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Only bypass the signature verification itself in fuzzer mode.

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Keep the setup_ctx logic, which, among other things, checks if the
signature algorithm is valid. This cuts down on some unnecessary
fuzzer-mode suppressions.

Change-Id: I644f75630791c9741a1b372e5f83ae7ff9f01c2f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/36766
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This commit is contained in:
David Benjamin
2019-07-19 23:31:14 +00:00
committed by CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org
parent 9f5c419b9f
commit 4dfd5af701
5 changed files with 16 additions and 28 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files
ssl/handshake_client.cc
+2 -7
View File
@@ -1071,13 +1071,8 @@ static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_read_server_key_exchange(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
return ssl_hs_error;
}
bool sig_ok = ssl_public_key_verify(ssl, signature, signature_algorithm,
hs->peer_pubkey.get(), transcript_data);
#if defined(BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE)
sig_ok = true;
ERR_clear_error();
#endif
if (!sig_ok) {
if (!ssl_public_key_verify(ssl, signature, signature_algorithm,
hs->peer_pubkey.get(), transcript_data)) {
// bad signature
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR);
ssl/handshake_server.cc
+2 -8
View File
@@ -1410,14 +1410,8 @@ static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_read_client_certificate_verify(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
return ssl_hs_error;
}
bool sig_ok =
ssl_public_key_verify(ssl, signature, signature_algorithm,
hs->peer_pubkey.get(), hs->transcript.buffer());
#if defined(BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE)
sig_ok = true;
ERR_clear_error();
#endif
if (!sig_ok) {
if (!ssl_public_key_verify(ssl, signature, signature_algorithm,
hs->peer_pubkey.get(), hs->transcript.buffer())) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR);
return ssl_hs_error;
ssl/ssl_privkey.cc
+10 -3
View File
@@ -236,9 +236,16 @@ bool ssl_public_key_verify(SSL *ssl, Span<const uint8_t> signature,
uint16_t sigalg, EVP_PKEY *pkey,
Span<const uint8_t> in) {
ScopedEVP_MD_CTX ctx;
return setup_ctx(ssl, ctx.get(), pkey, sigalg, true /* verify */) &&
EVP_DigestVerify(ctx.get(), signature.data(), signature.size(),
in.data(), in.size());
if (!setup_ctx(ssl, ctx.get(), pkey, sigalg, true /* verify */)) {
return false;
}
bool ok = EVP_DigestVerify(ctx.get(), signature.data(), signature.size(),
in.data(), in.size());
#if defined(BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE)
ok = true;
ERR_clear_error();
#endif
return ok;
}
enum ssl_private_key_result_t ssl_private_key_decrypt(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
ssl/test/runner/fuzzer_mode.json
-3
View File
@@ -18,9 +18,6 @@
"BadECDSA-*": "Fuzzer mode always accepts a signature.",
"*-InvalidSignature-*": "Fuzzer mode always accepts a signature.",
"*Auth-Verify-RSA_PKCS1_*-TLS13*": "Fuzzer mode always accepts a signature.",
"*Auth-Verify-ECDSA_SHA1-TLS13*": "Fuzzer mode always accepts a signature.",
"*Auth-Verify-ECDSA_P224_*-TLS13*": "Fuzzer mode always accepts a signature.",
"Verify-*Auth-SignatureType*": "Fuzzer mode always accepts a signature.",
"ECDSACurveMismatch-Verify-TLS13*": "Fuzzer mode always accepts a signature.",
"InvalidChannelIDSignature-*": "Fuzzer mode always accepts a signature.",
ssl/tls13_both.cc
+2 -7
View File
@@ -370,13 +370,8 @@ bool tls13_process_certificate_verify(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, const SSLMessage &msg)
return false;
}
bool sig_ok = ssl_public_key_verify(ssl, signature, signature_algorithm,
hs->peer_pubkey.get(), input);
#if defined(BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE)
sig_ok = true;
ERR_clear_error();
#endif
if (!sig_ok) {
if (!ssl_public_key_verify(ssl, signature, signature_algorithm,
hs->peer_pubkey.get(), input)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR);
return false;