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update main-with-bazel from master branch

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BoringSSL Robot
2024-02-23 18:12:49 +00:00
parent 1a9d15d7b3 ec2a08dda8
commit d7e12c4e5c
30 changed files with 257 additions and 169 deletions
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BUILD.generated.bzl
+1 -1
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@@ -171,13 +171,13 @@ crypto_headers = [
"src/include/openssl/evp.h",
"src/include/openssl/evp_errors.h",
"src/include/openssl/ex_data.h",
"src/include/openssl/experimental/kyber.h",
"src/include/openssl/hkdf.h",
"src/include/openssl/hmac.h",
"src/include/openssl/hpke.h",
"src/include/openssl/hrss.h",
"src/include/openssl/is_boringssl.h",
"src/include/openssl/kdf.h",
"src/include/openssl/kyber.h",
"src/include/openssl/lhash.h",
"src/include/openssl/md4.h",
"src/include/openssl/md5.h",
sources.json
+1 -1
View File
@@ -405,13 +405,13 @@
"src/include/openssl/evp.h",
"src/include/openssl/evp_errors.h",
"src/include/openssl/ex_data.h",
"src/include/openssl/experimental/kyber.h",
"src/include/openssl/hkdf.h",
"src/include/openssl/hmac.h",
"src/include/openssl/hpke.h",
"src/include/openssl/hrss.h",
"src/include/openssl/is_boringssl.h",
"src/include/openssl/kdf.h",
"src/include/openssl/kyber.h",
"src/include/openssl/lhash.h",
"src/include/openssl/md4.h",
"src/include/openssl/md5.h",
src/API-CONVENTIONS.md
+3
View File
@@ -16,6 +16,9 @@ OpenSSL's legacy ASN.1, X.509, and PEM implementation. If possible, avoid using
them. These are left largely unmodified from upstream and are retained only for
compatibility with existing OpenSSL consumers.
Experimental public APIs are found in `include/openssl/experimental`. Use of
these will likely be incompatible with changes in the near future as they are
finalized.
## Forward declarations
src/crypto/bio/bio_test.cc
+1 -4
View File
@@ -813,10 +813,7 @@ TEST_P(BIOPairTest, TestPair) {
// A closed write end may not be written to.
EXPECT_EQ(0u, BIO_ctrl_get_write_guarantee(bio1));
EXPECT_EQ(-1, BIO_write(bio1, "_____", 5));
uint32_t err = ERR_get_error();
EXPECT_EQ(ERR_LIB_BIO, ERR_GET_LIB(err));
EXPECT_EQ(BIO_R_BROKEN_PIPE, ERR_GET_REASON(err));
EXPECT_TRUE(ErrorEquals(ERR_get_error(), ERR_LIB_BIO, BIO_R_BROKEN_PIPE));
// The other end is still functional.
EXPECT_EQ(5, BIO_write(bio2, "12345", 5));
src/crypto/cipher_extra/aead_test.cc
+7 -7
View File
@@ -381,7 +381,7 @@ TEST_P(PerAEADTest, TestVectorScatterGather) {
// Skip decryption for AEADs that don't implement open_gather().
if (!ret) {
int err = ERR_peek_error();
uint32_t err = ERR_peek_error();
if (ERR_GET_LIB(err) == ERR_LIB_CIPHER &&
ERR_GET_REASON(err) == CIPHER_R_CTRL_NOT_IMPLEMENTED) {
t->SkipCurrent();
@@ -709,10 +709,10 @@ TEST_P(PerAEADTest, InvalidNonceLength) {
nonce.data(), nonce.size(), nullptr /* in */,
0, kZeros /* ad */, ad_len));
uint32_t err = ERR_get_error();
EXPECT_EQ(ERR_LIB_CIPHER, ERR_GET_LIB(err));
// TODO(davidben): Merge these errors. https://crbug.com/boringssl/129.
if (ERR_GET_REASON(err) != CIPHER_R_UNSUPPORTED_NONCE_SIZE) {
EXPECT_EQ(CIPHER_R_INVALID_NONCE_SIZE, ERR_GET_REASON(err));
if (!ErrorEquals(err, ERR_LIB_CIPHER, CIPHER_R_UNSUPPORTED_NONCE_SIZE)) {
EXPECT_TRUE(
ErrorEquals(err, ERR_LIB_CIPHER, CIPHER_R_INVALID_NONCE_SIZE));
}
ctx.Reset();
@@ -723,9 +723,9 @@ TEST_P(PerAEADTest, InvalidNonceLength) {
nonce.data(), nonce.size(), kZeros /* in */,
sizeof(kZeros), kZeros /* ad */, ad_len));
err = ERR_get_error();
EXPECT_EQ(ERR_LIB_CIPHER, ERR_GET_LIB(err));
if (ERR_GET_REASON(err) != CIPHER_R_UNSUPPORTED_NONCE_SIZE) {
EXPECT_EQ(CIPHER_R_INVALID_NONCE_SIZE, ERR_GET_REASON(err));
if (!ErrorEquals(err, ERR_LIB_CIPHER, CIPHER_R_UNSUPPORTED_NONCE_SIZE)) {
EXPECT_TRUE(
ErrorEquals(err, ERR_LIB_CIPHER, CIPHER_R_INVALID_NONCE_SIZE));
}
}
}
src/crypto/dsa/dsa_test.cc
+2 -3
View File
@@ -267,9 +267,8 @@ TEST(DSATest, InvalidGroup) {
static const uint8_t kDigest[32] = {0};
EXPECT_FALSE(
DSA_sign(0, kDigest, sizeof(kDigest), sig.data(), &sig_len, dsa.get()));
uint32_t err = ERR_get_error();
EXPECT_EQ(ERR_LIB_DSA, ERR_GET_LIB(err));
EXPECT_EQ(DSA_R_INVALID_PARAMETERS, ERR_GET_REASON(err));
EXPECT_TRUE(
ErrorEquals(ERR_get_error(), ERR_LIB_DSA, DSA_R_INVALID_PARAMETERS));
}
// Signing and verifying should cleanly fail when the DSA object is empty.
src/crypto/evp/evp_extra_test.cc
+12 -16
View File
@@ -812,7 +812,8 @@ TEST(EVPExtraTest, MarshalEmptyPublicKey) {
bssl::ScopedCBB cbb;
EXPECT_FALSE(EVP_marshal_public_key(cbb.get(), empty.get()))
<< "Marshalled empty public key.";
EXPECT_EQ(EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM, ERR_GET_REASON(ERR_peek_last_error()));
EXPECT_TRUE(ErrorEquals(ERR_peek_last_error(), ERR_LIB_EVP,
EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM));
}
TEST(EVPExtraTest, d2i_PrivateKey) {
@@ -890,16 +891,14 @@ TEST(EVPExtraTest, Ed25519) {
// Passing too small of a buffer is noticed.
len = 31;
EXPECT_FALSE(EVP_PKEY_get_raw_public_key(pubkey.get(), buf, &len));
uint32_t err = ERR_get_error();
EXPECT_EQ(ERR_LIB_EVP, ERR_GET_LIB(err));
EXPECT_EQ(EVP_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, ERR_GET_REASON(err));
EXPECT_TRUE(
ErrorEquals(ERR_get_error(), ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL));
ERR_clear_error();
// There is no private key.
EXPECT_FALSE(EVP_PKEY_get_raw_private_key(pubkey.get(), nullptr, &len));
err = ERR_get_error();
EXPECT_EQ(ERR_LIB_EVP, ERR_GET_LIB(err));
EXPECT_EQ(EVP_R_NOT_A_PRIVATE_KEY, ERR_GET_REASON(err));
EXPECT_TRUE(
ErrorEquals(ERR_get_error(), ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_NOT_A_PRIVATE_KEY));
ERR_clear_error();
// The public key must encode properly.
@@ -915,9 +914,8 @@ TEST(EVPExtraTest, Ed25519) {
// The public key must gracefully fail to encode as a private key.
ASSERT_TRUE(CBB_init(cbb.get(), 0));
EXPECT_FALSE(EVP_marshal_private_key(cbb.get(), pubkey.get()));
err = ERR_get_error();
EXPECT_EQ(ERR_LIB_EVP, ERR_GET_LIB(err));
EXPECT_EQ(EVP_R_NOT_A_PRIVATE_KEY, ERR_GET_REASON(err));
EXPECT_TRUE(
ErrorEquals(ERR_get_error(), ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_NOT_A_PRIVATE_KEY));
ERR_clear_error();
cbb.Reset();
@@ -940,9 +938,8 @@ TEST(EVPExtraTest, Ed25519) {
// Passing too small of a buffer is noticed.
len = 31;
EXPECT_FALSE(EVP_PKEY_get_raw_private_key(privkey.get(), buf, &len));
err = ERR_get_error();
EXPECT_EQ(ERR_LIB_EVP, ERR_GET_LIB(err));
EXPECT_EQ(EVP_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, ERR_GET_REASON(err));
EXPECT_TRUE(
ErrorEquals(ERR_get_error(), ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL));
ERR_clear_error();
// The public key must be extractable.
len = 32;
@@ -995,9 +992,8 @@ TEST(EVPExtraTest, Ed25519) {
EVP_DigestSignInit(ctx.get(), nullptr, nullptr, nullptr, privkey.get()));
len = 31;
EXPECT_FALSE(EVP_DigestSign(ctx.get(), buf, &len, nullptr /* msg */, 0));
err = ERR_get_error();
EXPECT_EQ(ERR_LIB_EVP, ERR_GET_LIB(err));
EXPECT_EQ(EVP_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, ERR_GET_REASON(err));
EXPECT_TRUE(
ErrorEquals(ERR_get_error(), ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL));
ERR_clear_error();
}
src/crypto/evp/scrypt_test.cc
+2 -3
View File
@@ -69,9 +69,8 @@ TEST(ScryptTest, MemoryLimit) {
reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t *>(kSalt),
strlen(kSalt), 1048576 /* N */, 8 /* r */,
1 /* p */, 0 /* max_mem */, key, sizeof(key)));
uint32_t err = ERR_get_error();
EXPECT_EQ(ERR_LIB_EVP, ERR_GET_LIB(err));
EXPECT_EQ(EVP_R_MEMORY_LIMIT_EXCEEDED, ERR_GET_REASON(err));
EXPECT_TRUE(
ErrorEquals(ERR_get_error(), ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_MEMORY_LIMIT_EXCEEDED));
}
TEST(ScryptTest, InvalidParameters) {
src/crypto/fipsmodule/bn/bn_test.cc
+1 -3
View File
@@ -884,9 +884,7 @@ static void TestNotModSquare(BIGNUMFileTest *t, BN_CTX *ctx) {
EXPECT_FALSE(BN_mod_sqrt(ret.get(), not_mod_square.get(), p.get(), ctx))
<< "BN_mod_sqrt unexpectedly succeeded.";
uint32_t err = ERR_peek_error();
EXPECT_EQ(ERR_LIB_BN, ERR_GET_LIB(err));
EXPECT_EQ(BN_R_NOT_A_SQUARE, ERR_GET_REASON(err));
EXPECT_TRUE(ErrorEquals(ERR_peek_error(), ERR_LIB_BN, BN_R_NOT_A_SQUARE));
ERR_clear_error();
}
src/crypto/fipsmodule/service_indicator/service_indicator_test.cc
+2 -1
View File
@@ -657,7 +657,8 @@ TEST_P(AEADServiceIndicatorTest, EVP_AEAD) {
encrypt_output.size(), nonce.data(), nonce.size(),
kPlaintext, sizeof(kPlaintext), nullptr, 0)));
EXPECT_EQ(approved, FIPSStatus::NOT_APPROVED);
EXPECT_EQ(ERR_GET_REASON(ERR_get_error()), CIPHER_R_INVALID_NONCE);
EXPECT_TRUE(
ErrorEquals(ERR_get_error(), ERR_LIB_CIPHER, CIPHER_R_INVALID_NONCE));
}
}
src/crypto/hpke/hpke_test.cc
+6 -9
View File
@@ -554,9 +554,8 @@ TEST(HPKETest, SetupSenderBufferTooSmall) {
sender_ctx.get(), enc, &enc_len, sizeof(enc),
EVP_hpke_x25519_hkdf_sha256(), EVP_hpke_hkdf_sha256(),
EVP_hpke_aes_128_gcm(), public_key_r, sizeof(public_key_r), nullptr, 0));
uint32_t err = ERR_get_error();
EXPECT_EQ(ERR_LIB_EVP, ERR_GET_LIB(err));
EXPECT_EQ(EVP_R_INVALID_BUFFER_SIZE, ERR_GET_REASON(err));
EXPECT_TRUE(
ErrorEquals(ERR_get_error(), ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_BUFFER_SIZE));
ERR_clear_error();
}
@@ -587,9 +586,8 @@ TEST(HPKETest, SetupRecipientWrongLengthEnc) {
ASSERT_FALSE(EVP_HPKE_CTX_setup_recipient(
recipient_ctx.get(), key.get(), EVP_hpke_hkdf_sha256(),
EVP_hpke_aes_128_gcm(), bogus_enc, sizeof(bogus_enc), nullptr, 0));
uint32_t err = ERR_get_error();
EXPECT_EQ(ERR_LIB_EVP, ERR_GET_LIB(err));
EXPECT_EQ(EVP_R_INVALID_PEER_KEY, ERR_GET_REASON(err));
EXPECT_TRUE(
ErrorEquals(ERR_get_error(), ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_PEER_KEY));
ERR_clear_error();
}
@@ -603,9 +601,8 @@ TEST(HPKETest, SetupSenderWrongLengthPeerPublicValue) {
EVP_hpke_x25519_hkdf_sha256(), EVP_hpke_hkdf_sha256(),
EVP_hpke_aes_128_gcm(), bogus_public_key_r, sizeof(bogus_public_key_r),
nullptr, 0));
uint32_t err = ERR_get_error();
EXPECT_EQ(ERR_LIB_EVP, ERR_GET_LIB(err));
EXPECT_EQ(EVP_R_INVALID_PEER_KEY, ERR_GET_REASON(err));
EXPECT_TRUE(
ErrorEquals(ERR_get_error(), ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_PEER_KEY));
ERR_clear_error();
}
src/crypto/kyber/internal.h
+1 -1
View File
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@
#define OPENSSL_HEADER_CRYPTO_KYBER_INTERNAL_H
#include <openssl/base.h>
#include <openssl/kyber.h>
#include <openssl/experimental/kyber.h>
#if defined(__cplusplus)
extern "C" {
src/crypto/kyber/kyber.c
+1 -1
View File
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
* OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN
* CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */
#include <openssl/kyber.h>
#include <openssl/experimental/kyber.h>
#include <assert.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
src/crypto/kyber/kyber_test.cc
+1 -1
View File
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@
#include <openssl/bytestring.h>
#include <openssl/ctrdrbg.h>
#include <openssl/kyber.h>
#include <openssl/experimental/kyber.h>
#include "../test/file_test.h"
#include "../test/test_util.h"
src/crypto/pem/pem_test.cc
+4 -3
View File
@@ -20,6 +20,8 @@
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/rsa.h>
#include "../test/test_util.h"
// Test that implausible ciphers, notably an IV-less RC4, aren't allowed in PEM.
// This is a regression test for https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/6347,
@@ -39,7 +41,6 @@ TEST(PEMTest, NoRC4) {
bssl::UniquePtr<RSA> rsa(PEM_read_bio_RSAPublicKey(
bio.get(), nullptr, nullptr, const_cast<char *>("password")));
EXPECT_FALSE(rsa);
uint32_t err = ERR_get_error();
EXPECT_EQ(ERR_LIB_PEM, ERR_GET_LIB(err));
EXPECT_EQ(PEM_R_UNSUPPORTED_ENCRYPTION, ERR_GET_REASON(err));
EXPECT_TRUE(
ErrorEquals(ERR_get_error(), ERR_LIB_PEM, PEM_R_UNSUPPORTED_ENCRYPTION));
}
src/crypto/rsa_extra/rsa_test.cc
+6 -15
View File
@@ -712,9 +712,8 @@ TEST(RSATest, GenerateSmallKey) {
ASSERT_TRUE(BN_set_word(e.get(), RSA_F4));
EXPECT_FALSE(RSA_generate_key_ex(rsa.get(), 255, e.get(), nullptr));
uint32_t err = ERR_get_error();
EXPECT_EQ(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_GET_LIB(err));
EXPECT_EQ(RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL, ERR_GET_REASON(err));
EXPECT_TRUE(
ErrorEquals(ERR_get_error(), ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL));
}
// Attempting to generate an funny RSA key length should round down.
@@ -1175,17 +1174,13 @@ TEST(RSATest, MissingParameters) {
std::vector<uint8_t> out(RSA_size(sample.get()));
EXPECT_FALSE(RSA_sign(NID_sha256, kZeros, sizeof(kZeros), out.data(), &len_u,
rsa.get()));
uint32_t err = ERR_get_error();
EXPECT_EQ(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_GET_LIB(err));
EXPECT_EQ(RSA_R_VALUE_MISSING, ERR_GET_REASON(err));
EXPECT_TRUE(ErrorEquals(ERR_get_error(), ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_VALUE_MISSING));
size_t len;
EXPECT_FALSE(RSA_decrypt(rsa.get(), &len, out.data(), out.size(),
kOAEPCiphertext1, sizeof(kOAEPCiphertext1),
RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING));
err = ERR_get_error();
EXPECT_EQ(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_GET_LIB(err));
EXPECT_EQ(RSA_R_VALUE_MISSING, ERR_GET_REASON(err));
EXPECT_TRUE(ErrorEquals(ERR_get_error(), ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_VALUE_MISSING));
// A private key without e cannot perform public key operations.
rsa.reset(RSA_new_private_key_no_e(RSA_get0_n(sample.get()),
@@ -1194,15 +1189,11 @@ TEST(RSATest, MissingParameters) {
EXPECT_FALSE(RSA_verify(NID_sha256, kZeros, sizeof(kZeros), sig.data(),
sig.size(), rsa.get()));
err = ERR_get_error();
EXPECT_EQ(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_GET_LIB(err));
EXPECT_EQ(RSA_R_VALUE_MISSING, ERR_GET_REASON(err));
EXPECT_TRUE(ErrorEquals(ERR_get_error(), ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_VALUE_MISSING));
EXPECT_FALSE(RSA_encrypt(rsa.get(), &len, out.data(), out.size(), kPlaintext,
sizeof(kPlaintext), RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING));
err = ERR_get_error();
EXPECT_EQ(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_GET_LIB(err));
EXPECT_EQ(RSA_R_VALUE_MISSING, ERR_GET_REASON(err));
EXPECT_TRUE(ErrorEquals(ERR_get_error(), ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_VALUE_MISSING));
}
TEST(RSATest, Negative) {
src/crypto/test/test_util.cc
+15
View File
@@ -16,6 +16,8 @@
#include <ostream>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include "../internal.h"
@@ -67,3 +69,16 @@ std::string EncodeHex(bssl::Span<const uint8_t> in) {
return ret;
}
testing::AssertionResult ErrorEquals(uint32_t err, int lib, int reason) {
if (ERR_GET_LIB(err) == lib && ERR_GET_REASON(err) == reason) {
return testing::AssertionSuccess();
}
char buf[128], expected[128];
return testing::AssertionFailure()
<< "Got \"" << ERR_error_string_n(err, buf, sizeof(buf))
<< "\", wanted \""
<< ERR_error_string_n(ERR_PACK(lib, reason), expected,
sizeof(expected))
<< "\"";
}
src/crypto/test/test_util.h
+6
View File
@@ -24,6 +24,8 @@
#include <string>
#include <vector>
#include <gtest/gtest.h>
#include <openssl/span.h>
#include "../internal.h"
@@ -67,5 +69,9 @@ bool DecodeHex(std::vector<uint8_t> *out, const std::string &in);
// EncodeHex returns |in| encoded in hexadecimal.
std::string EncodeHex(bssl::Span<const uint8_t> in);
// ErrorEquals asserts that |err| is an error with library |lib| and reason
// |reason|.
testing::AssertionResult ErrorEquals(uint32_t err, int lib, int reason);
#endif // OPENSSL_HEADER_CRYPTO_TEST_TEST_UTIL_H
src/crypto/x509/by_dir.c
+12 -17
View File
@@ -72,6 +72,7 @@ typedef struct lookup_dir_hashes_st {
} BY_DIR_HASH;
typedef struct lookup_dir_entry_st {
CRYPTO_MUTEX lock;
char *dir;
int dir_type;
STACK_OF(BY_DIR_HASH) *hashes;
@@ -156,6 +157,7 @@ static int by_dir_hash_cmp(const BY_DIR_HASH *const *a,
static void by_dir_entry_free(BY_DIR_ENTRY *ent) {
if (ent != NULL) {
CRYPTO_MUTEX_cleanup(&ent->lock);
OPENSSL_free(ent->dir);
sk_BY_DIR_HASH_pop_free(ent->hashes, by_dir_hash_free);
OPENSSL_free(ent);
@@ -215,15 +217,12 @@ static int add_cert_dir(BY_DIR *ctx, const char *dir, int type) {
if (!ent) {
return 0;
}
CRYPTO_MUTEX_init(&ent->lock);
ent->dir_type = type;
ent->hashes = sk_BY_DIR_HASH_new(by_dir_hash_cmp);
ent->dir = OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1);
if (!ent->dir || !ent->hashes) {
by_dir_entry_free(ent);
return 0;
}
OPENSSL_strlcpy(ent->dir, ss, len + 1);
if (!sk_BY_DIR_ENTRY_push(ctx->dirs, ent)) {
ent->dir = OPENSSL_strndup(ss, len);
if (ent->dir == NULL || ent->hashes == NULL ||
!sk_BY_DIR_ENTRY_push(ctx->dirs, ent)) {
by_dir_entry_free(ent);
return 0;
}
@@ -232,10 +231,6 @@ static int add_cert_dir(BY_DIR *ctx, const char *dir, int type) {
return 1;
}
// g_ent_hashes_lock protects the |hashes| member of all |BY_DIR_ENTRY|
// objects.
static CRYPTO_MUTEX g_ent_hashes_lock = CRYPTO_MUTEX_INIT;
static int get_cert_by_subject(X509_LOOKUP *xl, int type, X509_NAME *name,
X509_OBJECT *ret) {
union {
@@ -300,7 +295,7 @@ static int get_cert_by_subject(X509_LOOKUP *xl, int type, X509_NAME *name,
}
if (type == X509_LU_CRL && ent->hashes) {
htmp.hash = h;
CRYPTO_MUTEX_lock_read(&g_ent_hashes_lock);
CRYPTO_MUTEX_lock_read(&ent->lock);
if (sk_BY_DIR_HASH_find(ent->hashes, &idx, &htmp)) {
hent = sk_BY_DIR_HASH_value(ent->hashes, idx);
k = hent->suffix;
@@ -308,7 +303,7 @@ static int get_cert_by_subject(X509_LOOKUP *xl, int type, X509_NAME *name,
hent = NULL;
k = 0;
}
CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock_read(&g_ent_hashes_lock);
CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock_read(&ent->lock);
} else {
k = 0;
hent = NULL;
@@ -341,7 +336,7 @@ static int get_cert_by_subject(X509_LOOKUP *xl, int type, X509_NAME *name,
// If a CRL, update the last file suffix added for this
if (type == X509_LU_CRL) {
CRYPTO_MUTEX_lock_write(&g_ent_hashes_lock);
CRYPTO_MUTEX_lock_write(&ent->lock);
// Look for entry again in case another thread added an entry
// first.
if (!hent) {
@@ -354,14 +349,14 @@ static int get_cert_by_subject(X509_LOOKUP *xl, int type, X509_NAME *name,
if (!hent) {
hent = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(BY_DIR_HASH));
if (hent == NULL) {
CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock_write(&g_ent_hashes_lock);
CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock_write(&ent->lock);
ok = 0;
goto finish;
}
hent->hash = h;
hent->suffix = k;
if (!sk_BY_DIR_HASH_push(ent->hashes, hent)) {
CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock_write(&g_ent_hashes_lock);
CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock_write(&ent->lock);
OPENSSL_free(hent);
ok = 0;
goto finish;
@@ -371,7 +366,7 @@ static int get_cert_by_subject(X509_LOOKUP *xl, int type, X509_NAME *name,
hent->suffix = k;
}
CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock_write(&g_ent_hashes_lock);
CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock_write(&ent->lock);
}
if (tmp != NULL) {
src/crypto/x509/x509_test.cc
+12 -18
View File
@@ -2062,9 +2062,8 @@ TEST(X509Test, TestEd25519BadParameters) {
ASSERT_FALSE(X509_verify(cert.get(), pkey.get()));
uint32_t err = ERR_get_error();
ASSERT_EQ(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_GET_LIB(err));
ASSERT_EQ(X509_R_INVALID_PARAMETER, ERR_GET_REASON(err));
EXPECT_TRUE(
ErrorEquals(ERR_get_error(), ERR_LIB_X509, X509_R_INVALID_PARAMETER));
ERR_clear_error();
}
@@ -2909,9 +2908,8 @@ TEST(X509Test, MismatchAlgorithms) {
ASSERT_TRUE(pkey);
EXPECT_FALSE(X509_verify(cert.get(), pkey.get()));
uint32_t err = ERR_get_error();
EXPECT_EQ(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_GET_LIB(err));
EXPECT_EQ(X509_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_MISMATCH, ERR_GET_REASON(err));
EXPECT_TRUE(ErrorEquals(ERR_get_error(), ERR_LIB_X509,
X509_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_MISMATCH));
}
TEST(X509Test, PEMX509Info) {
@@ -3044,9 +3042,8 @@ TEST(X509Test, ReadBIOEmpty) {
// certificates.
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> x509(d2i_X509_bio(bio.get(), nullptr));
EXPECT_FALSE(x509);
uint32_t err = ERR_get_error();
EXPECT_EQ(ERR_LIB_ASN1, ERR_GET_LIB(err));
EXPECT_EQ(ASN1_R_HEADER_TOO_LONG, ERR_GET_REASON(err));
EXPECT_TRUE(
ErrorEquals(ERR_get_error(), ERR_LIB_ASN1, ASN1_R_HEADER_TOO_LONG));
}
TEST(X509Test, ReadBIOOneByte) {
@@ -3058,9 +3055,8 @@ TEST(X509Test, ReadBIOOneByte) {
// to signal EOF.
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> x509(d2i_X509_bio(bio.get(), nullptr));
EXPECT_FALSE(x509);
uint32_t err = ERR_get_error();
EXPECT_EQ(ERR_LIB_ASN1, ERR_GET_LIB(err));
EXPECT_EQ(ASN1_R_NOT_ENOUGH_DATA, ERR_GET_REASON(err));
EXPECT_TRUE(
ErrorEquals(ERR_get_error(), ERR_LIB_ASN1, ASN1_R_NOT_ENOUGH_DATA));
}
TEST(X509Test, PartialBIOReturn) {
@@ -3773,9 +3769,8 @@ TEST(X509Test, AlgorithmParameters) {
cert = CertFromPEM(kP256InvalidParam);
ASSERT_TRUE(cert);
EXPECT_FALSE(X509_verify(cert.get(), key.get()));
uint32_t err = ERR_get_error();
EXPECT_EQ(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_GET_LIB(err));
EXPECT_EQ(X509_R_INVALID_PARAMETER, ERR_GET_REASON(err));
EXPECT_TRUE(
ErrorEquals(ERR_get_error(), ERR_LIB_X509, X509_R_INVALID_PARAMETER));
// RSA parameters should be NULL, but we accept omitted ones.
key = PrivateKeyFromPEM(kRSAKey);
@@ -3792,9 +3787,8 @@ TEST(X509Test, AlgorithmParameters) {
cert = CertFromPEM(kRSAInvalidParam);
ASSERT_TRUE(cert);
EXPECT_FALSE(X509_verify(cert.get(), key.get()));
err = ERR_get_error();
EXPECT_EQ(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_GET_LIB(err));
EXPECT_EQ(X509_R_INVALID_PARAMETER, ERR_GET_REASON(err));
EXPECT_TRUE(
ErrorEquals(ERR_get_error(), ERR_LIB_X509, X509_R_INVALID_PARAMETER));
}
TEST(X509Test, GeneralName) {
src/include/openssl/kyber.h → src/include/openssl/experimental/kyber.h
View File
src/include/openssl/ssl.h
+28 -10
View File
@@ -848,15 +848,22 @@ OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_CTX_set0_buffer_pool(SSL_CTX *ctx,
// the wire) but does not include the leaf. Both client and server certificates
// use these functions.
//
// Prefer to configure the certificate before the private key. If configured in
// the other order, inconsistent private keys will be silently dropped, rather
// than return an error. Additionally, overwriting a previously-configured
// certificate and key pair only works if the certificate is configured first.
//
// Certificates and keys may be configured before the handshake or dynamically
// in the early callback and certificate callback.
// SSL_CTX_use_certificate sets |ctx|'s leaf certificate to |x509|. It returns
// one on success and zero on failure.
// one on success and zero on failure. If |ctx| has a private key which is
// inconsistent with |x509|, the private key is silently dropped.
OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CTX_use_certificate(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x509);
// SSL_use_certificate sets |ssl|'s leaf certificate to |x509|. It returns one
// on success and zero on failure.
// on success and zero on failure. If |ssl| has a private key which is
// inconsistent with |x509|, the private key is silently dropped.
OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_use_certificate(SSL *ssl, X509 *x509);
// SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey sets |ctx|'s private key to |pkey|. It returns one on
@@ -990,14 +997,6 @@ SSL_get0_peer_delegation_algorithms(const SSL *ssl,
// chain of |ssl|.
OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_certs_clear(SSL *ssl);
// SSL_CTX_check_private_key returns one if the certificate and private key
// configured in |ctx| are consistent and zero otherwise.
OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CTX_check_private_key(const SSL_CTX *ctx);
// SSL_check_private_key returns one if the certificate and private key
// configured in |ssl| are consistent and zero otherwise.
OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_check_private_key(const SSL *ssl);
// SSL_CTX_get0_certificate returns |ctx|'s leaf certificate.
OPENSSL_EXPORT X509 *SSL_CTX_get0_certificate(const SSL_CTX *ctx);
@@ -5317,6 +5316,25 @@ OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_set1_curves_list(SSL *ssl, const char *curves);
// returns this value, but we define this constant for compatibility.
#define TLSEXT_nid_unknown 0x1000000
// SSL_CTX_check_private_key returns one if |ctx| has both a certificate and
// private key, and zero otherwise.
//
// This function does not check consistency because the library checks when the
// certificate and key are individually configured. However, if the private key
// is configured before the certificate, inconsistent private keys are silently
// dropped. Some callers are inadvertently relying on this function to detect
// when this happens.
//
// Instead, callers should configure the certificate first, then the private
// key, checking for errors in each. This function is then unnecessary.
OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CTX_check_private_key(const SSL_CTX *ctx);
// SSL_check_private_key returns one if |ssl| has both a certificate and private
// key, and zero otherwise.
//
// See discussion in |SSL_CTX_check_private_key|.
OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_check_private_key(const SSL *ssl);
// Compliance policy configurations
//
src/ssl/internal.h
-1
View File
@@ -3202,7 +3202,6 @@ bool ssl_is_key_type_supported(int key_type);
// message on the error queue.
bool ssl_compare_public_and_private_key(const EVP_PKEY *pubkey,
const EVP_PKEY *privkey);
bool ssl_cert_check_private_key(const CERT *cert, const EVP_PKEY *privkey);
bool ssl_get_new_session(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
bool ssl_encrypt_ticket(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out,
const SSL_SESSION *session);
src/ssl/ssl_cert.cc
-24
View File
@@ -493,30 +493,6 @@ bool ssl_compare_public_and_private_key(const EVP_PKEY *pubkey,
return false;
}
bool ssl_cert_check_private_key(const CERT *cert, const EVP_PKEY *privkey) {
if (privkey == nullptr) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY_ASSIGNED);
return false;
}
if (cert->chain == nullptr ||
sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_value(cert->chain.get(), 0) == nullptr) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED);
return false;
}
CBS cert_cbs;
CRYPTO_BUFFER_init_CBS(sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_value(cert->chain.get(), 0),
&cert_cbs);
UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY> pubkey = ssl_cert_parse_pubkey(&cert_cbs);
if (!pubkey) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_TYPE);
return false;
}
return ssl_compare_public_and_private_key(pubkey.get(), privkey);
}
bool ssl_cert_check_key_usage(const CBS *in, enum ssl_key_usage_t bit) {
CBS buf = *in;
src/ssl/ssl_key_share.cc
+1 -1
View File
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@
#include <openssl/curve25519.h>
#include <openssl/ec.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/kyber.h>
#include <openssl/experimental/kyber.h>
#include <openssl/hrss.h>
#include <openssl/mem.h>
#include <openssl/nid.h>
src/ssl/ssl_lib.cc
+23 -4
View File
@@ -1724,17 +1724,36 @@ int SSL_has_pending(const SSL *ssl) {
return SSL_pending(ssl) != 0 || !ssl->s3->read_buffer.empty();
}
static bool has_cert_and_key(const CERT *cert) {
// TODO(davidben): If |cert->key_method| is set, that should be fine too.
if (cert->privatekey == nullptr) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY_ASSIGNED);
return false;
}
if (cert->chain == nullptr ||
sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_value(cert->chain.get(), 0) == nullptr) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED);
return false;
}
return true;
}
int SSL_CTX_check_private_key(const SSL_CTX *ctx) {
return ssl_cert_check_private_key(ctx->cert.get(),
ctx->cert->privatekey.get());
// There is no need to actually check consistency because inconsistent values
// can never be configured.
return has_cert_and_key(ctx->cert.get());
}
int SSL_check_private_key(const SSL *ssl) {
if (!ssl->config) {
return 0;
}
return ssl_cert_check_private_key(ssl->config->cert.get(),
ssl->config->cert->privatekey.get());
// There is no need to actually check consistency because inconsistent values
// can never be configured.
return has_cert_and_key(ssl->config->cert.get());
}
long SSL_get_default_timeout(const SSL *ssl) {
src/ssl/ssl_privkey.cc
+15 -5
View File
@@ -83,11 +83,21 @@ static bool ssl_set_pkey(CERT *cert, EVP_PKEY *pkey) {
return false;
}
if (cert->chain != nullptr &&
sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_value(cert->chain.get(), 0) != nullptr &&
// Sanity-check that the private key and the certificate match.
!ssl_cert_check_private_key(cert, pkey)) {
return false;
// If the leaf certificate has been configured, check it matches.
const CRYPTO_BUFFER *leaf = cert->chain != nullptr
? sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_value(cert->chain.get(), 0)
: nullptr;
if (leaf != nullptr) {
CBS cert_cbs;
CRYPTO_BUFFER_init_CBS(leaf, &cert_cbs);
UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY> pubkey = ssl_cert_parse_pubkey(&cert_cbs);
if (!pubkey) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_TYPE);
return false;
}
if (!ssl_compare_public_and_private_key(pubkey.get(), pkey)) {
return false;
}
}
cert->privatekey = UpRef(pkey);
src/ssl/ssl_test.cc
+88 -18
View File
@@ -3021,9 +3021,8 @@ TEST(SSLTest, WriteAfterWrongVersionOnEarlyData) {
// The client processes the ServerHello and fails.
EXPECT_EQ(-1, SSL_do_handshake(client.get()));
EXPECT_EQ(SSL_ERROR_SSL, SSL_get_error(client.get(), -1));
uint32_t err = ERR_get_error();
EXPECT_EQ(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_GET_LIB(err));
EXPECT_EQ(SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_ON_EARLY_DATA, ERR_GET_REASON(err));
EXPECT_TRUE(ErrorEquals(ERR_get_error(), ERR_LIB_SSL,
SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_ON_EARLY_DATA));
// The client should have written an alert to the transport.
const uint8_t *unused;
@@ -3035,9 +3034,8 @@ TEST(SSLTest, WriteAfterWrongVersionOnEarlyData) {
// Writing should fail, with the same error as the handshake.
EXPECT_EQ(-1, SSL_write(client.get(), "a", 1));
EXPECT_EQ(SSL_ERROR_SSL, SSL_get_error(client.get(), -1));
err = ERR_get_error();
EXPECT_EQ(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_GET_LIB(err));
EXPECT_EQ(SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_ON_EARLY_DATA, ERR_GET_REASON(err));
EXPECT_TRUE(ErrorEquals(ERR_get_error(), ERR_LIB_SSL,
SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_ON_EARLY_DATA));
// Nothing should be written to the transport.
ASSERT_TRUE(BIO_mem_contents(mem.get(), &unused, &len));
@@ -4556,6 +4554,82 @@ TEST(SSLTest, SetChainAndKeyMismatch) {
ERR_clear_error();
}
TEST(SSLTest, CertThenKeyMismatch) {
bssl::UniquePtr<SSL_CTX> ctx(SSL_CTX_new(TLS_method()));
ASSERT_TRUE(ctx);
bssl::UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY> key = GetTestKey();
ASSERT_TRUE(key);
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> leaf = GetChainTestCertificate();
ASSERT_TRUE(leaf);
// There is no key or certificate, so |SSL_CTX_check_private_key| fails.
EXPECT_FALSE(SSL_CTX_check_private_key(ctx.get()));
// With only a certificate, |SSL_CTX_check_private_key| still fails.
ASSERT_TRUE(SSL_CTX_use_certificate(ctx.get(), leaf.get()));
EXPECT_FALSE(SSL_CTX_check_private_key(ctx.get()));
// The private key does not match the certificate, so it should fail.
EXPECT_FALSE(SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(ctx.get(), key.get()));
// Checking the private key fails, but this is really because there is still
// no private key.
EXPECT_FALSE(SSL_CTX_check_private_key(ctx.get()));
EXPECT_EQ(nullptr, SSL_CTX_get0_privatekey(ctx.get()));
}
TEST(SSLTest, KeyThenCertMismatch) {
bssl::UniquePtr<SSL_CTX> ctx(SSL_CTX_new(TLS_method()));
ASSERT_TRUE(ctx);
bssl::UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY> key = GetTestKey();
ASSERT_TRUE(key);
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> leaf = GetChainTestCertificate();
ASSERT_TRUE(leaf);
// There is no key or certificate, so |SSL_CTX_check_private_key| fails.
EXPECT_FALSE(SSL_CTX_check_private_key(ctx.get()));
// With only a key, |SSL_CTX_check_private_key| still fails.
ASSERT_TRUE(SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(ctx.get(), key.get()));
EXPECT_FALSE(SSL_CTX_check_private_key(ctx.get()));
// If configuring a certificate that doesn't match the key, configuration
// actually succeeds. We just silently drop the private key.
ASSERT_TRUE(SSL_CTX_use_certificate(ctx.get(), leaf.get()));
EXPECT_EQ(nullptr, SSL_CTX_get0_privatekey(ctx.get()));
// Some callers configure the private key, then the certificate, and then
// expect |SSL_CTX_check_private_key| to check consistency. It does, but only
// by way of noticing there is no private key. The actual consistency check
// happened in |SSL_CTX_use_certificate|.
EXPECT_FALSE(SSL_CTX_check_private_key(ctx.get()));
}
TEST(SSLTest, OverrideCertAndKey) {
// It is possible to override an existing certificate by configuring
// certificate, then key, due to |SSL_CTX_use_certificate|'s above silent
// dropping behavior.
bssl::UniquePtr<SSL_CTX> ctx(SSL_CTX_new(TLS_method()));
ASSERT_TRUE(ctx);
bssl::UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY> key = GetTestKey();
ASSERT_TRUE(key);
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> leaf = GetTestCertificate();
ASSERT_TRUE(leaf);
bssl::UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY> key2 = GetChainTestKey();
ASSERT_TRUE(key2);
bssl::UniquePtr<X509> leaf2 = GetChainTestCertificate();
ASSERT_TRUE(leaf2);
ASSERT_TRUE(SSL_CTX_use_certificate(ctx.get(), leaf.get()));
ASSERT_TRUE(SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(ctx.get(), key.get()));
ASSERT_TRUE(SSL_CTX_use_certificate(ctx.get(), leaf2.get()));
ASSERT_TRUE(SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(ctx.get(), key2.get()));
}
TEST(SSLTest, SetChainAndKeyCtx) {
bssl::UniquePtr<SSL_CTX> client_ctx(SSL_CTX_new(TLS_with_buffers_method()));
ASSERT_TRUE(client_ctx);
@@ -5114,9 +5188,8 @@ TEST(SSLTest, NoCiphersAvailable) {
int ret = SSL_do_handshake(ssl.get());
EXPECT_EQ(-1, ret);
EXPECT_EQ(SSL_ERROR_SSL, SSL_get_error(ssl.get(), ret));
uint32_t err = ERR_get_error();
EXPECT_EQ(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_GET_LIB(err));
EXPECT_EQ(SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE, ERR_GET_REASON(err));
EXPECT_TRUE(
ErrorEquals(ERR_get_error(), ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE));
}
TEST_P(SSLVersionTest, SessionVersion) {
@@ -7101,9 +7174,8 @@ TEST_F(QUICMethodTest, ExcessProvidedData) {
// EncryptedExtensions on key change.
ASSERT_EQ(SSL_do_handshake(client_.get()), -1);
ASSERT_EQ(SSL_get_error(client_.get(), -1), SSL_ERROR_SSL);
uint32_t err = ERR_get_error();
EXPECT_EQ(ERR_GET_LIB(err), ERR_LIB_SSL);
EXPECT_EQ(ERR_GET_REASON(err), SSL_R_EXCESS_HANDSHAKE_DATA);
EXPECT_TRUE(
ErrorEquals(ERR_get_error(), ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_EXCESS_HANDSHAKE_DATA));
// The client sends an alert in response to this. The alert is sent at
// handshake level because we install write secrets before read secrets and
@@ -7552,9 +7624,8 @@ TEST_P(SSLVersionTest, DoubleSSLError) {
// The client handshake should terminate on a certificate verification
// error.
EXPECT_EQ(SSL_ERROR_SSL, client_err);
uint32_t err = ERR_peek_error();
EXPECT_EQ(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_GET_LIB(err));
EXPECT_EQ(SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED, ERR_GET_REASON(err));
EXPECT_TRUE(ErrorEquals(ERR_peek_error(), ERR_LIB_SSL,
SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED));
break;
}
@@ -7830,9 +7901,8 @@ TEST(SSLTest, WriteWhileExplicitRenegotiate) {
// We never renegotiate as a server.
ASSERT_EQ(-1, SSL_read(server.get(), buf, sizeof(buf)));
ASSERT_EQ(SSL_ERROR_SSL, SSL_get_error(server.get(), -1));
uint32_t err = ERR_get_error();
EXPECT_EQ(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_GET_LIB(err));
EXPECT_EQ(SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION, ERR_GET_REASON(err));
EXPECT_TRUE(
ErrorEquals(ERR_get_error(), ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION));
}
TEST(SSLTest, ConnectionPropertiesDuringRenegotiate) {
src/tool/speed.cc
+1 -1
View File
@@ -38,8 +38,8 @@
#include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/experimental/kyber.h>
#include <openssl/hrss.h>
#include <openssl/kyber.h>
#include <openssl/mem.h>
#include <openssl/nid.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
src/util/doc.config
+5 -1
View File
@@ -36,7 +36,6 @@
"include/openssl/engine.h",
"include/openssl/hkdf.h",
"include/openssl/hmac.h",
"include/openssl/kyber.h",
"include/openssl/md5.h",
"include/openssl/rc4.h",
"include/openssl/rsa.h",
@@ -60,6 +59,11 @@
"include/openssl/conf.h",
"include/openssl/x509.h"
]
},{
"Name": "Experimental primitives. Will be removed and replaced when standardized!",
"Headers": [
"include/openssl/experimental/kyber.h"
]
},{
"Name": "SSL implementation",
"Headers": [