Reworking bssl_crypto: HKDF

Change-Id: I10052a0bf922ba6f68effdcebeca2c4da97345af
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/65170
Reviewed-by: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This commit is contained in:
Adam Langley
2024-01-13 15:14:05 +00:00
committed by Boringssl LUCI CQ
parent 190cc52a0b
commit b7534cfb26
2 changed files with 229 additions and 165 deletions
+229 -164
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@@ -12,87 +12,225 @@
* OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN
* CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
use crate::{
digest,
digest::{Sha256, Sha512},
sealed, CSlice, CSliceMut, ForeignTypeRef,
};
use alloc::vec::Vec;
//! Implements the HMAC-based Key Derivation Function from
//! <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5869>.
//!
//! One-shot operation:
//!
//! ```
//! use bssl_crypto::{hkdf, hkdf::HkdfSha256};
//!
//! let key: [u8; 32] = HkdfSha256::derive(b"secret", hkdf::Salt::NonEmpty(b"salt"),
//! b"info");
//! ```
//!
//! If deriving several keys that vary only in the `info` parameter, then part
//! of the computation can be shared by calculating the "pseudo-random key".
//! This is purely a performance optimisation.
//!
//! ```
//! use bssl_crypto::{hkdf, hkdf::HkdfSha256};
//!
//! let prk = HkdfSha256::extract(b"secret", hkdf::Salt::NonEmpty(b"salt"));
//! let key1 : [u8; 32] = prk.expand(b"info1");
//! let key2 : [u8; 32] = prk.expand(b"info2");
//!
//! assert_eq!(key1, HkdfSha256::derive(b"secret", hkdf::Salt::NonEmpty(b"salt"),
//! b"info1"));
//! assert_eq!(key2, HkdfSha256::derive(b"secret", hkdf::Salt::NonEmpty(b"salt"),
//! b"info2"));
//! ```
//!
//! The above examples assume that the size of the outputs is known at compile
//! time. (And only output lengths less than 256 bytes are supported.)
//!
//! ```compile_fail
//! use bssl_crypto::{hkdf, hkdf::HkdfSha256};
//!
//! let key: [u8; 256] = HkdfSha256::derive(b"secret", hkdf::Salt::None, b"info");
//! ```
//!
//! To use HKDF with longer, or run-time, lengths, use `derive_into` and
//! `extract_into`:
//!
//! ```
//! use bssl_crypto::{hkdf, hkdf::HkdfSha256};
//!
//! let mut out = [0u8; 50];
//! HkdfSha256::derive_into(b"secret", hkdf::Salt::None, b"info", &mut out).expect(
//! "HKDF can't produce that much");
//!
//! assert_eq!(out, HkdfSha256::derive(b"secret", hkdf::Salt::None, b"info"));
//! ```
use crate::{digest, sealed, with_output_array, FfiMutSlice, FfiSlice, ForeignTypeRef};
use core::marker::PhantomData;
/// Implementation of HKDF-SHA-256
pub type HkdfSha256 = Hkdf<Sha256>;
pub type HkdfSha256 = Hkdf<digest::Sha256>;
/// Implementation of HKDF-SHA-512
pub type HkdfSha512 = Hkdf<Sha512>;
pub type HkdfSha512 = Hkdf<digest::Sha512>;
/// Error type returned from the HKDF-Expand operations when the output key material has
/// an invalid length
/// Error type returned when too much output is requested from an HKDF operation.
#[derive(Debug)]
pub struct InvalidLength;
pub struct TooLong;
/// Implementation of HKDF operations which are generic over a provided hashing functions. Type
/// aliases are provided above for convenience of commonly used hashes
pub struct Hkdf<MD: digest::Algorithm> {
salt: Option<Vec<u8>>,
ikm: Vec<u8>,
_marker: PhantomData<MD>,
/// HKDF's optional salt values. See <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5869#section-3.1>
pub enum Salt<'a> {
/// No salt.
None,
/// An explicit salt. Note that an empty value here is interpreted the same
/// as if passing `None`.
NonEmpty(&'a [u8]),
}
impl<MD: digest::Algorithm> Hkdf<MD> {
/// The max length of the output key material used for expanding
pub const MAX_OUTPUT_LENGTH: usize = MD::OUTPUT_LEN * 255;
/// Creates a new instance of HKDF from a salt and key material
pub fn new(salt: Option<&[u8]>, ikm: &[u8]) -> Self {
Self {
salt: salt.map(Vec::from),
ikm: Vec::from(ikm),
_marker: PhantomData,
impl Salt<'_> {
fn as_ffi_ptr(&self) -> *const u8 {
match self {
Salt::None => core::ptr::null(),
Salt::NonEmpty(salt) => salt.as_ffi_ptr(),
}
}
/// Computes HKDF-Expand operation from RFC 5869. The info argument for the expand is set to
/// the concatenation of all the elements of info_components. Returns InvalidLength if the
/// output is too large.
pub fn expand_multi_info(
&self,
info_components: &[&[u8]],
okm: &mut [u8],
) -> Result<(), InvalidLength> {
self.expand(&info_components.concat(), okm)
fn len(&self) -> usize {
match self {
Salt::None => 0,
Salt::NonEmpty(salt) => salt.len(),
}
}
}
/// HKDF for any of the implemented hash functions. The aliases [`HkdfSha256`]
/// and [`HkdfSha512`] are provided for the most common cases.
pub struct Hkdf<MD: digest::Algorithm>(PhantomData<MD>);
impl<MD: digest::Algorithm> Hkdf<MD> {
/// The maximum number of bytes of key material that can be produced.
pub const MAX_OUTPUT_LEN: usize = MD::OUTPUT_LEN * 255;
/// Derive key material from the given secret, salt, and info. Attempting
/// to derive more than 255 bytes is a compile-time error, see `derive_into`
/// for longer outputs.
///
/// The semantics of the arguments are complex. See
/// <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5869#section-3>.
pub fn derive<const N: usize>(secret: &[u8], salt: Salt, info: &[u8]) -> [u8; N] {
Self::extract(secret, salt).expand(info)
}
/// Computes HKDF-Expand operation from RFC 5869. Returns InvalidLength if the output is too large.
pub fn expand(&self, info: &[u8], okm: &mut [u8]) -> Result<(), InvalidLength> {
// extract the salt bytes from the option, or empty slice if option is None
let salt = self.salt.as_deref().unwrap_or_default();
/// Derive key material from the given secret, salt, and info. Attempting
/// to derive more than `MAX_OUTPUT_LEN` bytes is a run-time error.
///
/// The semantics of the arguments are complex. See
/// <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5869#section-3>.
pub fn derive_into(
secret: &[u8],
salt: Salt,
info: &[u8],
out: &mut [u8],
) -> Result<(), TooLong> {
Self::extract(secret, salt).expand_into(info, out)
}
//validate the output size
(okm.len() <= Self::MAX_OUTPUT_LENGTH && !okm.is_empty())
.then(|| {
let mut okm_cslice = CSliceMut::from(okm);
/// Extract a pseudo-random key from the given secret and salt. This can
/// be used to avoid redoing computation when computing several keys that
/// vary only in the `info` parameter.
pub fn extract(secret: &[u8], salt: Salt) -> Prk {
let mut prk = [0u8; bssl_sys::EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE as usize];
let mut prk_len = 0usize;
let evp_md = MD::get_md(sealed::Sealed).as_ptr();
unsafe {
// Safety: `EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE` is the maximum output size of
// `HKDF_extract` so it'll never overrun the buffer.
bssl_sys::HKDF_extract(
prk.as_mut_ffi_ptr(),
&mut prk_len,
evp_md,
secret.as_ffi_ptr(),
secret.len(),
salt.as_ffi_ptr(),
salt.len(),
);
}
// This is documented to be always be true.
assert!(prk_len <= prk.len());
Prk {
prk,
len: prk_len,
evp_md,
}
}
}
// Safety:
// - We validate the output length above, so invalid length errors will never be hit
// which leaves allocation failures as the only possible error case, in which case
// we panic immediately
let result = unsafe {
bssl_sys::HKDF(
okm_cslice.as_mut_ptr(),
okm_cslice.len(),
MD::get_md(sealed::Sealed).as_ptr(),
CSlice::from(self.ikm.as_slice()).as_ptr(),
self.ikm.as_slice().len(),
CSlice::from(salt).as_ptr(),
salt.len(),
CSlice::from(info).as_ptr(),
info.len(),
)
};
assert!(result > 0, "Allocation failure in bssl_sys::HKDF");
/// A pseudo-random key, an intermediate value in the HKDF computation.
pub struct Prk {
prk: [u8; bssl_sys::EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE as usize],
len: usize,
evp_md: *const bssl_sys::EVP_MD,
}
#[allow(clippy::let_unit_value)]
impl Prk {
/// Derive key material for the given info parameter. Attempting
/// to derive more than 255 bytes is a compile-time error, see `expand_into`
/// for longer outputs.
pub fn expand<const N: usize>(&self, info: &[u8]) -> [u8; N] {
// This is the odd way to write a static assertion that uses a const
// parameter in Rust. Even then, Rust cannot reference `MAX_OUTPUT_LEN`.
// But if we safely assume that all hash functions output at least a
// byte then 255 is a safe lower bound on `MAX_OUTPUT_LEN`.
// A doctest at the top of the module checks that this assert is effective.
struct StaticAssert<const N: usize, const BOUND: usize>;
impl<const N: usize, const BOUND: usize> StaticAssert<N, BOUND> {
const BOUNDS_CHECK: () = assert!(N < BOUND, "Large outputs not supported");
}
let _ = StaticAssert::<N, 256>::BOUNDS_CHECK;
unsafe {
with_output_array(|out, out_len| {
// Safety: `HKDF_expand` writes exactly `out_len` bytes or else
// returns zero. `evp_md` is valid by construction.
let result = bssl_sys::HKDF_expand(
out,
out_len,
self.evp_md,
self.prk.as_ffi_ptr(),
self.len,
info.as_ffi_ptr(),
info.len(),
);
// The output length is known to be within bounds so the only other
// possibily is an allocation failure, which we don't attempt to
// handle.
assert_eq!(result, 1);
})
.ok_or(InvalidLength)
}
}
/// Derive key material from the given info parameter. Attempting
/// to derive more than the HKDF's `MAX_OUTPUT_LEN` bytes is a run-time
/// error.
pub fn expand_into(&self, info: &[u8], out: &mut [u8]) -> Result<(), TooLong> {
// Safety: writes at most `out.len()` bytes into `out`.
// `evp_md` is valid by construction.
let result = unsafe {
bssl_sys::HKDF_expand(
out.as_mut_ffi_ptr(),
out.len(),
self.evp_md,
self.prk.as_ffi_ptr(),
self.len,
info.as_ffi_ptr(),
info.len(),
)
};
if result == 1 {
Ok(())
} else {
Err(TooLong)
}
}
}
@@ -105,29 +243,17 @@ impl<MD: digest::Algorithm> Hkdf<MD> {
)]
mod tests {
use crate::{
hkdf::{HkdfSha256, HkdfSha512},
hkdf::{HkdfSha256, HkdfSha512, Salt},
test_helpers::{decode_hex, decode_hex_into_vec},
};
use core::iter;
struct Test {
ikm: Vec<u8>,
salt: Vec<u8>,
info: Vec<u8>,
okm: Vec<u8>,
}
#[test]
fn hkdf_sha_256_test() {
fn sha256() {
let ikm = decode_hex_into_vec("0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b");
let salt = decode_hex_into_vec("000102030405060708090a0b0c");
let salt_vec = decode_hex_into_vec("000102030405060708090a0b0c");
let salt = Salt::NonEmpty(&salt_vec);
let info = decode_hex_into_vec("f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9");
let hk = HkdfSha256::new(Some(salt.as_slice()), ikm.as_slice());
let mut okm = [0u8; 42];
hk.expand(&info, &mut okm)
.expect("42 is a valid length for Sha256 to output");
let okm: [u8; 42] = HkdfSha256::derive(ikm.as_slice(), salt, info.as_slice());
let expected = decode_hex(
"3cb25f25faacd57a90434f64d0362f2a2d2d0a90cf1a5a4c5db02d56ecc4c5bf34007208d5b887185865",
);
@@ -135,15 +261,12 @@ mod tests {
}
#[test]
fn hkdf_sha512_test() {
fn sha512() {
let ikm = decode_hex_into_vec("5d3db20e8238a90b62a600fa57fdb318");
let salt = decode_hex_into_vec("1d6f3b38a1e607b5e6bcd4af1800a9d3");
let salt_vec = decode_hex_into_vec("1d6f3b38a1e607b5e6bcd4af1800a9d3");
let salt = Salt::NonEmpty(&salt_vec);
let info = decode_hex_into_vec("2bc5f39032b6fc87da69ba8711ce735b169646fd");
let hk = HkdfSha512::new(Some(salt.as_slice()), ikm.as_slice());
let mut okm = [0u8; 42];
hk.expand(&info, &mut okm).expect("Should succeed");
let okm: [u8; 42] = HkdfSha512::derive(ikm.as_slice(), salt, info.as_slice());
let expected = decode_hex(
"8c3cf7122dcb5eb7efaf02718f1faf70bca20dcb75070e9d0871a413a6c05fc195a75aa9ffc349d70aae",
);
@@ -152,7 +275,13 @@ mod tests {
// Test Vectors from https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5869.
#[test]
fn test_rfc5869_sha256() {
fn rfc5869_sha256() {
struct Test {
ikm: Vec<u8>,
salt: Vec<u8>,
info: Vec<u8>,
okm: Vec<u8>,
}
let tests = [
Test {
// Test Case 1
@@ -202,6 +331,7 @@ mod tests {
"8da4e775a563c18f715f802a063c5a31b8a11f5c5ee1879ec3454e5f3c738d2d9d201395faa4b61a96c8"),
},
];
for Test {
ikm,
salt,
@@ -210,90 +340,25 @@ mod tests {
} in tests.iter()
{
let salt = if salt.is_empty() {
None
Salt::None
} else {
Some(salt.as_slice())
Salt::NonEmpty(&salt)
};
let hkdf = HkdfSha256::new(salt, ikm.as_slice());
let mut okm2 = vec![0u8; okm.len()];
assert!(hkdf.expand(info.as_slice(), &mut okm2).is_ok());
assert!(
HkdfSha256::derive_into(ikm.as_slice(), salt, info.as_slice(), &mut okm2).is_ok()
);
assert_eq!(okm2.as_slice(), okm.as_slice());
}
}
#[test]
fn test_lengths() {
let hkdf = HkdfSha256::new(None, &[]);
let mut longest = vec![0u8; HkdfSha256::MAX_OUTPUT_LENGTH];
assert!(hkdf.expand(&[], &mut longest).is_ok());
// start at 1 since 0 is an invalid length
let lengths = 1..HkdfSha256::MAX_OUTPUT_LENGTH + 1;
fn max_output() {
let hkdf = HkdfSha256::extract(b"", Salt::None);
let mut longest = vec![0u8; HkdfSha256::MAX_OUTPUT_LEN];
assert!(hkdf.expand_into(b"", &mut longest).is_ok());
for length in lengths {
let mut okm = vec![0u8; length];
assert!(hkdf.expand(&[], &mut okm).is_ok());
assert_eq!(okm.len(), length);
assert_eq!(okm[..], longest[..length]);
}
}
#[test]
fn test_max_length() {
let hkdf = HkdfSha256::new(Some(&[]), &[]);
let mut okm = vec![0u8; HkdfSha256::MAX_OUTPUT_LENGTH];
assert!(hkdf.expand(&[], &mut okm).is_ok());
}
#[test]
fn test_max_length_exceeded() {
let hkdf = HkdfSha256::new(Some(&[]), &[]);
let mut okm = vec![0u8; HkdfSha256::MAX_OUTPUT_LENGTH + 1];
assert!(hkdf.expand(&[], &mut okm).is_err());
}
#[test]
fn test_unsupported_length() {
let hkdf = HkdfSha256::new(Some(&[]), &[]);
let mut okm = vec![0u8; 90000];
assert!(hkdf.expand(&[], &mut okm).is_err());
}
#[test]
fn test_expand_multi_info() {
let info_components = &[
&b"09090909090909090909090909090909090909090909"[..],
&b"8a8a8a8a8a8a8a8a8a8a8a8a8a8a8a8a8a8a8a8a8a"[..],
&b"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0"[..],
&b"4c4c4c4c4c4c4c4c4c4c4c4c4c4c4c4c4c4c4"[..],
&b"1d1d1d1d1d1d1d1d1d1d1d1d1d1d1d1d1d"[..],
];
let hkdf = HkdfSha256::new(None, b"some ikm here");
// Compute HKDF-Expand on the concatenation of all the info components
let mut oneshot_res = [0u8; 16];
hkdf.expand(&info_components.concat(), &mut oneshot_res)
.unwrap();
// Now iteratively join the components of info_components until it's all 1 component. The value
// of HKDF-Expand should be the same throughout
let mut num_concatted = 0;
let mut info_head = Vec::new();
while num_concatted < info_components.len() {
info_head.extend(info_components[num_concatted]);
// Build the new input to be the info head followed by the remaining components
let input: Vec<&[u8]> = iter::once(info_head.as_slice())
.chain(info_components.iter().cloned().skip(num_concatted + 1))
.collect();
// Compute and compare to the one-shot answer
let mut multipart_res = [0u8; 16];
hkdf.expand_multi_info(&input, &mut multipart_res).unwrap();
assert_eq!(multipart_res, oneshot_res);
num_concatted += 1;
}
let mut too_long = vec![0u8; HkdfSha256::MAX_OUTPUT_LEN + 1];
assert!(hkdf.expand_into(b"", &mut too_long).is_err());
}
}
-1
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@@ -47,7 +47,6 @@ pub mod digest;
/// Ed25519, a signature scheme.
pub mod ed25519;
/// HKDF, a hash-based key derivation function.
pub mod hkdf;
/// HMAC, a hash-based message authentication code.