selftests/landlock: Test audit with restrict flags

Add audit_exec tests to filter Landlock denials according to
cross-execution or muted subdomains.

Add a wait-pipe-sandbox.c test program to sandbox itself and send a
(denied) signals to its parent.

Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250320190717.2287696-24-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
This commit is contained in:
Mickaël Salaün
2025-03-26 13:59:46 +01:00
parent 6a500b2297
commit 960ed6ca4c
5 changed files with 357 additions and 1 deletions
@@ -2,3 +2,4 @@
/sandbox-and-launch
/true
/wait-pipe
/wait-pipe-sandbox
+5 -1
View File
@@ -10,7 +10,11 @@ src_test := $(wildcard *_test.c)
TEST_GEN_PROGS := $(src_test:.c=)
TEST_GEN_PROGS_EXTENDED := true sandbox-and-launch wait-pipe
TEST_GEN_PROGS_EXTENDED := \
true \
sandbox-and-launch \
wait-pipe \
wait-pipe-sandbox
# Short targets:
$(TEST_GEN_PROGS): LDLIBS += -lcap -lpthread
@@ -7,7 +7,9 @@
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <errno.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include <linux/landlock.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <sys/mount.h>
#include <sys/prctl.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
@@ -329,4 +331,221 @@ TEST_F(audit_flags, signal)
}
}
static int matches_log_fs_read_root(int audit_fd)
{
return audit_match_record(
audit_fd, AUDIT_LANDLOCK_ACCESS,
REGEX_LANDLOCK_PREFIX
" blockers=fs\\.read_dir path=\"/\" dev=\"[^\"]\\+\" ino=[0-9]\\+$",
NULL);
}
FIXTURE(audit_exec)
{
struct audit_filter audit_filter;
int audit_fd;
};
FIXTURE_VARIANT(audit_exec)
{
const int restrict_flags;
};
/* clang-format off */
FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(audit_exec, default) {
/* clang-format on */
.restrict_flags = 0,
};
/* clang-format off */
FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(audit_exec, same_exec_off) {
/* clang-format on */
.restrict_flags = LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SAME_EXEC_OFF,
};
/* clang-format off */
FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(audit_exec, subdomains_off) {
/* clang-format on */
.restrict_flags = LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SUBDOMAINS_OFF,
};
/* clang-format off */
FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(audit_exec, cross_exec_on) {
/* clang-format on */
.restrict_flags = LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_NEW_EXEC_ON,
};
/* clang-format off */
FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(audit_exec, subdomains_off_and_cross_exec_on) {
/* clang-format on */
.restrict_flags = LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SUBDOMAINS_OFF |
LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_NEW_EXEC_ON,
};
FIXTURE_SETUP(audit_exec)
{
disable_caps(_metadata);
set_cap(_metadata, CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL);
self->audit_fd = audit_init();
EXPECT_LE(0, self->audit_fd)
{
const char *error_msg;
/* kill "$(auditctl -s | sed -ne 's/^pid \([0-9]\+\)$/\1/p')" */
if (self->audit_fd == -EEXIST)
error_msg = "socket already in use (e.g. auditd)";
else
error_msg = strerror(-self->audit_fd);
TH_LOG("Failed to initialize audit: %s", error_msg);
}
/* Applies test filter for the bin_wait_pipe_sandbox program. */
EXPECT_EQ(0, audit_init_filter_exe(&self->audit_filter,
bin_wait_pipe_sandbox));
EXPECT_EQ(0, audit_filter_exe(self->audit_fd, &self->audit_filter,
AUDIT_ADD_RULE));
clear_cap(_metadata, CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL);
}
FIXTURE_TEARDOWN(audit_exec)
{
set_cap(_metadata, CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL);
EXPECT_EQ(0, audit_filter_exe(self->audit_fd, &self->audit_filter,
AUDIT_DEL_RULE));
clear_cap(_metadata, CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL);
EXPECT_EQ(0, close(self->audit_fd));
}
TEST_F(audit_exec, signal_and_open)
{
struct audit_records records;
int pipe_child[2], pipe_parent[2];
char buf_parent;
pid_t child;
int status;
ASSERT_EQ(0, pipe2(pipe_child, 0));
ASSERT_EQ(0, pipe2(pipe_parent, 0));
child = fork();
ASSERT_LE(0, child);
if (child == 0) {
const struct landlock_ruleset_attr layer1 = {
.scoped = LANDLOCK_SCOPE_SIGNAL,
};
char pipe_child_str[12], pipe_parent_str[12];
char *const argv[] = { (char *)bin_wait_pipe_sandbox,
pipe_child_str, pipe_parent_str, NULL };
int ruleset_fd;
/* Passes the pipe FDs to the executed binary. */
EXPECT_EQ(0, close(pipe_child[0]));
EXPECT_EQ(0, close(pipe_parent[1]));
snprintf(pipe_child_str, sizeof(pipe_child_str), "%d",
pipe_child[1]);
snprintf(pipe_parent_str, sizeof(pipe_parent_str), "%d",
pipe_parent[0]);
ruleset_fd =
landlock_create_ruleset(&layer1, sizeof(layer1), 0);
if (ruleset_fd < 0) {
perror("Failed to create a ruleset");
_exit(1);
}
prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
if (landlock_restrict_self(ruleset_fd,
variant->restrict_flags)) {
perror("Failed to restrict self");
_exit(1);
}
close(ruleset_fd);
ASSERT_EQ(0, execve(argv[0], argv, NULL))
{
TH_LOG("Failed to execute \"%s\": %s", argv[0],
strerror(errno));
};
_exit(1);
return;
}
EXPECT_EQ(0, close(pipe_child[1]));
EXPECT_EQ(0, close(pipe_parent[0]));
/* Waits for the child. */
EXPECT_EQ(1, read(pipe_child[0], &buf_parent, 1));
/* Tests that there was no denial until now. */
EXPECT_EQ(0, audit_count_records(self->audit_fd, &records));
EXPECT_EQ(0, records.access);
EXPECT_EQ(0, records.domain);
/*
* Wait for the child to do a first denied action by layer1 and
* sandbox itself with layer2.
*/
EXPECT_EQ(1, write(pipe_parent[1], ".", 1));
EXPECT_EQ(1, read(pipe_child[0], &buf_parent, 1));
/* Tests that the audit record only matches the child. */
if (variant->restrict_flags & LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_NEW_EXEC_ON) {
/* Matches the current domain. */
EXPECT_EQ(0, matches_log_signal(_metadata, self->audit_fd,
getpid(), NULL));
}
/* Checks that we didn't miss anything. */
EXPECT_EQ(0, audit_count_records(self->audit_fd, &records));
EXPECT_EQ(0, records.access);
/*
* Wait for the child to do a second denied action by layer1 and
* layer2, and sandbox itself with layer3.
*/
EXPECT_EQ(1, write(pipe_parent[1], ".", 1));
EXPECT_EQ(1, read(pipe_child[0], &buf_parent, 1));
/* Tests that the audit record only matches the child. */
if (variant->restrict_flags & LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_NEW_EXEC_ON) {
/* Matches the current domain. */
EXPECT_EQ(0, matches_log_signal(_metadata, self->audit_fd,
getpid(), NULL));
}
if (!(variant->restrict_flags &
LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SUBDOMAINS_OFF)) {
/* Matches the child domain. */
EXPECT_EQ(0, matches_log_fs_read_root(self->audit_fd));
}
/* Checks that we didn't miss anything. */
EXPECT_EQ(0, audit_count_records(self->audit_fd, &records));
EXPECT_EQ(0, records.access);
/* Waits for the child to terminate. */
EXPECT_EQ(1, write(pipe_parent[1], ".", 1));
ASSERT_EQ(child, waitpid(child, &status, 0));
ASSERT_EQ(1, WIFEXITED(status));
ASSERT_EQ(0, WEXITSTATUS(status));
/* Tests that the audit record only matches the child. */
if (!(variant->restrict_flags &
LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SUBDOMAINS_OFF)) {
/*
* Matches the child domains, which tests that the
* llcred->domain_exec bitmask is correctly updated with a new
* domain.
*/
EXPECT_EQ(0, matches_log_fs_read_root(self->audit_fd));
EXPECT_EQ(0, matches_log_signal(_metadata, self->audit_fd,
getpid(), NULL));
}
/* Checks that we didn't miss anything. */
EXPECT_EQ(0, audit_count_records(self->audit_fd, &records));
EXPECT_EQ(0, records.access);
}
TEST_HARNESS_MAIN
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
static const char bin_sandbox_and_launch[] = "./sandbox-and-launch";
static const char bin_wait_pipe[] = "./wait-pipe";
static const char bin_wait_pipe_sandbox[] = "./wait-pipe-sandbox";
static void _init_caps(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata, bool drop_all)
{
@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
/*
* Write in a pipe, wait, sandbox itself, test sandboxing, and wait again.
*
* Used by audit_exec.flags from audit_test.c
*
* Copyright © 2024-2025 Microsoft Corporation
*/
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <linux/landlock.h>
#include <linux/prctl.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <sys/prctl.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include "wrappers.h"
static int sync_with(int pipe_child, int pipe_parent)
{
char buf;
/* Signals that we are waiting. */
if (write(pipe_child, ".", 1) != 1) {
perror("Failed to write to first argument");
return 1;
}
/* Waits for the parent do its test. */
if (read(pipe_parent, &buf, 1) != 1) {
perror("Failed to write to the second argument");
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
const struct landlock_ruleset_attr layer2 = {
.handled_access_fs = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_DIR,
};
const struct landlock_ruleset_attr layer3 = {
.scoped = LANDLOCK_SCOPE_SIGNAL,
};
int err, pipe_child, pipe_parent, ruleset_fd;
/* The first argument must be the file descriptor number of a pipe. */
if (argc != 3) {
fprintf(stderr, "Wrong number of arguments (not two)\n");
return 1;
}
pipe_child = atoi(argv[1]);
pipe_parent = atoi(argv[2]);
/* PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS already set by parent. */
/* First step to test parent's layer1. */
err = sync_with(pipe_child, pipe_parent);
if (err)
return err;
/* Tries to send a signal, denied by layer1. */
if (!kill(getppid(), 0)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Successfully sent a signal to the parent");
return 1;
}
/* Second step to test parent's layer1 and our layer2. */
err = sync_with(pipe_child, pipe_parent);
if (err)
return err;
ruleset_fd = landlock_create_ruleset(&layer2, sizeof(layer2), 0);
if (ruleset_fd < 0) {
perror("Failed to create the layer2 ruleset");
return 1;
}
if (landlock_restrict_self(ruleset_fd, 0)) {
perror("Failed to restrict self");
return 1;
}
close(ruleset_fd);
/* Tries to send a signal, denied by layer1. */
if (!kill(getppid(), 0)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Successfully sent a signal to the parent");
return 1;
}
/* Tries to open ., denied by layer2. */
if (open("/", O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY | O_CLOEXEC) >= 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Successfully opened /");
return 1;
}
/* Third step to test our layer2 and layer3. */
err = sync_with(pipe_child, pipe_parent);
if (err)
return err;
ruleset_fd = landlock_create_ruleset(&layer3, sizeof(layer3), 0);
if (ruleset_fd < 0) {
perror("Failed to create the layer3 ruleset");
return 1;
}
if (landlock_restrict_self(ruleset_fd, 0)) {
perror("Failed to restrict self");
return 1;
}
close(ruleset_fd);
/* Tries to open ., denied by layer2. */
if (open("/", O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY | O_CLOEXEC) >= 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Successfully opened /");
return 1;
}
/* Tries to send a signal, denied by layer3. */
if (!kill(getppid(), 0)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Successfully sent a signal to the parent");
return 1;
}
return 0;
}