OERV-RUNTIME/boringssl
2
0
Fork 0
Code Issues Packages Projects Releases Wiki Activity

update main-with-bazel from master branch

Browse Source
This commit is contained in:
BoringSSL Robot
2023-12-14 19:38:23 +00:00
parent 6d928147e3 b251d813ec
commit 9628c2e095
6 changed files with 86 additions and 42 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files
src/crypto/x509/internal.h
+2 -3
View File
@@ -379,9 +379,8 @@ struct x509_store_ctx_st {
X509_STORE_CTX_check_crl_fn check_crl; // Check CRL validity
// The following is built up
int valid; // if 0, rebuild chain
int last_untrusted; // index of last untrusted cert
STACK_OF(X509) *chain; // chain of X509s - built up and trusted
int last_untrusted; // index of last untrusted cert
STACK_OF(X509) *chain; // chain of X509s - built up and trusted
// When something goes wrong, this is why
int error_depth;
src/crypto/x509/x509_test.cc
+47 -14
View File
@@ -12,6 +12,8 @@
* OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN
* CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */
#include <limits.h>
#include <algorithm>
#include <functional>
#include <string>
@@ -1180,33 +1182,37 @@ TEST(X509Test, TestVerify) {
// though in different ways.
for (bool trusted_first : {true, false}) {
SCOPED_TRACE(trusted_first);
std::function<void(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *)> configure_callback;
if (!trusted_first) {
bool override_depth = false;
int depth = -1;
auto configure_callback = [&](X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) {
// Note we need the callback to clear the flag. Setting |flags| to zero
// only skips setting new flags.
configure_callback = [&](X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) {
if (!trusted_first) {
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_clear_flags(param, X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST);
};
}
}
if (override_depth) {
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(param, depth);
}
};
// No trust anchors configured.
ASSERT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY,
EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY,
Verify(leaf.get(), /*roots=*/{}, /*intermediates=*/{},
/*crls=*/{}, /*flags=*/0, configure_callback));
ASSERT_EQ(
EXPECT_EQ(
X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY,
Verify(leaf.get(), /*roots=*/{}, {intermediate.get()}, /*crls=*/{},
/*flags=*/0, configure_callback));
// Each chain works individually.
ASSERT_EQ(X509_V_OK, Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()}, {intermediate.get()},
EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_OK, Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()}, {intermediate.get()},
/*crls=*/{}, /*flags=*/0, configure_callback));
ASSERT_EQ(X509_V_OK, Verify(leaf.get(), {cross_signing_root.get()},
EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_OK, Verify(leaf.get(), {cross_signing_root.get()},
{intermediate.get(), root_cross_signed.get()},
/*crls=*/{}, /*flags=*/0, configure_callback));
// When both roots are available, we pick one or the other.
ASSERT_EQ(X509_V_OK,
EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_OK,
Verify(leaf.get(), {cross_signing_root.get(), root.get()},
{intermediate.get(), root_cross_signed.get()}, /*crls=*/{},
/*flags=*/0, configure_callback));
@@ -1215,7 +1221,7 @@ TEST(X509Test, TestVerify) {
// the cross-sign in the intermediates. With |trusted_first|, we
// preferentially stop path-building at |intermediate|. Without
// |trusted_first|, the "altchains" logic repairs it.
ASSERT_EQ(X509_V_OK, Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()},
EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_OK, Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()},
{intermediate.get(), root_cross_signed.get()},
/*crls=*/{}, /*flags=*/0, configure_callback));
@@ -1226,7 +1232,7 @@ TEST(X509Test, TestVerify) {
// This test exists to confirm our current behavior, but these modes are
// just workarounds for not having an actual path-building verifier. If we
// fix it, this test can be removed.
ASSERT_EQ(trusted_first ? X509_V_OK
EXPECT_EQ(trusted_first ? X509_V_OK
: X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY,
Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()},
{intermediate.get(), root_cross_signed.get()}, /*crls=*/{},
@@ -1234,18 +1240,45 @@ TEST(X509Test, TestVerify) {
// |forgery| is signed by |leaf_no_key_usage|, but is rejected because the
// leaf is not a CA.
ASSERT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA,
EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA,
Verify(forgery.get(), {intermediate_self_signed.get()},
{leaf_no_key_usage.get()}, /*crls=*/{}, /*flags=*/0,
configure_callback));
// Test that one cannot skip Basic Constraints checking with a contorted set
// of roots and intermediates. This is a regression test for CVE-2015-1793.
ASSERT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA,
EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA,
Verify(forgery.get(),
{intermediate_self_signed.get(), root_cross_signed.get()},
{leaf_no_key_usage.get(), intermediate.get()}, /*crls=*/{},
/*flags=*/0, configure_callback));
// Test depth limits. |configure_callback| looks at |override_depth| and
// |depth|. Negative numbers have historically worked, so test those too.
for (int d : {-4, -3, -2, -1, 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, INT_MAX - 3, INT_MAX - 2,
INT_MAX - 1, INT_MAX}) {
SCOPED_TRACE(d);
override_depth = true;
depth = d;
// A chain with a leaf, two intermediates, and a root is depth two.
EXPECT_EQ(
depth >= 2 ? X509_V_OK : X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY,
Verify(leaf.get(), {cross_signing_root.get()},
{intermediate.get(), root_cross_signed.get()},
/*crls=*/{}, /*flags=*/0, configure_callback));
// A chain with a leaf, a root, and no intermediates is depth zero.
EXPECT_EQ(
depth >= 0 ? X509_V_OK : X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY,
Verify(root_cross_signed.get(), {cross_signing_root.get()}, {},
/*crls=*/{}, /*flags=*/0, configure_callback));
// An explicitly trusted self-signed certificate is unaffected by depth
// checks.
EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_OK,
Verify(cross_signing_root.get(), {cross_signing_root.get()}, {},
/*crls=*/{}, /*flags=*/0, configure_callback));
}
}
}
src/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
+16 -14
View File
@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@
* [including the GNU Public Licence.] */
#include <ctype.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <time.h>
@@ -160,11 +161,11 @@ static X509 *lookup_cert_match(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) {
}
int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) {
X509 *x, *xtmp, *xtmp2, *chain_ss = NULL;
X509 *xtmp, *xtmp2, *chain_ss = NULL;
int bad_chain = 0;
X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = ctx->param;
int depth, i, ok = 0;
int num, j, retry, trust;
int i, ok = 0;
int j, retry, trust;
STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp = NULL;
if (ctx->cert == NULL) {
@@ -207,17 +208,17 @@ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) {
goto end;
}
num = (int)sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1);
depth = param->depth;
int num = (int)sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1);
// |param->depth| does not include the leaf certificate or the trust anchor,
// so the maximum size is 2 more.
int max_chain = param->depth >= INT_MAX - 2 ? INT_MAX : param->depth + 2;
for (;;) {
// If we have enough, we break
if (depth < num) {
break; // FIXME: If this happens, we should take
// note of it and, if appropriate, use the
// X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error code
// later.
if (num >= max_chain) {
// FIXME: If this happens, we should take note of it and, if appropriate,
// use the X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error code later.
break;
}
int is_self_signed;
@@ -321,8 +322,9 @@ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) {
}
// We now lookup certs from the certificate store
for (;;) {
// If we have enough, we break
if (depth < num) {
if (num >= max_chain) {
// FIXME: If this happens, we should take note of it and, if
// appropriate, use the X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error code later.
break;
}
if (!cert_self_signed(x, &is_self_signed)) {
src/include/openssl/base.h
+1 -1
View File
@@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ extern "C" {
// A consumer may use this symbol in the preprocessor to temporarily build
// against multiple revisions of BoringSSL at the same time. It is not
// recommended to do so for longer than is necessary.
#define BORINGSSL_API_VERSION 28
#define BORINGSSL_API_VERSION 29
#if defined(BORINGSSL_SHARED_LIBRARY)
src/include/openssl/ssl.h
+4 -4
View File
@@ -2601,13 +2601,13 @@ OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_set1_host(SSL *ssl, const char *hostname);
OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_set_hostflags(SSL *ssl, unsigned flags);
// SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth sets the maximum depth of a certificate chain
// accepted in verification. This number does not include the leaf, so a depth
// of 1 allows the leaf and one CA certificate.
// accepted in verification. This count excludes both the target certificate and
// the trust anchor (root certificate).
OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth(SSL_CTX *ctx, int depth);
// SSL_set_verify_depth sets the maximum depth of a certificate chain accepted
// in verification. This number does not include the leaf, so a depth of 1
// allows the leaf and one CA certificate.
// in verification. This count excludes both the target certificate and the
// trust anchor (root certificate).
OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_set_verify_depth(SSL *ssl, int depth);
// SSL_CTX_get_verify_depth returns the maximum depth of a certificate accepted
src/include/openssl/x509.h
+16 -6
View File
@@ -3522,8 +3522,14 @@ typedef int (*X509_STORE_CTX_get_crl_fn)(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **crl,
X509 *x);
typedef int (*X509_STORE_CTX_check_crl_fn)(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl);
// X509_STORE_set_depth configures |store| to, by default, limit certificate
// chains to |depth| intermediate certificates. This count excludes both the
// target certificate and the trust anchor (root certificate).
OPENSSL_EXPORT int X509_STORE_set_depth(X509_STORE *store, int depth);
// X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth configures |ctx| to, by default, limit certificate
// chains to |depth| intermediate certificates. This count excludes both the
// target certificate and the trust anchor (root certificate).
OPENSSL_EXPORT void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth);
#define X509_STORE_CTX_set_app_data(ctx, data) \
@@ -3734,14 +3740,12 @@ OPENSSL_EXPORT int X509_STORE_set1_param(X509_STORE *store,
//
// As of writing these late defaults are a depth limit (see
// |X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth|) and the |X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST| flag. This
// warning does not apply if the parameters were set in |store|. That is,
// callers may safely set a concrete depth limit in |store|, but unlimited depth
// must be configured at |X509_STORE_CTX|.
// warning does not apply if the parameters were set in |store|.
//
// TODO(crbug.com/boringssl/441): This behavior is very surprising. Can we
// remove this notion of late defaults? A depth limit of 100 can probably be
// applied unconditionally. |X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST| is mostly a workaround
// for poor path-building.
// remove this notion of late defaults? The unsettable value at |X509_STORE| is
// -1, which rejects everything but explicitly-trusted self-signed certificates.
// |X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST| is mostly a workaround for poor path-building.
OPENSSL_EXPORT X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_get0_param(X509_STORE *store);
// X509_STORE_set_verify_cb acts like |X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb| but sets
@@ -3963,6 +3967,10 @@ OPENSSL_EXPORT int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param,
int purpose);
OPENSSL_EXPORT int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param,
int trust);
// X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth configures |param| to limit certificate chains to
// |depth| intermediate certificates. This count excludes both the target
// certificate and the trust anchor (root certificate).
OPENSSL_EXPORT void X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param,
int depth);
@@ -4043,6 +4051,8 @@ OPENSSL_EXPORT int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param,
OPENSSL_EXPORT int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip_asc(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param,
const char *ipasc);
// X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_depth returns the maximum depth configured in |param|.
// See |X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth|.
OPENSSL_EXPORT int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_depth(const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param);
typedef void *(*X509V3_EXT_NEW)(void);