timer_access,
.readfn = gt_sec_vel2_tval_read,
.writefn = gt_sec_vel2_tval_write,
.resetfn = gt_sec_vel2_timer_reset,
},
{ .name = "CNTHVS_CTL_EL2", .state = ARM_CP_STATE_AA64,
.opc0 = 3, .opc1 = 4, .crn = 14, .crm = 4, .opc2 = 1,
.type = ARM_CP_IO, .access = PL2_RW,
.accessfn = gt_sel2timer_access,
.fieldoffset = offsetof(CPUARMState, cp15.c14_timer[GTIMER_S_EL2_VIRT].ctl),
.resetvalue = 0,
.writefn = gt_sec_vel2_ctl_write, .raw_writefn = raw_write,
},
{ .name = "CNTHVS_CVAL_EL2", .state = ARM_CP_STATE_AA64,
.opc0 = 3, .opc1 = 4, .crn = 14, .crm = 4, .opc2 = 2,
.type = ARM_CP_IO, .access = PL2_RW,
.accessfn = gt_sel2timer_access,
.fieldoffset = offsetof(CPUARMState, cp15.c14_timer[GTIMER_S_EL2_VIRT].cval),
.writefn = gt_sec_vel2_cval_write, .raw_writefn = raw_write,
},
#endif
};
static CPAccessResult nsacr_access(CPUARMState *env, const ARMCPRegInfo *ri,
@@ -7052,7 +7260,7 @@ static CPAccessResult access_terr(CPUARMState *env, const ARMCPRegInfo *ri,
if (el < 2 && (arm_hcr_el2_eff(env) & HCR_TERR)) {
return CP_ACCESS_TRAP_EL2;
}
if (el < 3 && (env->cp15.scr_el3 & SCR_TERR)) {
if (!arm_is_el3_or_mon(env) && (env->cp15.scr_el3 & SCR_TERR)) {
return CP_ACCESS_TRAP_EL3;
}
return CP_ACCESS_OK;
@@ -7737,8 +7945,8 @@ static CPAccessResult access_lor_other(CPUARMState *env,
const ARMCPRegInfo *ri, bool isread)
{
if (arm_is_secure_below_el3(env)) {
/* Access denied in secure mode. */
return CP_ACCESS_TRAP;
/* UNDEF if SCR_EL3.NS == 0 */
return CP_ACCESS_TRAP_UNCATEGORIZED;
}
return access_lor_ns(env, ri, isread);
}
@@ -10858,6 +11066,7 @@ void arm_log_exception(CPUState *cs)
[EXCP_NMI] = "NMI",
[EXCP_VINMI] = "Virtual IRQ NMI",
[EXCP_VFNMI] = "Virtual FIQ NMI",
[EXCP_MON_TRAP] = "Monitor Trap",
};
if (idx >= 0 && idx < ARRAY_SIZE(excnames)) {
@@ -11424,6 +11633,16 @@ static void arm_cpu_do_interrupt_aarch32(CPUState *cs)
mask = CPSR_A | CPSR_I | CPSR_F;
offset = 0;
break;
case EXCP_MON_TRAP:
new_mode = ARM_CPU_MODE_MON;
addr = 0x04;
mask = CPSR_A | CPSR_I | CPSR_F;
if (env->thumb) {
offset = 2;
} else {
offset = 4;
}
break;
default:
cpu_abort(cs, "Unhandled exception 0x%x\n", cs->exception_index);
return; /* Never happens. Keep compiler happy. */
+16
View File
@@ -897,6 +897,18 @@ static bool hvf_arm_get_host_cpu_features(ARMHostCPUFeatures *ahcf)
clamp_id_aa64mmfr0_parange_to_ipa_size(&host_isar.id_aa64mmfr0);
/*
* Disable SME, which is not properly handled by QEMU hvf yet.
* To allow this through we would need to:
* - make sure that the SME state is correctly handled in the
* get_registers/put_registers functions
* - get the SME-specific CPU properties to work with accelerators
* other than TCG
* - fix any assumptions we made that SME implies SVE (since
* on the M4 there is SME but not SVE)
*/
host_isar.id_aa64pfr1 &= ~R_ID_AA64PFR1_SME_MASK;
ahcf->isar = host_isar;
/*
@@ -1962,6 +1974,7 @@ int hvf_vcpu_exec(CPUState *cpu)
bool isv = syndrome & ARM_EL_ISV;
bool iswrite = (syndrome >> 6) & 1;
bool s1ptw = (syndrome >> 7) & 1;
bool sse = (syndrome >> 21) & 1;
uint32_t sas = (syndrome >> 22) & 3;
uint32_t len = 1 << sas;
uint32_t srt = (syndrome >> 16) & 0x1f;
@@ -1989,6 +2002,9 @@ int hvf_vcpu_exec(CPUState *cpu)
address_space_read(&address_space_memory,
hvf_exit->exception.physical_address,
MEMTXATTRS_UNSPECIFIED, &val, len);
if (sse) {
val = sextract64(val, 0, len * 8);
}
hvf_set_reg(cpu, srt, val);
}
+3 -2
View File
@@ -1814,7 +1814,8 @@ int delete_hw_watchpoint(target_ulong addr, target_ulong len, int type);
uint64_t gt_get_countervalue(CPUARMState *env);
/*
* Return the currently applicable offset between the system counter
* and CNTVCT_EL0 (this will be either 0 or the value of CNTVOFF_EL2).
* and the counter for the specified timer, as used for direct register
* accesses.
*/
uint64_t gt_virt_cnt_offset(CPUARMState *env);
uint64_t gt_direct_access_timer_offset(CPUARMState *env, int timeridx);
#endif
+37 -21
View File
@@ -313,15 +313,19 @@ void HELPER(check_bxj_trap)(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t rm)
}
#ifndef CONFIG_USER_ONLY
/* Function checks whether WFx (WFI/WFE) instructions are set up to be trapped.
/*
* Function checks whether WFx (WFI/WFE) instructions are set up to be trapped.
* The function returns the target EL (1-3) if the instruction is to be trapped;
* otherwise it returns 0 indicating it is not trapped.
* For a trap, *excp is updated with the EXCP_* trap type to use.
*/
static inline int check_wfx_trap(CPUARMState *env, bool is_wfe)
static inline int check_wfx_trap(CPUARMState *env, bool is_wfe, uint32_t *excp)
{
int cur_el = arm_current_el(env);
uint64_t mask;
*excp = EXCP_UDEF;
if (arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_M)) {
/* M profile cores can never trap WFI/WFE. */
return 0;
@@ -331,18 +335,9 @@ static inline int check_wfx_trap(CPUARMState *env, bool is_wfe)
* WFx instructions being trapped to EL1. These trap bits don't exist in v7.
*/
if (cur_el < 1 && arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_V8)) {
int target_el;
mask = is_wfe ? SCTLR_nTWE : SCTLR_nTWI;
if (arm_is_secure_below_el3(env) && !arm_el_is_aa64(env, 3)) {
/* Secure EL0 and Secure PL1 is at EL3 */
target_el = 3;
} else {
target_el = 1;
}
if (!(env->cp15.sctlr_el[target_el] & mask)) {
return target_el;
if (!(arm_sctlr(env, cur_el) & mask)) {
return exception_target_el(env);
}
}
@@ -358,9 +353,12 @@ static inline int check_wfx_trap(CPUARMState *env, bool is_wfe)
}
/* We are not trapping to EL1 or EL2; trap to EL3 if SCR_EL3 requires it */
if (cur_el < 3) {
if (arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_V8) && !arm_is_el3_or_mon(env)) {
mask = (is_wfe) ? SCR_TWE : SCR_TWI;
if (env->cp15.scr_el3 & mask) {
if (!arm_el_is_aa64(env, 3)) {
*excp = EXCP_MON_TRAP;
}
return 3;
}
}
@@ -383,7 +381,8 @@ void HELPER(wfi)(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t insn_len)
return;
#else
CPUState *cs = env_cpu(env);
int target_el = check_wfx_trap(env, false);
uint32_t excp;
int target_el = check_wfx_trap(env, false, &excp);
if (cpu_has_work(cs)) {
/* Don't bother to go into our "low power state" if
@@ -399,7 +398,7 @@ void HELPER(wfi)(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t insn_len)
env->regs[15] -= insn_len;
}
raise_exception(env, EXCP_UDEF, syn_wfx(1, 0xe, 0, insn_len == 2),
raise_exception(env, excp, syn_wfx(1, 0xe, 0, insn_len == 2),
target_el);
}
@@ -424,10 +423,17 @@ void HELPER(wfit)(CPUARMState *env, uint64_t timeout)
#else
ARMCPU *cpu = env_archcpu(env);
CPUState *cs = env_cpu(env);
int target_el = check_wfx_trap(env, false);
uint32_t excp;
int target_el = check_wfx_trap(env, false, &excp);
/* The WFIT should time out when CNTVCT_EL0 >= the specified value. */
uint64_t cntval = gt_get_countervalue(env);
uint64_t offset = gt_virt_cnt_offset(env);
/*
* We want the value that we would get if we read CNTVCT_EL0 from
* the current exception level, so the direct_access offset, not
* the indirect_access one. Compare the pseudocode LocalTimeoutEvent(),
* which calls VirtualCounterTimer().
*/
uint64_t offset = gt_direct_access_timer_offset(env, GTIMER_VIRT);
uint64_t cntvct = cntval - offset;
uint64_t nexttick;
@@ -441,8 +447,7 @@ void HELPER(wfit)(CPUARMState *env, uint64_t timeout)
if (target_el) {
env->pc -= 4;
raise_exception(env, EXCP_UDEF, syn_wfx(1, 0xe, 0, false),
target_el);
raise_exception(env, excp, syn_wfx(1, 0xe, 0, false), target_el);
}
if (uadd64_overflow(timeout, offset, &nexttick)) {
@@ -758,6 +763,7 @@ const void *HELPER(access_check_cp_reg)(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t key,
const ARMCPRegInfo *ri = get_arm_cp_reginfo(cpu->cp_regs, key);
CPAccessResult res = CP_ACCESS_OK;
int target_el;
uint32_t excp;
assert(ri != NULL);
@@ -842,8 +848,18 @@ const void *HELPER(access_check_cp_reg)(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t key,
}
fail:
excp = EXCP_UDEF;
switch (res & ~CP_ACCESS_EL_MASK) {
case CP_ACCESS_TRAP:
/*
* If EL3 is AArch32 then there's no syndrome register; the cases
* where we would raise a SystemAccessTrap to AArch64 EL3 all become
* raising a Monitor trap exception. (Because there's no visible
* syndrome it doesn't matter what we pass to raise_exception().)
*/
if ((res & CP_ACCESS_EL_MASK) == 3 && !arm_el_is_aa64(env, 3)) {
excp = EXCP_MON_TRAP;
}
break;
case CP_ACCESS_TRAP_UNCATEGORIZED:
/* Only CP_ACCESS_TRAP traps are direct to a specified EL */
@@ -879,7 +895,7 @@ const void *HELPER(access_check_cp_reg)(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t key,
g_assert_not_reached();
}
raise_exception(env, EXCP_UDEF, syndrome, target_el);
raise_exception(env, excp, syndrome, target_el);
}
const void *HELPER(lookup_cp_reg)(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t key)
+19 -18
View File
@@ -1215,14 +1215,14 @@ static bool fp_access_check_only(DisasContext *s)
{
if (s->fp_excp_el) {
assert(!s->fp_access_checked);
s->fp_access_checked = true;
s->fp_access_checked = -1;
gen_exception_insn_el(s, 0, EXCP_UDEF,
syn_fp_access_trap(1, 0xe, false, 0),
s->fp_excp_el);
return false;
}
s->fp_access_checked = true;
s->fp_access_checked = 1;
return true;
}
@@ -1247,23 +1247,23 @@ static bool fp_access_check(DisasContext *s)
bool sve_access_check(DisasContext *s)
{
if (s->pstate_sm || !dc_isar_feature(aa64_sve, s)) {
bool ret;
assert(dc_isar_feature(aa64_sme, s));
if (!sme_sm_enabled_check(s)) {
goto fail_exit;
}
} else if (s->sve_excp_el) {
ret = sme_sm_enabled_check(s);
s->sve_access_checked = (ret ? 1 : -1);
return ret;
}
if (s->sve_excp_el) {
/* Assert that we only raise one exception per instruction. */
assert(!s->sve_access_checked);
gen_exception_insn_el(s, 0, EXCP_UDEF,
syn_sve_access_trap(), s->sve_excp_el);
goto fail_exit;
s->sve_access_checked = -1;
return false;
}
s->sve_access_checked = true;
s->sve_access_checked = 1;
return fp_access_check(s);
fail_exit:
/* Assert that we only raise one exception per instruction. */
assert(!s->sve_access_checked);
s->sve_access_checked = true;
return false;
}
/*
@@ -1291,8 +1291,9 @@ bool sme_enabled_check(DisasContext *s)
* sme_excp_el by itself for cpregs access checks.
*/
if (!s->fp_excp_el || s->sme_excp_el < s->fp_excp_el) {
s->fp_access_checked = true;
return sme_access_check(s);
bool ret = sme_access_check(s);
s->fp_access_checked = (ret ? 1 : -1);
return ret;
}
return fp_access_check_only(s);
}
@@ -11825,8 +11826,8 @@ static void aarch64_tr_translate_insn(DisasContextBase *dcbase, CPUState *cpu)
s->insn = insn;
s->base.pc_next = pc + 4;
s->fp_access_checked = false;
s->sve_access_checked = false;
s->fp_access_checked = 0;
s->sve_access_checked = 0;
if (s->pstate_il) {
/*
+1 -1
View File
@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ TCGv_i64 gen_mte_checkN(DisasContext *s, TCGv_i64 addr, bool is_write,
static inline void assert_fp_access_checked(DisasContext *s)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_TCG
if (unlikely(!s->fp_access_checked || s->fp_excp_el)) {
if (unlikely(s->fp_access_checked <= 0)) {
fprintf(stderr, "target-arm: FP access check missing for "
"instruction 0x%08x\n", s->insn);
abort();
+85 -44
View File
@@ -5003,10 +5003,49 @@ static bool op_store_rr(DisasContext *s, arg_ldst_rr *a,
return true;
}
static void do_ldrd_load(DisasContext *s, TCGv_i32 addr, int rt, int rt2)
{
/*
* LDRD is required to be an atomic 64-bit access if the
* address is 8-aligned, two atomic 32-bit accesses if
* it's only 4-aligned, and to give an alignment fault
* if it's not 4-aligned. This is MO_ALIGN_4 | MO_ATOM_SUBALIGN.
* Rt is always the word from the lower address, and Rt2 the
* data from the higher address, regardless of endianness.
* So (like gen_load_exclusive) we avoid gen_aa32_ld_i64()
* so we don't get its SCTLR_B check, and instead do a 64-bit access
* using MO_BE if appropriate and then split the two halves.
*
* For M-profile, and for A-profile before LPAE, the 64-bit
* atomicity is not required. We could model that using
* the looser MO_ATOM_IFALIGN_PAIR, but providing a higher
* level of atomicity than required is harmless (we would not
* currently generate better code for IFALIGN_PAIR here).
*
* This also gives us the correct behaviour of not updating
* rt if the load of rt2 faults; this is required for cases
* like "ldrd r2, r3, [r2]" where rt is also the base register.
*/
int mem_idx = get_mem_index(s);
MemOp opc = MO_64 | MO_ALIGN_4 | MO_ATOM_SUBALIGN | s->be_data;
TCGv taddr = gen_aa32_addr(s, addr, opc);
TCGv_i64 t64 = tcg_temp_new_i64();
TCGv_i32 tmp = tcg_temp_new_i32();
TCGv_i32 tmp2 = tcg_temp_new_i32();
tcg_gen_qemu_ld_i64(t64, taddr, mem_idx, opc);
if (s->be_data == MO_BE) {
tcg_gen_extr_i64_i32(tmp2, tmp, t64);
} else {
tcg_gen_extr_i64_i32(tmp, tmp2, t64);
}
store_reg(s, rt, tmp);
store_reg(s, rt2, tmp2);
}
static bool trans_LDRD_rr(DisasContext *s, arg_ldst_rr *a)
{
int mem_idx = get_mem_index(s);
TCGv_i32 addr, tmp;
TCGv_i32 addr;
if (!ENABLE_ARCH_5TE) {
return false;
@@ -5017,25 +5056,49 @@ static bool trans_LDRD_rr(DisasContext *s, arg_ldst_rr *a)
}
addr = op_addr_rr_pre(s, a);
tmp = tcg_temp_new_i32();
gen_aa32_ld_i32(s, tmp, addr, mem_idx, MO_UL | MO_ALIGN);
store_reg(s, a->rt, tmp);
tcg_gen_addi_i32(addr, addr, 4);
tmp = tcg_temp_new_i32();
gen_aa32_ld_i32(s, tmp, addr, mem_idx, MO_UL | MO_ALIGN);
store_reg(s, a->rt + 1, tmp);
do_ldrd_load(s, addr, a->rt, a->rt + 1);
/* LDRD w/ base writeback is undefined if the registers overlap. */
op_addr_rr_post(s, a, addr, -4);
op_addr_rr_post(s, a, addr, 0);
return true;
}
static void do_strd_store(DisasContext *s, TCGv_i32 addr, int rt, int rt2)
{
/*
* STRD is required to be an atomic 64-bit access if the
* address is 8-aligned, two atomic 32-bit accesses if
* it's only 4-aligned, and to give an alignment fault
* if it's not 4-aligned.
* Rt is always the word from the lower address, and Rt2 the
* data from the higher address, regardless of endianness.
* So (like gen_store_exclusive) we avoid gen_aa32_ld_i64()
* so we don't get its SCTLR_B check, and instead do a 64-bit access
* using MO_BE if appropriate, using a value constructed
* by putting the two halves together in the right order.
*
* As with LDRD, the 64-bit atomicity is not required for
* M-profile, or for A-profile before LPAE, and we provide
* the higher guarantee always for simplicity.
*/
int mem_idx = get_mem_index(s);
MemOp opc = MO_64 | MO_ALIGN_4 | MO_ATOM_SUBALIGN | s->be_data;
TCGv taddr = gen_aa32_addr(s, addr, opc);
TCGv_i32 t1 = load_reg(s, rt);
TCGv_i32 t2 = load_reg(s, rt2);
TCGv_i64 t64 = tcg_temp_new_i64();
if (s->be_data == MO_BE) {
tcg_gen_concat_i32_i64(t64, t2, t1);
} else {
tcg_gen_concat_i32_i64(t64, t1, t2);
}
tcg_gen_qemu_st_i64(t64, taddr, mem_idx, opc);
}
static bool trans_STRD_rr(DisasContext *s, arg_ldst_rr *a)
{
int mem_idx = get_mem_index(s);
TCGv_i32 addr, tmp;
TCGv_i32 addr;
if (!ENABLE_ARCH_5TE) {
return false;
@@ -5046,15 +5109,9 @@ static bool trans_STRD_rr(DisasContext *s, arg_ldst_rr *a)
}
addr = op_addr_rr_pre(s, a);
tmp = load_reg(s, a->rt);
gen_aa32_st_i32(s, tmp, addr, mem_idx, MO_UL | MO_ALIGN);
do_strd_store(s, addr, a->rt, a->rt + 1);
tcg_gen_addi_i32(addr, addr, 4);
tmp = load_reg(s, a->rt + 1);
gen_aa32_st_i32(s, tmp, addr, mem_idx, MO_UL | MO_ALIGN);
op_addr_rr_post(s, a, addr, -4);
op_addr_rr_post(s, a, addr, 0);
return true;
}
@@ -5152,23 +5209,14 @@ static bool op_store_ri(DisasContext *s, arg_ldst_ri *a,
static bool op_ldrd_ri(DisasContext *s, arg_ldst_ri *a, int rt2)
{
int mem_idx = get_mem_index(s);
TCGv_i32 addr, tmp;
TCGv_i32 addr;
addr = op_addr_ri_pre(s, a);
tmp = tcg_temp_new_i32();
gen_aa32_ld_i32(s, tmp, addr, mem_idx, MO_UL | MO_ALIGN);
store_reg(s, a->rt, tmp);
tcg_gen_addi_i32(addr, addr, 4);
tmp = tcg_temp_new_i32();
gen_aa32_ld_i32(s, tmp, addr, mem_idx, MO_UL | MO_ALIGN);
store_reg(s, rt2, tmp);
do_ldrd_load(s, addr, a->rt, rt2);
/* LDRD w/ base writeback is undefined if the registers overlap. */
op_addr_ri_post(s, a, addr, -4);
op_addr_ri_post(s, a, addr, 0);
return true;
}
@@ -5191,20 +5239,13 @@ static bool trans_LDRD_ri_t32(DisasContext *s, arg_ldst_ri2 *a)
static bool op_strd_ri(DisasContext *s, arg_ldst_ri *a, int rt2)
{
int mem_idx = get_mem_index(s);
TCGv_i32 addr, tmp;
TCGv_i32 addr;
addr = op_addr_ri_pre(s, a);
tmp = load_reg(s, a->rt);
gen_aa32_st_i32(s, tmp, addr, mem_idx, MO_UL | MO_ALIGN);
do_strd_store(s, addr, a->rt, rt2);
tcg_gen_addi_i32(addr, addr, 4);
tmp = load_reg(s, rt2);
gen_aa32_st_i32(s, tmp, addr, mem_idx, MO_UL | MO_ALIGN);
op_addr_ri_post(s, a, addr, -4);
op_addr_ri_post(s, a, addr, 0);
return true;
}
+7 -3
View File
@@ -91,15 +91,19 @@ typedef struct DisasContext {
bool aarch64;
bool thumb;
bool lse2;
/* Because unallocated encodings generate different exception syndrome
/*
* Because unallocated encodings generate different exception syndrome
* information from traps due to FP being disabled, we can't do a single
* "is fp access disabled" check at a high level in the decode tree.
* To help in catching bugs where the access check was forgotten in some
* code path, we set this flag when the access check is done, and assert
* that it is set at the point where we actually touch the FP regs.
* 0: not checked,
* 1: checked, access ok
* -1: checked, access denied
*/
bool fp_access_checked;
bool sve_access_checked;
int8_t fp_access_checked;
int8_t sve_access_checked;
/* ARMv8 single-step state (this is distinct from the QEMU gdbstub
* single-step support).
*/
+6 -5
View File
@@ -63,23 +63,24 @@ int loongarch_cpu_gdb_write_register(CPUState *cs, uint8_t *mem_buf, int n)
{
CPULoongArchState *env = cpu_env(cs);
target_ulong tmp;
int read_length;
int length = 0;
if (n < 0 || n > 34) {
return 0;
}
if (is_la64(env)) {
tmp = ldq_le_p(mem_buf);
read_length = 8;
length = 8;
} else {
tmp = ldl_le_p(mem_buf);
read_length = 4;
length = 4;
}
if (0 <= n && n < 32) {
env->gpr[n] = tmp;
length = read_length;
} else if (n == 33) {
set_pc(env, tmp);
length = read_length;
}
return length;
}
@@ -3480,7 +3480,7 @@ static uint64_t vldi_get_value(DisasContext *ctx, uint32_t imm)
break;
case 1:
/* data: {2{16'0, imm[7:0], 8'0}} */
data = (t << 24) | (t << 8);
data = (t << 40) | (t << 8);
break;
case 2:
/* data: {2{8'0, imm[7:0], 16'0}} */
-8
View File
@@ -2732,14 +2732,6 @@ static void init_proc_e200(CPUPPCState *env)
SPR_NOACCESS, SPR_NOACCESS,
&spr_read_generic, &spr_write_generic,
0x00000000); /* TOFIX */
spr_register(env, SPR_BOOKE_DSRR0, "DSRR0",
SPR_NOACCESS, SPR_NOACCESS,
&spr_read_generic, &spr_write_generic,
0x00000000);
spr_register(env, SPR_BOOKE_DSRR1, "DSRR1",
SPR_NOACCESS, SPR_NOACCESS,
&spr_read_generic, &spr_write_generic,
0x00000000);
init_tlbs_emb(env);
init_excp_e200(env, 0xFFFF0000UL);
+1 -1
View File
@@ -994,8 +994,8 @@ static bool do_vector_rotl_quad(DisasContext *ctx, arg_VX *a, bool mask,
{
TCGv_i64 ah, al, vrb, n, t0, t1, zero = tcg_constant_i64(0);
REQUIRE_VECTOR(ctx);
REQUIRE_INSNS_FLAGS2(ctx, ISA310);
REQUIRE_VECTOR(ctx);
ah = tcg_temp_new_i64();
al = tcg_temp_new_i64();
+10 -10
View File
@@ -61,8 +61,8 @@ static bool trans_LXVD2X(DisasContext *ctx, arg_LXVD2X *a)
TCGv EA;
TCGv_i64 t0;
REQUIRE_VSX(ctx);
REQUIRE_INSNS_FLAGS2(ctx, VSX);
REQUIRE_VSX(ctx);
t0 = tcg_temp_new_i64();
gen_set_access_type(ctx, ACCESS_INT);
@@ -80,8 +80,8 @@ static bool trans_LXVW4X(DisasContext *ctx, arg_LXVW4X *a)
TCGv EA;
TCGv_i64 xth, xtl;
REQUIRE_VSX(ctx);
REQUIRE_INSNS_FLAGS2(ctx, VSX);
REQUIRE_VSX(ctx);
xth = tcg_temp_new_i64();
xtl = tcg_temp_new_i64();
@@ -113,12 +113,12 @@ static bool trans_LXVWSX(DisasContext *ctx, arg_LXVWSX *a)
TCGv EA;
TCGv_i32 data;
REQUIRE_INSNS_FLAGS2(ctx, ISA300);
if (a->rt < 32) {
REQUIRE_VSX(ctx);
} else {
REQUIRE_VECTOR(ctx);
}
REQUIRE_INSNS_FLAGS2(ctx, ISA300);
gen_set_access_type(ctx, ACCESS_INT);
EA = do_ea_calc(ctx, a->ra, cpu_gpr[a->rb]);
@@ -133,8 +133,8 @@ static bool trans_LXVDSX(DisasContext *ctx, arg_LXVDSX *a)
TCGv EA;
TCGv_i64 data;
REQUIRE_VSX(ctx);
REQUIRE_INSNS_FLAGS2(ctx, VSX);
REQUIRE_VSX(ctx);
gen_set_access_type(ctx, ACCESS_INT);
EA = do_ea_calc(ctx, a->ra, cpu_gpr[a->rb]);
@@ -185,8 +185,8 @@ static bool trans_LXVH8X(DisasContext *ctx, arg_LXVH8X *a)
TCGv EA;
TCGv_i64 xth, xtl;
REQUIRE_VSX(ctx);
REQUIRE_INSNS_FLAGS2(ctx, ISA300);
REQUIRE_VSX(ctx);
xth = tcg_temp_new_i64();
xtl = tcg_temp_new_i64();
@@ -208,8 +208,8 @@ static bool trans_LXVB16X(DisasContext *ctx, arg_LXVB16X *a)
TCGv EA;
TCGv_i128 data;
REQUIRE_VSX(ctx);
REQUIRE_INSNS_FLAGS2(ctx, ISA300);
REQUIRE_VSX(ctx);
data = tcg_temp_new_i128();
gen_set_access_type(ctx, ACCESS_INT);
@@ -312,8 +312,8 @@ static bool trans_STXVD2X(DisasContext *ctx, arg_STXVD2X *a)
TCGv EA;
TCGv_i64 t0;
REQUIRE_VSX(ctx);
REQUIRE_INSNS_FLAGS2(ctx, VSX);
REQUIRE_VSX(ctx);
t0 = tcg_temp_new_i64();
gen_set_access_type(ctx, ACCESS_INT);
@@ -331,8 +331,8 @@ static bool trans_STXVW4X(DisasContext *ctx, arg_STXVW4X *a)
TCGv EA;
TCGv_i64 xsh, xsl;
REQUIRE_VSX(ctx);
REQUIRE_INSNS_FLAGS2(ctx, VSX);
REQUIRE_VSX(ctx);
xsh = tcg_temp_new_i64();
xsl = tcg_temp_new_i64();
@@ -364,8 +364,8 @@ static bool trans_STXVH8X(DisasContext *ctx, arg_STXVH8X *a)
TCGv EA;
TCGv_i64 xsh, xsl;
REQUIRE_VSX(ctx);
REQUIRE_INSNS_FLAGS2(ctx, ISA300);
REQUIRE_VSX(ctx);
xsh = tcg_temp_new_i64();
xsl = tcg_temp_new_i64();
@@ -394,8 +394,8 @@ static bool trans_STXVB16X(DisasContext *ctx, arg_STXVB16X *a)
TCGv EA;
TCGv_i128 data;
REQUIRE_VSX(ctx);
REQUIRE_INSNS_FLAGS2(ctx, ISA300);
REQUIRE_VSX(ctx);
data = tcg_temp_new_i128();
gen_set_access_type(ctx, ACCESS_INT);
+3 -2
View File
@@ -1897,6 +1897,7 @@ static void prop_vlen_set(Object *obj, Visitor *v, const char *name,
void *opaque, Error **errp)
{
RISCVCPU *cpu = RISCV_CPU(obj);
uint16_t cpu_vlen = cpu->cfg.vlenb << 3;
uint16_t value;
if (!visit_type_uint16(v, name, &value, errp)) {
@@ -1908,10 +1909,10 @@ static void prop_vlen_set(Object *obj, Visitor *v, const char *name,
return;
}
if (value != cpu->cfg.vlenb && riscv_cpu_is_vendor(obj)) {
if (value != cpu_vlen && riscv_cpu_is_vendor(obj)) {
cpu_set_prop_err(cpu, name, errp);
error_append_hint(errp, "Current '%s' val: %u\n",
name, cpu->cfg.vlenb << 3);
name, cpu_vlen);
return;
}
+18
View File
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
#include "exec/page-protection.h"
#include "instmap.h"
#include "tcg/tcg-op.h"
#include "hw/core/tcg-cpu-ops.h"
#include "trace.h"
#include "semihosting/common-semi.h"
#include "sysemu/cpu-timers.h"
@@ -1550,6 +1551,23 @@ bool riscv_cpu_tlb_fill(CPUState *cs, vaddr address, int size,
} else if (probe) {
return false;
} else {
int wp_access = 0;
if (access_type == MMU_DATA_LOAD) {
wp_access |= BP_MEM_READ;
} else if (access_type == MMU_DATA_STORE) {
wp_access |= BP_MEM_WRITE;
}
/*
* If a watchpoint isn't found for 'addr' this will
* be a no-op and we'll resume the mmu_exception path.
* Otherwise we'll throw a debug exception and execution
* will continue elsewhere.
*/
cpu_check_watchpoint(cs, address, size, MEMTXATTRS_UNSPECIFIED,
wp_access, retaddr);
raise_mmu_exception(env, address, access_type, pmp_violation,
first_stage_error, two_stage_lookup,
two_stage_indirect_error);
+5
View File
@@ -190,6 +190,11 @@ static RISCVException cfi_ss(CPURISCVState *env, int csrno)
return RISCV_EXCP_ILLEGAL_INST;
}
/* If ext implemented, M-mode always have access to SSP CSR */
if (env->priv == PRV_M) {
return RISCV_EXCP_NONE;
}
/* if bcfi not active for current env, access to csr is illegal */
if (!cpu_get_bcfien(env)) {
#if !defined(CONFIG_USER_ONLY)
+4 -2
View File
@@ -478,7 +478,7 @@ static void type2_breakpoint_insert(CPURISCVState *env, target_ulong index)
bool enabled = type2_breakpoint_enabled(ctrl);
CPUState *cs = env_cpu(env);
int flags = BP_CPU | BP_STOP_BEFORE_ACCESS;
uint32_t size;
uint32_t size, def_size;
if (!enabled) {
return;
@@ -501,7 +501,9 @@ static void type2_breakpoint_insert(CPURISCVState *env, target_ulong index)
cpu_watchpoint_insert(cs, addr, size, flags,
&env->cpu_watchpoint[index]);
} else {
cpu_watchpoint_insert(cs, addr, 8, flags,
def_size = riscv_cpu_mxl(env) == MXL_RV64 ? 8 : 4;
cpu_watchpoint_insert(cs, addr, def_size, flags,
&env->cpu_watchpoint[index]);
}
}
@@ -15,6 +15,13 @@
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along with
* this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#define REQUIRE_ZICFISS(ctx) do { \
if (!ctx->cfg_ptr->ext_zicfiss) { \
return false; \
} \
} while (0)
static bool trans_sspopchk(DisasContext *ctx, arg_sspopchk *a)
{
if (!ctx->bcfi_enabled) {
@@ -77,6 +84,11 @@ static bool trans_ssrdp(DisasContext *ctx, arg_ssrdp *a)
static bool trans_ssamoswap_w(DisasContext *ctx, arg_amoswap_w *a)
{
REQUIRE_A_OR_ZAAMO(ctx);
REQUIRE_ZICFISS(ctx);
if (ctx->priv == PRV_M) {
generate_exception(ctx, RISCV_EXCP_STORE_AMO_ACCESS_FAULT);
}
if (!ctx->bcfi_enabled) {
return false;
}
@@ -97,6 +109,11 @@ static bool trans_ssamoswap_d(DisasContext *ctx, arg_amoswap_w *a)
{
REQUIRE_64BIT(ctx);
REQUIRE_A_OR_ZAAMO(ctx);
REQUIRE_ZICFISS(ctx);
if (ctx->priv == PRV_M) {
generate_exception(ctx, RISCV_EXCP_STORE_AMO_ACCESS_FAULT);
}
if (!ctx->bcfi_enabled) {
return false;
}
+16 -16
View File
@@ -222,7 +222,7 @@ static inline void xor_round_key(AESState *round_state, AESState *round_key)
uint32_t total_elems = vext_get_total_elems(env, desc, 4); \
uint32_t vta = vext_vta(desc); \
\
VSTART_CHECK_EARLY_EXIT(env); \
VSTART_CHECK_EARLY_EXIT(env, vl); \
\
for (uint32_t i = env->vstart / 4; i < env->vl / 4; i++) { \
AESState round_key; \
@@ -248,7 +248,7 @@ static inline void xor_round_key(AESState *round_state, AESState *round_key)
uint32_t total_elems = vext_get_total_elems(env, desc, 4); \
uint32_t vta = vext_vta(desc); \
\
VSTART_CHECK_EARLY_EXIT(env); \
VSTART_CHECK_EARLY_EXIT(env, vl); \
\
for (uint32_t i = env->vstart / 4; i < env->vl / 4; i++) { \
AESState round_key; \
@@ -309,7 +309,7 @@ void HELPER(vaeskf1_vi)(void *vd_vptr, void *vs2_vptr, uint32_t uimm,
uint32_t total_elems = vext_get_total_elems(env, desc, 4);
uint32_t vta = vext_vta(desc);
VSTART_CHECK_EARLY_EXIT(env);
VSTART_CHECK_EARLY_EXIT(env, vl);
uimm &= 0b1111;
if (uimm > 10 || uimm == 0) {
@@ -357,7 +357,7 @@ void HELPER(vaeskf2_vi)(void *vd_vptr, void *vs2_vptr, uint32_t uimm,
uint32_t total_elems = vext_get_total_elems(env, desc, 4);
uint32_t vta = vext_vta(desc);
VSTART_CHECK_EARLY_EXIT(env);
VSTART_CHECK_EARLY_EXIT(env, vl);
uimm &= 0b1111;
if (uimm > 14 || uimm < 2) {
@@ -465,7 +465,7 @@ void HELPER(vsha2ms_vv)(void *vd, void *vs1, void *vs2, CPURISCVState *env,
uint32_t total_elems;
uint32_t vta = vext_vta(desc);
VSTART_CHECK_EARLY_EXIT(env);
VSTART_CHECK_EARLY_EXIT(env, env->vl);
for (uint32_t i = env->vstart / 4; i < env->vl / 4; i++) {
if (sew == MO_32) {
@@ -582,7 +582,7 @@ void HELPER(vsha2ch32_vv)(void *vd, void *vs1, void *vs2, CPURISCVState *env,
uint32_t total_elems;
uint32_t vta = vext_vta(desc);
VSTART_CHECK_EARLY_EXIT(env);
VSTART_CHECK_EARLY_EXIT(env, env->vl);
for (uint32_t i = env->vstart / 4; i < env->vl / 4; i++) {
vsha2c_32(((uint32_t *)vs2) + 4 * i, ((uint32_t *)vd) + 4 * i,
@@ -602,7 +602,7 @@ void HELPER(vsha2ch64_vv)(void *vd, void *vs1, void *vs2, CPURISCVState *env,
uint32_t total_elems;
uint32_t vta = vext_vta(desc);
VSTART_CHECK_EARLY_EXIT(env);
VSTART_CHECK_EARLY_EXIT(env, env->vl);
for (uint32_t i = env->vstart / 4; i < env->vl / 4; i++) {
vsha2c_64(((uint64_t *)vs2) + 4 * i, ((uint64_t *)vd) + 4 * i,
@@ -622,7 +622,7 @@ void HELPER(vsha2cl32_vv)(void *vd, void *vs1, void *vs2, CPURISCVState *env,
uint32_t total_elems;
uint32_t vta = vext_vta(desc);
VSTART_CHECK_EARLY_EXIT(env);
VSTART_CHECK_EARLY_EXIT(env, env->vl);
for (uint32_t i = env->vstart / 4; i < env->vl / 4; i++) {
vsha2c_32(((uint32_t *)vs2) + 4 * i, ((uint32_t *)vd) + 4 * i,
@@ -642,7 +642,7 @@ void HELPER(vsha2cl64_vv)(void *vd, void *vs1, void *vs2, CPURISCVState *env,
uint32_t total_elems;
uint32_t vta = vext_vta(desc);
VSTART_CHECK_EARLY_EXIT(env);
VSTART_CHECK_EARLY_EXIT(env, env->vl);
for (uint32_t i = env->vstart / 4; i < env->vl / 4; i++) {
vsha2c_64(((uint64_t *)vs2) + 4 * i, ((uint64_t *)vd) + 4 * i,
@@ -676,7 +676,7 @@ void HELPER(vsm3me_vv)(void *vd_vptr, void *vs1_vptr, void *vs2_vptr,
uint32_t *vs1 = vs1_vptr;
uint32_t *vs2 = vs2_vptr;
VSTART_CHECK_EARLY_EXIT(env);
VSTART_CHECK_EARLY_EXIT(env, env->vl);
for (int i = env->vstart / 8; i < env->vl / 8; i++) {
uint32_t w[24];
@@ -777,7 +777,7 @@ void HELPER(vsm3c_vi)(void *vd_vptr, void *vs2_vptr, uint32_t uimm,
uint32_t *vs2 = vs2_vptr;
uint32_t v1[8], v2[8], v3[8];
VSTART_CHECK_EARLY_EXIT(env);
VSTART_CHECK_EARLY_EXIT(env, env->vl);
for (int i = env->vstart / 8; i < env->vl / 8; i++) {
for (int k = 0; k < 8; k++) {
@@ -802,7 +802,7 @@ void HELPER(vghsh_vv)(void *vd_vptr, void *vs1_vptr, void *vs2_vptr,
uint32_t vta = vext_vta(desc);
uint32_t total_elems = vext_get_total_elems(env, desc, 4);
VSTART_CHECK_EARLY_EXIT(env);
VSTART_CHECK_EARLY_EXIT(env, env->vl);
for (uint32_t i = env->vstart / 4; i < env->vl / 4; i++) {
uint64_t Y[2] = {vd[i * 2 + 0], vd[i * 2 + 1]};
@@ -841,7 +841,7 @@ void HELPER(vgmul_vv)(void *vd_vptr, void *vs2_vptr, CPURISCVState *env,
uint32_t vta = vext_vta(desc);
uint32_t total_elems = vext_get_total_elems(env, desc, 4);
VSTART_CHECK_EARLY_EXIT(env);
VSTART_CHECK_EARLY_EXIT(env, env->vl);
for (uint32_t i = env->vstart / 4; i < env->vl / 4; i++) {
uint64_t Y[2] = {brev8(vd[i * 2 + 0]), brev8(vd[i * 2 + 1])};
@@ -879,7 +879,7 @@ void HELPER(vsm4k_vi)(void *vd, void *vs2, uint32_t uimm5, CPURISCVState *env,
uint32_t esz = sizeof(uint32_t);
uint32_t total_elems = vext_get_total_elems(env, desc, esz);
VSTART_CHECK_EARLY_EXIT(env);
VSTART_CHECK_EARLY_EXIT(env, env->vl);
for (uint32_t i = group_start; i < group_end; ++i) {
uint32_t vstart = i * egs;
@@ -937,7 +937,7 @@ void HELPER(vsm4r_vv)(void *vd, void *vs2, CPURISCVState *env, uint32_t desc)
uint32_t esz = sizeof(uint32_t);
uint32_t total_elems = vext_get_total_elems(env, desc, esz);
VSTART_CHECK_EARLY_EXIT(env);
VSTART_CHECK_EARLY_EXIT(env, env->vl);
for (uint32_t i = group_start; i < group_end; ++i) {
uint32_t vstart = i * egs;
@@ -973,7 +973,7 @@ void HELPER(vsm4r_vs)(void *vd, void *vs2, CPURISCVState *env, uint32_t desc)
uint32_t esz = sizeof(uint32_t);
uint32_t total_elems = vext_get_total_elems(env, desc, esz);
VSTART_CHECK_EARLY_EXIT(env);
VSTART_CHECK_EARLY_EXIT(env, env->vl);
for (uint32_t i = group_start; i < group_end; ++i) {
uint32_t vstart = i * egs;
+51 -40
View File
@@ -265,7 +265,7 @@ vext_ldst_stride(void *vd, void *v0, target_ulong base, target_ulong stride,
uint32_t esz = 1 << log2_esz;
uint32_t vma = vext_vma(desc);
VSTART_CHECK_EARLY_EXIT(env);
VSTART_CHECK_EARLY_EXIT(env, env->vl);
for (i = env->vstart; i < env->vl; env->vstart = ++i) {
k = 0;
@@ -388,10 +388,7 @@ vext_ldst_us(void *vd, target_ulong base, CPURISCVState *env, uint32_t desc,
uint32_t msize = nf * esz;
int mmu_index = riscv_env_mmu_index(env, false);
if (env->vstart >= evl) {
env->vstart = 0;
return;
}
VSTART_CHECK_EARLY_EXIT(env, evl);
/* Calculate the page range of first page */
addr = base + ((env->vstart * nf) << log2_esz);
@@ -533,7 +530,7 @@ vext_ldst_index(void *vd, void *v0, target_ulong base,
uint32_t esz = 1 << log2_esz;
uint32_t vma = vext_vma(desc);
VSTART_CHECK_EARLY_EXIT(env);
VSTART_CHECK_EARLY_EXIT(env, env->vl);
/* load bytes from guest memory */
for (i = env->vstart; i < env->vl; env->vstart = ++i) {
@@ -625,7 +622,7 @@ vext_ldff(void *vd, void *v0, target_ulong base, CPURISCVState *env,
target_ulong addr, offset, remain, page_split, elems;
int mmu_index = riscv_env_mmu_index(env, false);
VSTART_CHECK_EARLY_EXIT(env);
VSTART_CHECK_EARLY_EXIT(env, env->vl);
/* probe every access */
for (i = env->vstart; i < env->vl; i++) {
@@ -1092,7 +1089,7 @@ void HELPER(NAME)(void *vd, void *v0, void *vs1, void *vs2, \
uint32_t vta = vext_vta(desc); \
uint32_t i; \
\
VSTART_CHECK_EARLY_EXIT(env); \
VSTART_CHECK_EARLY_EXIT(env, vl); \
\
for (i = env->vstart; i < vl; i++) { \
ETYPE s1 = *((ETYPE *)vs1 + H(i)); \
@@ -1126,7 +1123,7 @@ void HELPER(NAME)(void *vd, void *v0, target_ulong s1, void *vs2, \
uint32_t vta = vext_vta(desc); \
uint32_t i; \
\
VSTART_CHECK_EARLY_EXIT(env); \
VSTART_CHECK_EARLY_EXIT(env, vl); \
\
for (i = env->vstart; i < vl; i++) { \
ETYPE s2 = *((ETYPE *)vs2 + H(i)); \
@@ -1163,7 +1160,7 @@ void HELPER(NAME)(void *vd, void *v0, void *vs1, void *vs2, \
uint32_t vta_all_1s = vext_vta_all_1s(desc); \
uint32_t i; \
\
VSTART_CHECK_EARLY_EXIT(env); \
VSTART_CHECK_EARLY_EXIT(env, vl); \
\
for (i = env->vstart; i < vl; i++) { \
ETYPE s1 = *((ETYPE *)vs1 + H(i)); \
@@ -1203,7 +1200,7 @@ void HELPER(NAME)(void *vd, void *v0, target_ulong s1, \
uint32_t vta_all_1s = vext_vta_all_1s(desc); \
uint32_t i; \
\
VSTART_CHECK_EARLY_EXIT(env); \
VSTART_CHECK_EARLY_EXIT(env, vl); \
\
for (i = env->vstart; i < vl; i++) { \
ETYPE s2 = *((ETYPE *)vs2 + H(i)); \
@@ -1301,7 +1298,7 @@ void HELPER(NAME)(void *vd, void *v0, void *vs1, \
uint32_t vma = vext_vma(desc); \
uint32_t i; \
\
VSTART_CHECK_EARLY_EXIT(env); \
VSTART_CHECK_EARLY_EXIT(env, vl); \
\
for (i = env->vstart; i < vl; i++) { \
if (!vm && !vext_elem_mask(v0, i)) { \
@@ -1350,7 +1347,7 @@ void HELPER(NAME)(void *vd, void *v0, target_ulong s1, \
uint32_t vma = vext_vma(desc); \
uint32_t i; \
\
VSTART_CHECK_EARLY_EXIT(env); \
VSTART_CHECK_EARLY_EXIT(env, vl); \
\
for (i = env->vstart; i < vl; i++) { \
if (!vm && !vext_elem_mask(v0, i)) { \
@@ -1414,7 +1411,7 @@ void HELPER(NAME)(void *vd, void *v0, void *vs1, void *vs2, \
uint32_t vma = vext_vma(desc); \
uint32_t i; \
\
VSTART_CHECK_EARLY_EXIT(env); \
VSTART_CHECK_EARLY_EXIT(env, vl); \
\
for (i = env->vstart; i < vl; i++) { \
ETYPE s1 = *((ETYPE *)vs1 + H(i)); \
@@ -1481,7 +1478,7 @@ void HELPER(NAME)(void *vd, void *v0, target_ulong s1, void *vs2, \
uint32_t vma = vext_vma(desc); \
uint32_t i; \
\
VSTART_CHECK_EARLY_EXIT(env); \
VSTART_CHECK_EARLY_EXIT(env, vl); \
\
for (i = env->vstart; i < vl; i++) { \
ETYPE s2 = *((ETYPE *)vs2 + H(i)); \
@@ -2030,7 +2027,7 @@ void HELPER(NAME)(void *vd, void *vs1, CPURISCVState *env, \
uint32_t vta = vext_vta(desc); \
uint32_t i; \
\
VSTART_CHECK_EARLY_EXIT(env); \
VSTART_CHECK_EARLY_EXIT(env, vl); \
\
for (i = env->vstart; i < vl; i++) { \
ETYPE s1 = *((ETYPE *)vs1 + H(i)); \
@@ -2056,7 +2053,7 @@ void HELPER(NAME)(void *vd, uint64_t s1, CPURISCVState *env, \
uint32_t vta = vext_vta(desc); \
uint32_t i; \
\
VSTART_CHECK_EARLY_EXIT(env); \
VSTART_CHECK_EARLY_EXIT(env, vl); \
\
for (i = env->vstart; i < vl; i++) { \
*((ETYPE *)vd + H(i)) = (ETYPE)s1; \
@@ -2081,7 +2078,7 @@ void HELPER(NAME)(void *vd, void *v0, void *vs1, void *vs2, \
uint32_t vta = vext_vta(desc); \
uint32_t i; \
\
VSTART_CHECK_EARLY_EXIT(env); \
VSTART_CHECK_EARLY_EXIT(env, vl); \
\
for (i = env->vstart; i < vl; i++) { \
ETYPE *vt = (!vext_elem_mask(v0, i) ? vs2 : vs1); \
@@ -2107,7 +2104,7 @@ void HELPER(NAME)(void *vd, void *v0, target_ulong s1, \
uint32_t vta = vext_vta(desc); \
uint32_t i; \
\
VSTART_CHECK_EARLY_EXIT(env); \
VSTART_CHECK_EARLY_EXIT(env, vl); \
\
for (i = env->vstart; i < vl; i++) { \
ETYPE s2 = *((ETYPE *)vs2 + H(i)); \
@@ -2154,8 +2151,6 @@ vext_vv_rm_1(void *vd, void *v0, void *vs1, void *vs2,
uint32_t vl, uint32_t vm, int vxrm,
opivv2_rm_fn *fn, uint32_t vma, uint32_t esz)
{
VSTART_CHECK_EARLY_EXIT(env);
for (uint32_t i = env->vstart; i < vl; i++) {
if (!vm && !vext_elem_mask(v0, i)) {
/* set masked-off elements to 1s */
@@ -2179,6 +2174,8 @@ vext_vv_rm_2(void *vd, void *v0, void *vs1, void *vs2,
uint32_t vta = vext_vta(desc);
uint32_t vma = vext_vma(desc);
VSTART_CHECK_EARLY_EXIT(env, vl);
switch (env->vxrm) {
case 0: /* rnu */
vext_vv_rm_1(vd, v0, vs1, vs2,
@@ -2281,8 +2278,6 @@ vext_vx_rm_1(void *vd, void *v0, target_long s1, void *vs2,
uint32_t vl, uint32_t vm, int vxrm,
opivx2_rm_fn *fn, uint32_t vma, uint32_t esz)
{
VSTART_CHECK_EARLY_EXIT(env);
for (uint32_t i = env->vstart; i < vl; i++) {
if (!vm && !vext_elem_mask(v0, i)) {
/* set masked-off elements to 1s */
@@ -2306,6 +2301,8 @@ vext_vx_rm_2(void *vd, void *v0, target_long s1, void *vs2,
uint32_t vta = vext_vta(desc);
uint32_t vma = vext_vma(desc);
VSTART_CHECK_EARLY_EXIT(env, vl);
switch (env->vxrm) {
case 0: /* rnu */
vext_vx_rm_1(vd, v0, s1, vs2,
@@ -3080,7 +3077,7 @@ void HELPER(NAME)(void *vd, void *v0, void *vs1, \
uint32_t vma = vext_vma(desc); \
uint32_t i; \
\
VSTART_CHECK_EARLY_EXIT(env); \
VSTART_CHECK_EARLY_EXIT(env, vl); \
\
for (i = env->vstart; i < vl; i++) { \
if (!vm && !vext_elem_mask(v0, i)) { \
@@ -3125,7 +3122,7 @@ void HELPER(NAME)(void *vd, void *v0, uint64_t s1, \
uint32_t vma = vext_vma(desc); \
uint32_t i; \
\
VSTART_CHECK_EARLY_EXIT(env); \
VSTART_CHECK_EARLY_EXIT(env, vl); \
\
for (i = env->vstart; i < vl; i++) { \
if (!vm && !vext_elem_mask(v0, i)) { \
@@ -3713,7 +3710,7 @@ void HELPER(NAME)(void *vd, void *v0, void *vs2, \
uint32_t vma = vext_vma(desc); \
uint32_t i; \
\
VSTART_CHECK_EARLY_EXIT(env); \
VSTART_CHECK_EARLY_EXIT(env, vl); \
\
if (vl == 0) { \
return; \
@@ -4236,7 +4233,7 @@ void HELPER(NAME)(void *vd, void *v0, void *vs1, void *vs2, \
uint32_t vma = vext_vma(desc); \
uint32_t i; \
\
VSTART_CHECK_EARLY_EXIT(env); \
VSTART_CHECK_EARLY_EXIT(env, vl); \
\
for (i = env->vstart; i < vl; i++) { \
ETYPE s1 = *((ETYPE *)vs1 + H(i)); \
@@ -4278,7 +4275,7 @@ void HELPER(NAME)(void *vd, void *v0, uint64_t s1, void *vs2, \
uint32_t vma = vext_vma(desc); \
uint32_t i; \
\
VSTART_CHECK_EARLY_EXIT(env); \
VSTART_CHECK_EARLY_EXIT(env, vl); \
\
for (i = env->vstart; i < vl; i++) { \
ETYPE s2 = *((ETYPE *)vs2 + H(i)); \
@@ -4473,7 +4470,7 @@ void HELPER(NAME)(void *vd, void *v0, uint64_t s1, void *vs2, \
uint32_t vta = vext_vta(desc); \
uint32_t i; \
\
VSTART_CHECK_EARLY_EXIT(env); \
VSTART_CHECK_EARLY_EXIT(env, vl); \
\
for (i = env->vstart; i < vl; i++) { \
ETYPE s2 = *((ETYPE *)vs2 + H(i)); \
@@ -4641,6 +4638,8 @@ void HELPER(NAME)(void *vd, void *v0, void *vs1, \
uint32_t i; \
TD s1 = *((TD *)vs1 + HD(0)); \
\
VSTART_CHECK_EARLY_EXIT(env, vl); \
\
for (i = env->vstart; i < vl; i++) { \
TS2 s2 = *((TS2 *)vs2 + HS2(i)); \
if (!vm && !vext_elem_mask(v0, i)) { \
@@ -4648,7 +4647,9 @@ void HELPER(NAME)(void *vd, void *v0, void *vs1, \
} \
s1 = OP(s1, (TD)s2); \
} \
*((TD *)vd + HD(0)) = s1; \
if (vl > 0) { \
*((TD *)vd + HD(0)) = s1; \
} \
env->vstart = 0; \
/* set tail elements to 1s */ \
vext_set_elems_1s(vd, vta, esz, vlenb); \
@@ -4727,6 +4728,8 @@ void HELPER(NAME)(void *vd, void *v0, void *vs1, \
uint32_t i; \
TD s1 = *((TD *)vs1 + HD(0)); \
\
VSTART_CHECK_EARLY_EXIT(env, vl); \
\
for (i = env->vstart; i < vl; i++) { \
TS2 s2 = *((TS2 *)vs2 + HS2(i)); \
if (!vm && !vext_elem_mask(v0, i)) { \
@@ -4734,7 +4737,9 @@ void HELPER(NAME)(void *vd, void *v0, void *vs1, \
} \
s1 = OP(s1, (TD)s2, &env->fp_status); \
} \
*((TD *)vd + HD(0)) = s1; \
if (vl > 0) { \
*((TD *)vd + HD(0)) = s1; \
} \
env->vstart = 0; \
/* set tail elements to 1s */ \
vext_set_elems_1s(vd, vta, esz, vlenb); \
@@ -4799,7 +4804,7 @@ void HELPER(NAME)(void *vd, void *v0, void *vs1, \
uint32_t i; \
int a, b; \
\
VSTART_CHECK_EARLY_EXIT(env); \
VSTART_CHECK_EARLY_EXIT(env, vl); \
\
for (i = env->vstart; i < vl; i++) { \
a = vext_elem_mask(vs1, i); \
@@ -4889,6 +4894,8 @@ static void vmsetm(void *vd, void *v0, void *vs2, CPURISCVState *env,
int i;
bool first_mask_bit = false;
VSTART_CHECK_EARLY_EXIT(env, vl);
for (i = env->vstart; i < vl; i++) {
if (!vm && !vext_elem_mask(v0, i)) {
/* set masked-off elements to 1s */
@@ -4961,6 +4968,8 @@ void HELPER(NAME)(void *vd, void *v0, void *vs2, CPURISCVState *env, \
uint32_t sum = 0; \
int i; \
\
VSTART_CHECK_EARLY_EXIT(env, vl); \
\
for (i = env->vstart; i < vl; i++) { \
if (!vm && !vext_elem_mask(v0, i)) { \
/* set masked-off elements to 1s */ \
@@ -4994,7 +5003,7 @@ void HELPER(NAME)(void *vd, void *v0, CPURISCVState *env, uint32_t desc) \
uint32_t vma = vext_vma(desc); \
int i; \
\
VSTART_CHECK_EARLY_EXIT(env); \
VSTART_CHECK_EARLY_EXIT(env, vl); \
\
for (i = env->vstart; i < vl; i++) { \
if (!vm && !vext_elem_mask(v0, i)) { \
@@ -5031,7 +5040,7 @@ void HELPER(NAME)(void *vd, void *v0, target_ulong s1, void *vs2, \
uint32_t vma = vext_vma(desc); \
target_ulong offset = s1, i_min, i; \
\
VSTART_CHECK_EARLY_EXIT(env); \
VSTART_CHECK_EARLY_EXIT(env, vl); \
\
i_min = MAX(env->vstart, offset); \
for (i = i_min; i < vl; i++) { \
@@ -5066,7 +5075,7 @@ void HELPER(NAME)(void *vd, void *v0, target_ulong s1, void *vs2, \
uint32_t vma = vext_vma(desc); \
target_ulong i_max, i_min, i; \
\
VSTART_CHECK_EARLY_EXIT(env); \
VSTART_CHECK_EARLY_EXIT(env, vl); \
\
i_min = MIN(s1 < vlmax ? vlmax - s1 : 0, vl); \
i_max = MAX(i_min, env->vstart); \
@@ -5110,7 +5119,7 @@ static void vslide1up_##BITWIDTH(void *vd, void *v0, uint64_t s1, \
uint32_t vma = vext_vma(desc); \
uint32_t i; \
\
VSTART_CHECK_EARLY_EXIT(env); \
VSTART_CHECK_EARLY_EXIT(env, vl); \
\
for (i = env->vstart; i < vl; i++) { \
if (!vm && !vext_elem_mask(v0, i)) { \
@@ -5161,7 +5170,7 @@ static void vslide1down_##BITWIDTH(void *vd, void *v0, uint64_t s1, \
uint32_t vma = vext_vma(desc); \
uint32_t i; \
\
VSTART_CHECK_EARLY_EXIT(env); \
VSTART_CHECK_EARLY_EXIT(env, vl); \
\
for (i = env->vstart; i < vl; i++) { \
if (!vm && !vext_elem_mask(v0, i)) { \
@@ -5238,7 +5247,7 @@ void HELPER(NAME)(void *vd, void *v0, void *vs1, void *vs2, \
uint64_t index; \
uint32_t i; \
\
VSTART_CHECK_EARLY_EXIT(env); \
VSTART_CHECK_EARLY_EXIT(env, vl); \
\
for (i = env->vstart; i < vl; i++) { \
if (!vm && !vext_elem_mask(v0, i)) { \
@@ -5283,7 +5292,7 @@ void HELPER(NAME)(void *vd, void *v0, target_ulong s1, void *vs2, \
uint64_t index = s1; \
uint32_t i; \
\
VSTART_CHECK_EARLY_EXIT(env); \
VSTART_CHECK_EARLY_EXIT(env, vl); \
\
for (i = env->vstart; i < vl; i++) { \
if (!vm && !vext_elem_mask(v0, i)) { \
@@ -5319,6 +5328,8 @@ void HELPER(NAME)(void *vd, void *v0, void *vs1, void *vs2, \
uint32_t vta = vext_vta(desc); \
uint32_t num = 0, i; \
\
VSTART_CHECK_EARLY_EXIT(env, vl); \
\
for (i = env->vstart; i < vl; i++) { \
if (!vext_elem_mask(vs1, i)) { \
continue; \
@@ -5379,7 +5390,7 @@ void HELPER(NAME)(void *vd, void *v0, void *vs2, \
uint32_t vma = vext_vma(desc); \
uint32_t i; \
\
VSTART_CHECK_EARLY_EXIT(env); \
VSTART_CHECK_EARLY_EXIT(env, vl); \
\
for (i = env->vstart; i < vl; i++) { \
if (!vm && !vext_elem_mask(v0, i)) { \
+2 -2
View File
@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ void do_vext_vv(void *vd, void *v0, void *vs1, void *vs2,
uint32_t vma = vext_vma(desc);
uint32_t i;
VSTART_CHECK_EARLY_EXIT(env);
VSTART_CHECK_EARLY_EXIT(env, vl);
for (i = env->vstart; i < vl; i++) {
if (!vm && !vext_elem_mask(v0, i)) {
@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ void do_vext_vx(void *vd, void *v0, target_long s1, void *vs2,
uint32_t vma = vext_vma(desc);
uint32_t i;
VSTART_CHECK_EARLY_EXIT(env);
VSTART_CHECK_EARLY_EXIT(env, vl);
for (i = env->vstart; i < vl; i++) {
if (!vm && !vext_elem_mask(v0, i)) {
+6 -6
View File
@@ -24,11 +24,11 @@
#include "tcg/tcg-gvec-desc.h"
#include "internals.h"
#define VSTART_CHECK_EARLY_EXIT(env) do { \
if (env->vstart >= env->vl) { \
env->vstart = 0; \
return; \
} \
#define VSTART_CHECK_EARLY_EXIT(env, vl) do { \
if (env->vstart >= vl) { \
env->vstart = 0; \
return; \
} \
} while (0)
static inline uint32_t vext_nf(uint32_t desc)
@@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ void HELPER(NAME)(void *vd, void *v0, void *vs2, \
uint32_t vma = vext_vma(desc); \
uint32_t i; \
\
VSTART_CHECK_EARLY_EXIT(env); \
VSTART_CHECK_EARLY_EXIT(env, vl); \
\
for (i = env->vstart; i < vl; i++) { \
if (!vm && !vext_elem_mask(v0, i)) { \
+3 -1
View File
@@ -279,9 +279,11 @@ void flush_idcache_range(uintptr_t rx, uintptr_t rw, size_t len)
for (p = rw & -dcache_lsize; p < rw + len; p += dcache_lsize) {
asm volatile("dc\tcvau, %0" : : "r" (p) : "memory");
}
asm volatile("dsb\tish" : : : "memory");
}
/* DSB unconditionally to ensure any outstanding writes are committed. */
asm volatile("dsb\tish" : : : "memory");
/*
* If CTR_EL0.DIC is enabled, Instruction cache cleaning to the Point
* of Unification is not required for instruction to data coherence.
-4
View File
@@ -409,10 +409,6 @@ static bool timer_mod_ns_locked(QEMUTimerList *timer_list,
static void timerlist_rearm(QEMUTimerList *timer_list)
{
/* Interrupt execution to force deadline recalculation. */
if (icount_enabled() && timer_list->clock->type == QEMU_CLOCK_VIRTUAL) {
icount_start_warp_timer();
}
timerlist_notify(timer_list);
}