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This is the next part of the great loader rework, with a lot of breaking changes: - Complete removal of the "trusted children" thing - now children processes can be spawned arbitrarily and from arbitrary mountpoint types, without any additional configuration needed. - There's a new, required option in the manifest: `libos.entrypoint` - it specifies the URI to the entry binary in the first process. There's no need anymore to name the manifest and the first binary identically. - On SGX, the main binary is not measured in MRENCLAVE anymore - only PAL, LibOS and the manifest are measured. This is enough to bind MRENCLAVE to a specific entrypoint user executable if wanted - it just has to be mounted as a trusted file. - All Graphene SGX enclaves have now exactly the same MRENCLAVE. This is a hash of a "Graphene stub", which can "fork" into one of two states in runtime: initial process or child. The initial process creates a new "Graphene namespace" with a clean state, it can also be attested remotely (contrary to child processes). The initial process can spawn children processes by spawning a Graphene stub and directing it to start in the child mode. It then attests it locally, and if successful, establishes an encrypted pipe, "connects" to its own namespace and treats as trusted (including sending protected files key). - Now, there's only one, central manifest describing the initial state of a Graphene instance which can be spawned from it (previously, each process required a separate manifest which could have different configuration - which wasn't actually supported and didn't make sense design-wise). One downside of central manifests is that all processes require the same enclave configuration (e.g. size), but that was already the case so far because of broken checkpointing code. Also, this is only a temporary problem, which will cease to exist after the introduction of EDMM. - `sgx.static_address` was renamed to `sgx.nonpie_binary` and now has to be inserted manually by users (`sgx_sign` tools doesn't know about the binaries run inside, which can be even provided or generated in runtime by the user's workload). - Caveat: the memory gap for non-PIE executables was removed because it requires adding a new option to the manifest to be cleanly implemented. This is left for some future loader rework PR.
# Redis This directory contains the Makefile and the template manifest for the most recent version of Redis (as of this writing, version 5.0.5). This was tested on a machine with SGX v1 and Ubuntu 16.04. The Makefile and the template manifest contain extensive comments and are made self-explanatory. Please review them to gain understanding of Graphene-SGX and requirements for applications running under Graphene-SGX. # Quick Start ```sh # build Redis and the final manifest make SGX=1 # run original Redis against a benchmark (redis-benchmark supplied with Redis) ./redis-server --save '' --protected-mode no & src/src/redis-benchmark kill %% # run Redis in non-SGX Graphene against a benchmark ./pal_loader redis-server --save '' --protected-mode no & src/src/redis-benchmark kill %% # run Redis in Graphene-SGX against a benchmark SGX=1 ./pal_loader redis-server --save '' --protected-mode no & src/src/redis-benchmark kill %% ``` # Why this Redis configuration? Notice that we run Redis with two parameters: `save ''` and `protected-mode no`: - `save ''` disables saving DB to disk (both RDB snapshots and AOF logs). We use this parameter to side-step some bugs in Graphene triggered during the graceful shutdown of Redis. - `protected-mode no` allows clients to connect to Redis on any network interface. Even though we use the loopback interface (which is always allowed in Redis), Graphene hides this information. Therefore, we ask Redis to allow clients on all interfaces. # Redis with Select By default, Redis uses the epoll mechanism of Linux to monitor client connections. To test Redis with select, add `USE_SELECT=1`, e.g., `make SGX=1 USE_SELECT=1`.