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Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net

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Conflicts:
	net/ipv4/ip_gre.c

Minor conflicts between tunnel bug fixes in net and
ipv6 tunnel cleanups in net-next.

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This commit is contained in:
David S. Miller
2016-05-04 00:52:29 -04:00
parent 26879da587 7391daf2ff
commit cba6532100
263 changed files with 2440 additions and 1224 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files
kernel/bpf/inode.c
+4 -3
View File
@@ -31,10 +31,10 @@ static void *bpf_any_get(void *raw, enum bpf_type type)
{
switch (type) {
case BPF_TYPE_PROG:
atomic_inc(&((struct bpf_prog *)raw)->aux->refcnt);
raw = bpf_prog_inc(raw);
break;
case BPF_TYPE_MAP:
bpf_map_inc(raw, true);
raw = bpf_map_inc(raw, true);
break;
default:
WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
@@ -297,7 +297,8 @@ static void *bpf_obj_do_get(const struct filename *pathname,
goto out;
raw = bpf_any_get(inode->i_private, *type);
touch_atime(&path);
if (!IS_ERR(raw))
touch_atime(&path);
path_put(&path);
return raw;
kernel/bpf/syscall.c
+20 -4
View File
@@ -218,11 +218,18 @@ struct bpf_map *__bpf_map_get(struct fd f)
return f.file->private_data;
}
void bpf_map_inc(struct bpf_map *map, bool uref)
/* prog's and map's refcnt limit */
#define BPF_MAX_REFCNT 32768
struct bpf_map *bpf_map_inc(struct bpf_map *map, bool uref)
{
atomic_inc(&map->refcnt);
if (atomic_inc_return(&map->refcnt) > BPF_MAX_REFCNT) {
atomic_dec(&map->refcnt);
return ERR_PTR(-EBUSY);
}
if (uref)
atomic_inc(&map->usercnt);
return map;
}
struct bpf_map *bpf_map_get_with_uref(u32 ufd)
@@ -234,7 +241,7 @@ struct bpf_map *bpf_map_get_with_uref(u32 ufd)
if (IS_ERR(map))
return map;
bpf_map_inc(map, true);
map = bpf_map_inc(map, true);
fdput(f);
return map;
@@ -658,6 +665,15 @@ static struct bpf_prog *__bpf_prog_get(struct fd f)
return f.file->private_data;
}
struct bpf_prog *bpf_prog_inc(struct bpf_prog *prog)
{
if (atomic_inc_return(&prog->aux->refcnt) > BPF_MAX_REFCNT) {
atomic_dec(&prog->aux->refcnt);
return ERR_PTR(-EBUSY);
}
return prog;
}
/* called by sockets/tracing/seccomp before attaching program to an event
* pairs with bpf_prog_put()
*/
@@ -670,7 +686,7 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_prog_get(u32 ufd)
if (IS_ERR(prog))
return prog;
atomic_inc(&prog->aux->refcnt);
prog = bpf_prog_inc(prog);
fdput(f);
return prog;
kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+47 -29
View File
@@ -249,16 +249,6 @@ static const char * const reg_type_str[] = {
[CONST_IMM] = "imm",
};
static const struct {
int map_type;
int func_id;
} func_limit[] = {
{BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY, BPF_FUNC_tail_call},
{BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERF_EVENT_ARRAY, BPF_FUNC_perf_event_read},
{BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERF_EVENT_ARRAY, BPF_FUNC_perf_event_output},
{BPF_MAP_TYPE_STACK_TRACE, BPF_FUNC_get_stackid},
};
static void print_verifier_state(struct verifier_env *env)
{
enum bpf_reg_type t;
@@ -943,27 +933,52 @@ static int check_func_arg(struct verifier_env *env, u32 regno,
static int check_map_func_compatibility(struct bpf_map *map, int func_id)
{
bool bool_map, bool_func;
int i;
if (!map)
return 0;
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(func_limit); i++) {
bool_map = (map->map_type == func_limit[i].map_type);
bool_func = (func_id == func_limit[i].func_id);
/* only when map & func pair match it can continue.
* don't allow any other map type to be passed into
* the special func;
*/
if (bool_func && bool_map != bool_func) {
verbose("cannot pass map_type %d into func %d\n",
map->map_type, func_id);
return -EINVAL;
}
/* We need a two way check, first is from map perspective ... */
switch (map->map_type) {
case BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY:
if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_tail_call)
goto error;
break;
case BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERF_EVENT_ARRAY:
if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_perf_event_read &&
func_id != BPF_FUNC_perf_event_output)
goto error;
break;
case BPF_MAP_TYPE_STACK_TRACE:
if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_get_stackid)
goto error;
break;
default:
break;
}
/* ... and second from the function itself. */
switch (func_id) {
case BPF_FUNC_tail_call:
if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY)
goto error;
break;
case BPF_FUNC_perf_event_read:
case BPF_FUNC_perf_event_output:
if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERF_EVENT_ARRAY)
goto error;
break;
case BPF_FUNC_get_stackid:
if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_STACK_TRACE)
goto error;
break;
default:
break;
}
return 0;
error:
verbose("cannot pass map_type %d into func %d\n",
map->map_type, func_id);
return -EINVAL;
}
static int check_raw_mode(const struct bpf_func_proto *fn)
@@ -2111,15 +2126,18 @@ static int replace_map_fd_with_map_ptr(struct verifier_env *env)
return -E2BIG;
}
/* remember this map */
env->used_maps[env->used_map_cnt++] = map;
/* hold the map. If the program is rejected by verifier,
* the map will be released by release_maps() or it
* will be used by the valid program until it's unloaded
* and all maps are released in free_bpf_prog_info()
*/
bpf_map_inc(map, false);
map = bpf_map_inc(map, false);
if (IS_ERR(map)) {
fdput(f);
return PTR_ERR(map);
}
env->used_maps[env->used_map_cnt++] = map;
fdput(f);
next_insn:
insn++;
kernel/cgroup.c
+5 -2
View File
@@ -2825,9 +2825,10 @@ static ssize_t __cgroup_procs_write(struct kernfs_open_file *of, char *buf,
size_t nbytes, loff_t off, bool threadgroup)
{
struct task_struct *tsk;
struct cgroup_subsys *ss;
struct cgroup *cgrp;
pid_t pid;
int ret;
int ssid, ret;
if (kstrtoint(strstrip(buf), 0, &pid) || pid < 0)
return -EINVAL;
@@ -2875,8 +2876,10 @@ out_unlock_rcu:
rcu_read_unlock();
out_unlock_threadgroup:
percpu_up_write(&cgroup_threadgroup_rwsem);
for_each_subsys(ss, ssid)
if (ss->post_attach)
ss->post_attach();
cgroup_kn_unlock(of->kn);
cpuset_post_attach_flush();
return ret ?: nbytes;
}
kernel/cpuset.c
+2 -2
View File
@@ -58,7 +58,6 @@
#include <asm/uaccess.h>
#include <linux/atomic.h>
#include <linux/mutex.h>
#include <linux/workqueue.h>
#include <linux/cgroup.h>
#include <linux/wait.h>
@@ -1016,7 +1015,7 @@ static void cpuset_migrate_mm(struct mm_struct *mm, const nodemask_t *from,
}
}
void cpuset_post_attach_flush(void)
static void cpuset_post_attach(void)
{
flush_workqueue(cpuset_migrate_mm_wq);
}
@@ -2087,6 +2086,7 @@ struct cgroup_subsys cpuset_cgrp_subsys = {
.can_attach = cpuset_can_attach,
.cancel_attach = cpuset_cancel_attach,
.attach = cpuset_attach,
.post_attach = cpuset_post_attach,
.bind = cpuset_bind,
.legacy_cftypes = files,
.early_init = true,
kernel/events/core.c
+38 -17
View File
@@ -412,7 +412,8 @@ int perf_cpu_time_max_percent_handler(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
if (ret || !write)
return ret;
if (sysctl_perf_cpu_time_max_percent == 100) {
if (sysctl_perf_cpu_time_max_percent == 100 ||
sysctl_perf_cpu_time_max_percent == 0) {
printk(KERN_WARNING
"perf: Dynamic interrupt throttling disabled, can hang your system!\n");
WRITE_ONCE(perf_sample_allowed_ns, 0);
@@ -1105,6 +1106,7 @@ static void put_ctx(struct perf_event_context *ctx)
* function.
*
* Lock order:
* cred_guard_mutex
* task_struct::perf_event_mutex
* perf_event_context::mutex
* perf_event::child_mutex;
@@ -3420,7 +3422,6 @@ static struct task_struct *
find_lively_task_by_vpid(pid_t vpid)
{
struct task_struct *task;
int err;
rcu_read_lock();
if (!vpid)
@@ -3434,16 +3435,7 @@ find_lively_task_by_vpid(pid_t vpid)
if (!task)
return ERR_PTR(-ESRCH);
/* Reuse ptrace permission checks for now. */
err = -EACCES;
if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS))
goto errout;
return task;
errout:
put_task_struct(task);
return ERR_PTR(err);
}
/*
@@ -8446,6 +8438,24 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
get_online_cpus();
if (task) {
err = mutex_lock_interruptible(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
if (err)
goto err_cpus;
/*
* Reuse ptrace permission checks for now.
*
* We must hold cred_guard_mutex across this and any potential
* perf_install_in_context() call for this new event to
* serialize against exec() altering our credentials (and the
* perf_event_exit_task() that could imply).
*/
err = -EACCES;
if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS))
goto err_cred;
}
if (flags & PERF_FLAG_PID_CGROUP)
cgroup_fd = pid;
@@ -8453,7 +8463,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
NULL, NULL, cgroup_fd);
if (IS_ERR(event)) {
err = PTR_ERR(event);
goto err_cpus;
goto err_cred;
}
if (is_sampling_event(event)) {
@@ -8512,11 +8522,6 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
goto err_context;
}
if (task) {
put_task_struct(task);
task = NULL;
}
/*
* Look up the group leader (we will attach this event to it):
*/
@@ -8614,6 +8619,11 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
WARN_ON_ONCE(ctx->parent_ctx);
/*
* This is the point on no return; we cannot fail hereafter. This is
* where we start modifying current state.
*/
if (move_group) {
/*
* See perf_event_ctx_lock() for comments on the details
@@ -8685,6 +8695,11 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
mutex_unlock(&gctx->mutex);
mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex);
if (task) {
mutex_unlock(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
put_task_struct(task);
}
put_online_cpus();
mutex_lock(&current->perf_event_mutex);
@@ -8717,6 +8732,9 @@ err_alloc:
*/
if (!event_file)
free_event(event);
err_cred:
if (task)
mutex_unlock(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
err_cpus:
put_online_cpus();
err_task:
@@ -9001,6 +9019,9 @@ static void perf_event_exit_task_context(struct task_struct *child, int ctxn)
/*
* When a child task exits, feed back event values to parent events.
*
* Can be called with cred_guard_mutex held when called from
* install_exec_creds().
*/
void perf_event_exit_task(struct task_struct *child)
{
kernel/kcov.c
+2 -1
View File
@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
#define pr_fmt(fmt) "kcov: " fmt
#define DISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING
#include <linux/compiler.h>
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/file.h>
@@ -43,7 +44,7 @@ struct kcov {
* Entry point from instrumented code.
* This is called once per basic-block/edge.
*/
void __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc(void)
void notrace __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc(void)
{
struct task_struct *t;
enum kcov_mode mode;
kernel/kexec_core.c
+5 -2
View File
@@ -1415,6 +1415,9 @@ static int __init crash_save_vmcoreinfo_init(void)
VMCOREINFO_OFFSET(page, lru);
VMCOREINFO_OFFSET(page, _mapcount);
VMCOREINFO_OFFSET(page, private);
VMCOREINFO_OFFSET(page, compound_dtor);
VMCOREINFO_OFFSET(page, compound_order);
VMCOREINFO_OFFSET(page, compound_head);
VMCOREINFO_OFFSET(pglist_data, node_zones);
VMCOREINFO_OFFSET(pglist_data, nr_zones);
#ifdef CONFIG_FLAT_NODE_MEM_MAP
@@ -1447,8 +1450,8 @@ static int __init crash_save_vmcoreinfo_init(void)
#ifdef CONFIG_X86
VMCOREINFO_NUMBER(KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE);
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_HUGETLBFS
VMCOREINFO_SYMBOL(free_huge_page);
#ifdef CONFIG_HUGETLB_PAGE
VMCOREINFO_NUMBER(HUGETLB_PAGE_DTOR);
#endif
arch_crash_save_vmcoreinfo();
kernel/locking/lockdep.c
+34 -3
View File
@@ -2176,15 +2176,37 @@ cache_hit:
chain->irq_context = hlock->irq_context;
i = get_first_held_lock(curr, hlock);
chain->depth = curr->lockdep_depth + 1 - i;
BUILD_BUG_ON((1UL << 24) <= ARRAY_SIZE(chain_hlocks));
BUILD_BUG_ON((1UL << 6) <= ARRAY_SIZE(curr->held_locks));
BUILD_BUG_ON((1UL << 8*sizeof(chain_hlocks[0])) <= ARRAY_SIZE(lock_classes));
if (likely(nr_chain_hlocks + chain->depth <= MAX_LOCKDEP_CHAIN_HLOCKS)) {
chain->base = nr_chain_hlocks;
nr_chain_hlocks += chain->depth;
for (j = 0; j < chain->depth - 1; j++, i++) {
int lock_id = curr->held_locks[i].class_idx - 1;
chain_hlocks[chain->base + j] = lock_id;
}
chain_hlocks[chain->base + j] = class - lock_classes;
}
if (nr_chain_hlocks < MAX_LOCKDEP_CHAIN_HLOCKS)
nr_chain_hlocks += chain->depth;
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_LOCKDEP
/*
* Important for check_no_collision().
*/
if (unlikely(nr_chain_hlocks > MAX_LOCKDEP_CHAIN_HLOCKS)) {
if (debug_locks_off_graph_unlock())
return 0;
print_lockdep_off("BUG: MAX_LOCKDEP_CHAIN_HLOCKS too low!");
dump_stack();
return 0;
}
#endif
hlist_add_head_rcu(&chain->entry, hash_head);
debug_atomic_inc(chain_lookup_misses);
inc_chains();
@@ -2932,6 +2954,11 @@ static int mark_irqflags(struct task_struct *curr, struct held_lock *hlock)
return 1;
}
static inline unsigned int task_irq_context(struct task_struct *task)
{
return 2 * !!task->hardirq_context + !!task->softirq_context;
}
static int separate_irq_context(struct task_struct *curr,
struct held_lock *hlock)
{
@@ -2940,8 +2967,6 @@ static int separate_irq_context(struct task_struct *curr,
/*
* Keep track of points where we cross into an interrupt context:
*/
hlock->irq_context = 2*(curr->hardirq_context ? 1 : 0) +
curr->softirq_context;
if (depth) {
struct held_lock *prev_hlock;
@@ -2973,6 +2998,11 @@ static inline int mark_irqflags(struct task_struct *curr,
return 1;
}
static inline unsigned int task_irq_context(struct task_struct *task)
{
return 0;
}
static inline int separate_irq_context(struct task_struct *curr,
struct held_lock *hlock)
{
@@ -3241,6 +3271,7 @@ static int __lock_acquire(struct lockdep_map *lock, unsigned int subclass,
hlock->acquire_ip = ip;
hlock->instance = lock;
hlock->nest_lock = nest_lock;
hlock->irq_context = task_irq_context(curr);
hlock->trylock = trylock;
hlock->read = read;
hlock->check = check;
kernel/locking/lockdep_proc.c
+2
View File
@@ -141,6 +141,8 @@ static int lc_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
int i;
if (v == SEQ_START_TOKEN) {
if (nr_chain_hlocks > MAX_LOCKDEP_CHAIN_HLOCKS)
seq_printf(m, "(buggered) ");
seq_printf(m, "all lock chains:\n");
return 0;
}
kernel/workqueue.c
+29
View File
@@ -666,6 +666,35 @@ static void set_work_pool_and_clear_pending(struct work_struct *work,
*/
smp_wmb();
set_work_data(work, (unsigned long)pool_id << WORK_OFFQ_POOL_SHIFT, 0);
/*
* The following mb guarantees that previous clear of a PENDING bit
* will not be reordered with any speculative LOADS or STORES from
* work->current_func, which is executed afterwards. This possible
* reordering can lead to a missed execution on attempt to qeueue
* the same @work. E.g. consider this case:
*
* CPU#0 CPU#1
* ---------------------------- --------------------------------
*
* 1 STORE event_indicated
* 2 queue_work_on() {
* 3 test_and_set_bit(PENDING)
* 4 } set_..._and_clear_pending() {
* 5 set_work_data() # clear bit
* 6 smp_mb()
* 7 work->current_func() {
* 8 LOAD event_indicated
* }
*
* Without an explicit full barrier speculative LOAD on line 8 can
* be executed before CPU#0 does STORE on line 1. If that happens,
* CPU#0 observes the PENDING bit is still set and new execution of
* a @work is not queued in a hope, that CPU#1 will eventually
* finish the queued @work. Meanwhile CPU#1 does not see
* event_indicated is set, because speculative LOAD was executed
* before actual STORE.
*/
smp_mb();
}
static void clear_work_data(struct work_struct *work)