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Remove CERT_PKEY::valid_flags.

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CERT_PKEY_SIGN isn't meaningful since, without strict mode, we always fall back
to SHA-1 anyway. So the digest is never NULL when CERT_PKEY_SIGN is computed.
The entire valid_flags is now back to it's pre-1.0.2 check of seeing if the
certificate and key are configured.

This finally removes the sensitivity between valid_flags and selecting the
digest, so we can defer choosing the digest all we like.

Change-Id: I9f9952498f512d7f0cc799497f7c5b52145a48af
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2288
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This commit is contained in:
David Benjamin
2014-11-18 22:22:23 +00:00
committed by Adam Langley
parent f31e681acf
commit 033e5f47d1
6 changed files with 39 additions and 89 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files
ssl/s3_clnt.c
+1 -2
View File
@@ -1649,11 +1649,10 @@ int ssl3_get_certificate_request(SSL *s)
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_certificate_request, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
goto err;
}
/* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
/* Clear certificate digests. */
for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
{
s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
}
if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, &supported_signature_algorithms))
{
ssl/s3_lib.c
-1
View File
@@ -1806,7 +1806,6 @@ const SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_choose_cipher(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *clnt,
allow = srvr;
}
tls1_set_cert_validity(s);
ssl_get_compatible_server_ciphers(s, &mask_k, &mask_a);
for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(prio); i++)
ssl/ssl_cert.c
-3
View File
@@ -290,7 +290,6 @@ CERT *ssl_cert_dup(CERT *cert)
goto err;
}
}
rpk->valid_flags = 0;
}
/* Set digests to defaults. NB: we don't copy existing values as they
@@ -389,8 +388,6 @@ void ssl_cert_clear_certs(CERT *c)
sk_X509_pop_free(cpk->chain, X509_free);
cpk->chain = NULL;
}
/* Clear all flags. */
cpk->valid_flags = 0;
}
}
ssl/ssl_lib.c
+12 -11
View File
@@ -2104,11 +2104,16 @@ void SSL_set_cert_cb(SSL *s, int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, void *arg), void *arg)
ssl_cert_set_cert_cb(s->cert, cb, arg);
}
static int ssl_has_key(SSL *s, size_t idx)
{
CERT_PKEY *cpk = &s->cert->pkeys[idx];
return cpk->x509 && cpk->privatekey;
}
void ssl_get_compatible_server_ciphers(SSL *s, unsigned long *out_mask_k,
unsigned long *out_mask_a)
{
CERT *c = s->cert;
CERT_PKEY *cpk;
int rsa_enc, rsa_sign, dh_tmp;
unsigned long mask_k, mask_a;
int have_ecc_cert, ecdsa_ok;
@@ -2126,12 +2131,9 @@ void ssl_get_compatible_server_ciphers(SSL *s, unsigned long *out_mask_k,
dh_tmp = (c->dh_tmp != NULL || c->dh_tmp_cb != NULL);
have_ecdh_tmp = (c->ecdh_tmp || c->ecdh_tmp_cb || c->ecdh_tmp_auto);
cpk = &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC]);
rsa_enc = cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_VALID;
cpk = &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN]);
rsa_sign = cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
cpk = &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC]);
have_ecc_cert = cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_VALID;
rsa_enc = ssl_has_key(s, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
rsa_sign = ssl_has_key(s, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
have_ecc_cert = ssl_has_key(s, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
mask_k = 0;
mask_a = 0;
@@ -2149,16 +2151,15 @@ void ssl_get_compatible_server_ciphers(SSL *s, unsigned long *out_mask_k,
mask_a |= SSL_aNULL;
/* An ECC certificate may be usable for ECDSA cipher suites depending on
* the key usage extension. */
* the key usage extension and on the client's curve preferences. */
if (have_ecc_cert)
{
cpk = &c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC];
x = cpk->x509;
x = c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509;
/* This call populates extension flags (ex_flags) */
X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0);
ecdsa_ok = (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) ?
(x->ex_kusage & X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE) : 1;
if (!(cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_SIGN))
if (!tls1_check_ec_cert(s, x))
ecdsa_ok = 0;
if (ecdsa_ok)
{
ssl/ssl_locl.h
+7 -14
View File
@@ -421,13 +421,6 @@
#define SSL_GET_MESSAGE_DONT_HASH_MESSAGE 0
#define SSL_GET_MESSAGE_HASH_MESSAGE 1
/* Flags for a CERT_PKEY. */
/* Certificate can be used with this session */
#define CERT_PKEY_VALID 0x1
/* Certificate can also be used for signing */
#define CERT_PKEY_SIGN 0x2
typedef struct cert_pkey_st
{
X509 *x509;
@@ -436,11 +429,6 @@ typedef struct cert_pkey_st
const EVP_MD *digest;
/* Chain for this certificate */
STACK_OF(X509) *chain;
/* Set if CERT_PKEY can be used with current SSL session: e.g.
* appropriate curve, signature algorithms etc. If zero it can't be
* used at all.
*/
int valid_flags;
} CERT_PKEY;
typedef struct cert_st
@@ -1046,6 +1034,13 @@ int tls1_get_shared_curve(SSL *s);
int tls1_set_curves(uint16_t **out_curve_ids, size_t *out_curve_ids_len,
const int *curves, size_t ncurves);
/* tls1_check_ec_cert returns one if |x| is an ECC certificate with curve and
* point format compatible with the client's preferences. Otherwise it returns
* zero. */
int tls1_check_ec_cert(SSL *s, X509 *x);
/* tls1_check_ec_tmp_key returns one if the EC temporary key is compatible with
* client extensions and zero otherwise. */
int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s);
int tls1_shared_list(SSL *s,
@@ -1073,8 +1068,6 @@ int tls1_record_handshake_hashes_for_channel_id(SSL *s);
int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client);
int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *salg, size_t salglen, int client);
void tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, size_t idx);
void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s);
/* ssl_ctx_log_rsa_client_key_exchange logs |premaster| to |ctx|, if logging is
* enabled. It returns one on success and zero on failure. The entry is
ssl/t1_lib.c
+19 -58
View File
@@ -654,36 +654,30 @@ static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
}
}
/* Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks
* EC certificates have compatible curves and compression.
*/
static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x)
int tls1_check_ec_cert(SSL *s, X509 *x)
{
uint8_t comp_id;
int ret = 0;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
uint16_t curve_id;
EVP_PKEY *pkey;
int rv;
pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
if (!pkey)
return 0;
/* If not EC nothing to do */
if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)
uint8_t comp_id;
if (!pkey ||
pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC ||
!tls1_curve_params_from_ec_key(&curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec) ||
!tls1_check_curve_id(s, curve_id) ||
!tls1_check_point_format(s, comp_id))
{
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
return 1;
goto done;
}
rv = tls1_curve_params_from_ec_key(&curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
if (!rv)
return 0;
/* Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a
* supported curves extension. */
if (s->server && !tls1_check_curve_id(s, curve_id))
return 0;
return tls1_check_point_format(s, comp_id);
ret = 1;
done:
if (pkey)
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
return ret;
}
/* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s)
{
uint16_t curve_id;
@@ -1457,11 +1451,10 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, CBS *cbs, int *out_alert)
OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
}
/* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
/* Clear certificate digests. */
for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
{
s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
}
/* Clear ECC extensions */
if (s->s3->tmp.peer_ecpointformatlist != 0)
@@ -2915,35 +2908,3 @@ int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
return 0;
}
/* Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
* server. This allows the server to check chains before attempting to use them.
*/
void tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, size_t idx)
{
CERT_PKEY *cpk = &s->cert->pkeys[idx];
/* Clear the flags. */
cpk->valid_flags = 0;
/* If no cert or key, forget it. */
if (!cpk->x509 || !cpk->privatekey)
return;
/* Check cert parameters are consistent */
if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, cpk->x509))
return;
cpk->valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID;
if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || cpk->digest)
cpk->valid_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
}
/* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
{
tls1_check_chain(s, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
tls1_check_chain(s, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
tls1_check_chain(s, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
}