From 7f43c2014fa03bb8718569ae628acf2089683bff Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Marc Zyngier Date: Thu, 26 Nov 2020 17:25:30 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 1/2] arm64: Make the Meltdown mitigation state available Our Meltdown mitigation state isn't exposed outside of cpufeature.c, contrary to the rest of the Spectre mitigation state. As we are going to use it in KVM, expose a arm64_get_meltdown_state() helper which returns the same possible values as arm64_get_spectre_v?_state(). Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier --- arch/arm64/include/asm/spectre.h | 2 ++ arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c | 20 +++++++++++++++++--- 2 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/spectre.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/spectre.h index fcdfbce302bd..52e788981f4a 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/spectre.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/spectre.h @@ -29,4 +29,6 @@ bool has_spectre_v4(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *cap, int scope); void spectre_v4_enable_mitigation(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *__unused); void spectre_v4_enable_task_mitigation(struct task_struct *tsk); +enum mitigation_state arm64_get_meltdown_state(void); + #endif /* __ASM_SPECTRE_H */ diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c index 6f36c4f62f69..280b10762f6b 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c @@ -2846,14 +2846,28 @@ static int __init enable_mrs_emulation(void) core_initcall(enable_mrs_emulation); +enum mitigation_state arm64_get_meltdown_state(void) +{ + if (__meltdown_safe) + return SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED; + + if (arm64_kernel_unmapped_at_el0()) + return SPECTRE_MITIGATED; + + return SPECTRE_VULNERABLE; +} + ssize_t cpu_show_meltdown(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf) { - if (__meltdown_safe) + switch (arm64_get_meltdown_state()) { + case SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED: return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n"); - if (arm64_kernel_unmapped_at_el0()) + case SPECTRE_MITIGATED: return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: PTI\n"); - return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n"); + default: + return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n"); + } } From 4f1df628d4ec22b04f67e068e6d02538d3dd557b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Marc Zyngier Date: Thu, 26 Nov 2020 17:27:13 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 2/2] KVM: arm64: Advertise ID_AA64PFR0_EL1.CSV3=1 if the CPUs are Meltdown-safe Cores that predate the introduction of ID_AA64PFR0_EL1.CSV3 to the ARMv8 architecture have this field set to 0, even of some of them are not affected by the vulnerability. The kernel maintains a list of unaffected cores (A53, A55 and a few others) so that it doesn't impose an expensive mitigation uncessarily. As we do for CSV2, let's expose the CSV3 property to guests that run on HW that is effectively not vulnerable. This can be reset to zero by writing to the ID register from userspace, ensuring that VMs can be migrated despite the new property being set. Reported-by: Will Deacon Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier --- arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 1 + arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c | 6 ++++-- arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c | 16 +++++++++++++--- 3 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h index 0cd9f0f75c13..147347028a20 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h @@ -120,6 +120,7 @@ struct kvm_arch { unsigned int pmuver; u8 pfr0_csv2; + u8 pfr0_csv3; }; struct kvm_vcpu_fault_info { diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c index c0ffb019ca8b..dc3fa6a0f9e5 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c @@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ static int kvm_arm_default_max_vcpus(void) return vgic_present ? kvm_vgic_get_max_vcpus() : KVM_MAX_VCPUS; } -static void set_default_csv2(struct kvm *kvm) +static void set_default_spectre(struct kvm *kvm) { /* * The default is to expose CSV2 == 1 if the HW isn't affected. @@ -114,6 +114,8 @@ static void set_default_csv2(struct kvm *kvm) */ if (arm64_get_spectre_v2_state() == SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED) kvm->arch.pfr0_csv2 = 1; + if (arm64_get_meltdown_state() == SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED) + kvm->arch.pfr0_csv3 = 1; } /** @@ -141,7 +143,7 @@ int kvm_arch_init_vm(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long type) /* The maximum number of VCPUs is limited by the host's GIC model */ kvm->arch.max_vcpus = kvm_arm_default_max_vcpus(); - set_default_csv2(kvm); + set_default_spectre(kvm); return ret; out_free_stage2_pgd: diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c index c1fac9836af1..6f653c0f60ec 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c @@ -1122,6 +1122,8 @@ static u64 read_id_reg(const struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, val &= ~(0xfUL << ID_AA64PFR0_AMU_SHIFT); val &= ~(0xfUL << ID_AA64PFR0_CSV2_SHIFT); val |= ((u64)vcpu->kvm->arch.pfr0_csv2 << ID_AA64PFR0_CSV2_SHIFT); + val &= ~(0xfUL << ID_AA64PFR0_CSV3_SHIFT); + val |= ((u64)vcpu->kvm->arch.pfr0_csv3 << ID_AA64PFR0_CSV3_SHIFT); } else if (id == SYS_ID_AA64PFR1_EL1) { val &= ~(0xfUL << ID_AA64PFR1_MTE_SHIFT); } else if (id == SYS_ID_AA64ISAR1_EL1 && !vcpu_has_ptrauth(vcpu)) { @@ -1209,9 +1211,9 @@ static int set_id_aa64pfr0_el1(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, const struct kvm_one_reg *reg, void __user *uaddr) { const u64 id = sys_reg_to_index(rd); + u8 csv2, csv3; int err; u64 val; - u8 csv2; err = reg_from_user(&val, uaddr, id); if (err) @@ -1227,13 +1229,21 @@ static int set_id_aa64pfr0_el1(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, (csv2 && arm64_get_spectre_v2_state() != SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED)) return -EINVAL; - /* We can only differ with CSV2, and anything else is an error */ + /* Same thing for CSV3 */ + csv3 = cpuid_feature_extract_unsigned_field(val, ID_AA64PFR0_CSV3_SHIFT); + if (csv3 > 1 || + (csv3 && arm64_get_meltdown_state() != SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED)) + return -EINVAL; + + /* We can only differ with CSV[23], and anything else is an error */ val ^= read_id_reg(vcpu, rd, false); - val &= ~(0xFUL << ID_AA64PFR0_CSV2_SHIFT); + val &= ~((0xFUL << ID_AA64PFR0_CSV2_SHIFT) | + (0xFUL << ID_AA64PFR0_CSV3_SHIFT)); if (val) return -EINVAL; vcpu->kvm->arch.pfr0_csv2 = csv2; + vcpu->kvm->arch.pfr0_csv3 = csv3 ; return 0; }