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Don't call ssl3_read_message from ssl3_read_app_data.

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With this change, it should now always be the case that rr->length is
zero on entry to ssl3_read_message. This will let us detach everything
but application data from rr. This pushes some init_buf invariants down
into tls_open_record so we don't need to maintain them everywhere.

Change-Id: I206747434e0a9603eea7d19664734fd16fa2de8e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/21524
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
This commit is contained in:
David Benjamin
2017-10-17 17:54:01 +00:00
committed by CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org
parent 97250f4d64
commit 33febf6048
4 changed files with 52 additions and 32 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files
ssl/internal.h
+4
View File
@@ -1001,6 +1001,10 @@ size_t ssl_max_handshake_message_len(const SSL *ssl);
// dtls_clear_incoming_messages releases all buffered incoming messages.
void dtls_clear_incoming_messages(SSL *ssl);
// tls_can_accept_handshake_data returns whether |ssl| is able to accept more
// data into handshake buffer.
bool tls_can_accept_handshake_data(const SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert);
// tls_has_unprocessed_handshake_data returns whether there is buffered
// handshake data that has not been consumed by |get_message|.
bool tls_has_unprocessed_handshake_data(const SSL *ssl);
ssl/s3_both.cc
+20 -14
View File
@@ -464,6 +464,26 @@ bool ssl3_get_message(SSL *ssl, SSLMessage *out) {
return true;
}
bool tls_can_accept_handshake_data(const SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert) {
// If there is a complete message, the caller must have consumed it first.
SSLMessage msg;
size_t bytes_needed;
if (parse_message(ssl, &msg, &bytes_needed)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
*out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return false;
}
// Enforce the limit so the peer cannot force us to buffer 16MB.
if (bytes_needed > 4 + ssl_max_handshake_message_len(ssl)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
*out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
return false;
}
return true;
}
bool tls_has_unprocessed_handshake_data(const SSL *ssl) {
size_t msg_len = 0;
if (ssl->s3->has_message) {
@@ -478,20 +498,6 @@ bool tls_has_unprocessed_handshake_data(const SSL *ssl) {
}
int ssl3_read_message(SSL *ssl) {
SSLMessage msg;
size_t bytes_needed;
if (parse_message(ssl, &msg, &bytes_needed)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
}
// Enforce the limit so the peer cannot force us to buffer 16MB.
if (bytes_needed > 4 + ssl_max_handshake_message_len(ssl)) {
ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
return -1;
}
// Re-create the handshake buffer if needed.
if (ssl->init_buf == NULL) {
ssl->init_buf = BUF_MEM_new();
ssl/s3_pkt.cc
+14 -18
View File
@@ -365,22 +365,20 @@ int ssl3_read_app_data(SSL *ssl, bool *out_got_handshake, uint8_t *buf, int len,
SSL3_RECORD *rr = &ssl->s3->rrec;
for (;;) {
// A previous iteration may have read a partial handshake message. Do not
// allow more app data in that case.
int has_hs_data = ssl->init_buf != NULL && ssl->init_buf->length > 0;
// Get new packet if necessary.
if (rr->length == 0 && !has_hs_data) {
if (rr->length == 0) {
int ret = ssl3_get_record(ssl);
if (ret <= 0) {
return ret;
}
}
if (has_hs_data || rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
const bool is_early_data_read = ssl->server && SSL_in_early_data(ssl);
if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
// If reading 0-RTT data, reject handshake data. 0-RTT data is terminated
// by an alert.
if (SSL_in_init(ssl)) {
if (is_early_data_read) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
return -1;
@@ -395,20 +393,19 @@ int ssl3_read_app_data(SSL *ssl, bool *out_got_handshake, uint8_t *buf, int len,
return -1;
}
// Parse post-handshake handshake messages.
int ret = ssl3_read_message(ssl);
if (ret <= 0) {
return ret;
if (ssl->init_buf == NULL) {
ssl->init_buf = BUF_MEM_new();
}
if (ssl->init_buf == NULL ||
!BUF_MEM_append(ssl->init_buf, rr->data, rr->length)) {
return -1;
}
*out_got_handshake = true;
rr->length = 0;
ssl_read_buffer_discard(ssl);
return -1;
}
const int is_early_data_read = ssl->server &&
ssl->s3->hs != NULL &&
ssl->s3->hs->can_early_read &&
ssl_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION;
// Handle the end_of_early_data alert.
if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT &&
rr->length == 2 &&
@@ -457,8 +454,7 @@ int ssl3_read_change_cipher_spec(SSL *ssl) {
}
}
if (rr->type != SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC ||
tls_has_unprocessed_handshake_data(ssl)) {
if (rr->type != SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
return -1;
ssl/tls_record.cc
+14
View File
@@ -192,6 +192,12 @@ static enum ssl_open_record_t do_tls_open_record(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_type,
size_t *out_consumed,
uint8_t *out_alert,
Span<uint8_t> in) {
// If there is an unprocessed handshake message or we are already buffering
// too much, stop before decrypting another handshake record.
if (!tls_can_accept_handshake_data(ssl, out_alert)) {
return ssl_open_record_error;
}
CBS cbs = CBS(in);
// Decode the record header.
@@ -321,6 +327,14 @@ static enum ssl_open_record_t do_tls_open_record(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_type,
return ssl_process_alert(ssl, out_alert, *out);
}
// Handshake messages may not interleave with any other record type.
if (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE &&
tls_has_unprocessed_handshake_data(ssl)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
*out_alert = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
return ssl_open_record_error;
}
ssl->s3->warning_alert_count = 0;
*out_type = type;