We use the standard Apache 2.0 file header, described in "APPENDIX: How to apply the Apache License to your work." This was primarily automated by running: git ls-tree -r --name-only HEAD | xargs go run ./util/relicense.go See go/boringssl-relicensing-triage for the results of triaging the output of the tool. As part of this, switch from taking fiat-crypto under MIT license to Apache 2.0. (It is licensed under MIT OR Apache-2.0 OR BSD-1-Clause.) The copyright_summary tool can also be used to confirm we didn't accidentally drop any copyright lines: # Run before the CL git grep -l Copyright | xargs go run ./util/copyright_summary.go -out /tmp/old.json # Run after the CL git grep -l Copyright | xargs go run ./util/copyright_summary.go -compare /tmp/old.json Bug: 364634028 Change-Id: I17c50e761e9d077a1f92e25969e50ed35e320c59 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/75852 Reviewed-by: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com> Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
396 lines
13 KiB
C++
396 lines
13 KiB
C++
// Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
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//
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// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
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// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
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// You may obtain a copy of the License at
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//
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// https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
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//
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// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
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// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
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// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
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// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
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// limitations under the License.
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#include <openssl/ssl.h>
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#include <assert.h>
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#include <limits.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include <algorithm>
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#include <openssl/err.h>
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#include <openssl/evp.h>
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#include <openssl/mem.h>
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#include <openssl/rand.h>
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#include "../crypto/err/internal.h"
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#include "../crypto/internal.h"
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#include "internal.h"
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BSSL_NAMESPACE_BEGIN
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static int do_tls_write(SSL *ssl, size_t *out_bytes_written, uint8_t type,
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Span<const uint8_t> in);
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int tls_write_app_data(SSL *ssl, bool *out_needs_handshake,
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size_t *out_bytes_written, Span<const uint8_t> in) {
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assert(ssl_can_write(ssl));
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assert(!ssl->s3->aead_write_ctx->is_null_cipher());
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*out_needs_handshake = false;
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if (ssl->s3->write_shutdown != ssl_shutdown_none) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PROTOCOL_IS_SHUTDOWN);
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return -1;
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}
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size_t total_bytes_written = ssl->s3->unreported_bytes_written;
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if (in.size() < total_bytes_written) {
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// This can happen if the caller disables |SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE|,
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// asks us to write some input of length N, we successfully encrypt M bytes
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// and write it, but fail to write the rest. We will report
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// |SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE|. If the caller then retries with fewer than M
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// bytes, we cannot satisfy that request. The caller is required to always
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// retry with at least as many bytes as the previous attempt.
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
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return -1;
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}
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in = in.subspan(total_bytes_written);
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const bool is_early_data_write =
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!ssl->server && SSL_in_early_data(ssl) && ssl->s3->hs->can_early_write;
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for (;;) {
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size_t max_send_fragment = ssl->max_send_fragment;
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if (is_early_data_write) {
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SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs = ssl->s3->hs.get();
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if (hs->early_data_written >= hs->early_session->ticket_max_early_data) {
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ssl->s3->unreported_bytes_written = total_bytes_written;
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hs->can_early_write = false;
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*out_needs_handshake = true;
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return -1;
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}
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max_send_fragment = std::min(
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max_send_fragment, size_t{hs->early_session->ticket_max_early_data -
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hs->early_data_written});
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}
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const size_t to_write = std::min(max_send_fragment, in.size());
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size_t bytes_written;
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int ret = do_tls_write(ssl, &bytes_written, SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA,
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in.subspan(0, to_write));
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if (ret <= 0) {
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ssl->s3->unreported_bytes_written = total_bytes_written;
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return ret;
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}
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// Note |bytes_written| may be less than |to_write| if there was a pending
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// record from a smaller write attempt.
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assert(bytes_written <= to_write);
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total_bytes_written += bytes_written;
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in = in.subspan(bytes_written);
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if (is_early_data_write) {
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ssl->s3->hs->early_data_written += bytes_written;
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}
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if (in.empty() || (ssl->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE)) {
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ssl->s3->unreported_bytes_written = 0;
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*out_bytes_written = total_bytes_written;
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return 1;
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}
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}
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}
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// tls_seal_align_prefix_len returns the length of the prefix before the start
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// of the bulk of the ciphertext when sealing a record with |ssl|. Callers may
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// use this to align buffers.
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//
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// Note when TLS 1.0 CBC record-splitting is enabled, this includes the one byte
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// record and is the offset into second record's ciphertext. Thus sealing a
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// small record may result in a smaller output than this value.
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//
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// TODO(davidben): Is this alignment valuable? Record-splitting makes this a
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// mess.
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static size_t tls_seal_align_prefix_len(const SSL *ssl) {
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size_t ret =
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SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + ssl->s3->aead_write_ctx->ExplicitNonceLen();
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if (ssl_needs_record_splitting(ssl)) {
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ret += SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
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ret += ssl_cipher_get_record_split_len(ssl->s3->aead_write_ctx->cipher());
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}
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return ret;
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}
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// do_tls_write writes an SSL record of the given type. On success, it sets
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// |*out_bytes_written| to number of bytes successfully written and returns one.
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// On error, it returns a value <= 0 from the underlying |BIO|.
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static int do_tls_write(SSL *ssl, size_t *out_bytes_written, uint8_t type,
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Span<const uint8_t> in) {
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// If there is a pending write, the retry must be consistent.
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if (!ssl->s3->pending_write.empty() &&
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(ssl->s3->pending_write.size() > in.size() ||
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(!(ssl->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER) &&
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ssl->s3->pending_write.data() != in.data()) ||
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ssl->s3->pending_write_type != type)) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY);
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return -1;
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}
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// Flush any unwritten data to the transport. There may be data to flush even
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// if |wpend_tot| is zero.
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int ret = ssl_write_buffer_flush(ssl);
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if (ret <= 0) {
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return ret;
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}
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// If there is a pending write, we just completed it. Report it to the caller.
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if (!ssl->s3->pending_write.empty()) {
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*out_bytes_written = ssl->s3->pending_write.size();
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ssl->s3->pending_write = {};
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return 1;
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}
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SSLBuffer *buf = &ssl->s3->write_buffer;
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if (in.size() > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH || buf->size() > 0) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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return -1;
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}
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if (!tls_flush_pending_hs_data(ssl)) {
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return -1;
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}
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// We may have unflushed handshake data that must be written before |in|. This
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// may be a KeyUpdate acknowledgment, 0-RTT key change messages, or a
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// NewSessionTicket.
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Span<const uint8_t> pending_flight;
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if (ssl->s3->pending_flight != nullptr) {
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pending_flight =
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Span(reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t *>(ssl->s3->pending_flight->data),
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ssl->s3->pending_flight->length);
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pending_flight = pending_flight.subspan(ssl->s3->pending_flight_offset);
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}
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size_t max_out = pending_flight.size();
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if (!in.empty()) {
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const size_t max_ciphertext_len = in.size() + SSL_max_seal_overhead(ssl);
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if (max_ciphertext_len < in.size() ||
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max_out + max_ciphertext_len < max_out) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_OVERFLOW);
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return -1;
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}
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max_out += max_ciphertext_len;
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}
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if (max_out == 0) {
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// Nothing to write.
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*out_bytes_written = 0;
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return 1;
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}
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if (!buf->EnsureCap(pending_flight.size() + tls_seal_align_prefix_len(ssl),
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max_out)) {
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return -1;
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}
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// Copy |pending_flight| to the output.
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if (!pending_flight.empty()) {
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OPENSSL_memcpy(buf->remaining().data(), pending_flight.data(),
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pending_flight.size());
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ssl->s3->pending_flight.reset();
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ssl->s3->pending_flight_offset = 0;
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buf->DidWrite(pending_flight.size());
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}
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if (!in.empty()) {
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size_t ciphertext_len;
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if (!tls_seal_record(ssl, buf->remaining().data(), &ciphertext_len,
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buf->remaining().size(), type, in.data(), in.size())) {
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return -1;
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}
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buf->DidWrite(ciphertext_len);
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}
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// Now that we've made progress on the connection, uncork KeyUpdate
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// acknowledgments.
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ssl->s3->key_update_pending = false;
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// Flush the write buffer.
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ret = ssl_write_buffer_flush(ssl);
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if (ret <= 0) {
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// Track the unfinished write.
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if (!in.empty()) {
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ssl->s3->pending_write = in;
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ssl->s3->pending_write_type = type;
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}
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return ret;
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}
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*out_bytes_written = in.size();
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return 1;
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}
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ssl_open_record_t tls_open_app_data(SSL *ssl, Span<uint8_t> *out,
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size_t *out_consumed, uint8_t *out_alert,
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Span<uint8_t> in) {
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assert(ssl_can_read(ssl));
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assert(!ssl->s3->aead_read_ctx->is_null_cipher());
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uint8_t type;
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Span<uint8_t> body;
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auto ret = tls_open_record(ssl, &type, &body, out_consumed, out_alert, in);
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if (ret != ssl_open_record_success) {
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return ret;
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}
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const bool is_early_data_read = ssl->server && SSL_in_early_data(ssl);
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if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
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// Post-handshake data prior to TLS 1.3 is always renegotiation, which we
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// never accept as a server. Otherwise |tls_get_message| will send
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// |SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE|.
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if (ssl->server && ssl_protocol_version(ssl) < TLS1_3_VERSION) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
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*out_alert = SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION;
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return ssl_open_record_error;
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}
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if (!tls_append_handshake_data(ssl, body)) {
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*out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
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return ssl_open_record_error;
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}
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return ssl_open_record_discard;
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}
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if (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
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*out_alert = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
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return ssl_open_record_error;
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}
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if (is_early_data_read) {
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if (body.size() > kMaxEarlyDataAccepted - ssl->s3->hs->early_data_read) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_TOO_MUCH_READ_EARLY_DATA);
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*out_alert = SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
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return ssl_open_record_error;
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}
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ssl->s3->hs->early_data_read += body.size();
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}
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if (body.empty()) {
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return ssl_open_record_discard;
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}
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*out = body;
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return ssl_open_record_success;
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}
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ssl_open_record_t tls_open_change_cipher_spec(SSL *ssl, size_t *out_consumed,
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uint8_t *out_alert,
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Span<uint8_t> in) {
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uint8_t type;
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Span<uint8_t> body;
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auto ret = tls_open_record(ssl, &type, &body, out_consumed, out_alert, in);
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if (ret != ssl_open_record_success) {
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return ret;
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}
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if (type != SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
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*out_alert = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
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return ssl_open_record_error;
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}
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if (body.size() != 1 || body[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
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*out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
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return ssl_open_record_error;
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}
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ssl_do_msg_callback(ssl, 0 /* read */, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, body);
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return ssl_open_record_success;
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}
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void ssl_send_alert(SSL *ssl, int level, int desc) {
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// This function is called in response to a fatal error from the peer. Ignore
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// any failures writing the alert and report only the original error. In
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// particular, if the transport uses |SSL_write|, our existing error will be
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// clobbered so we must save and restore the error queue. See
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// https://crbug.com/959305.
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//
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// TODO(davidben): Return the alert out of the handshake, rather than calling
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// this function internally everywhere.
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//
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// TODO(davidben): This does not allow retrying if the alert hit EAGAIN. See
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// https://crbug.com/boringssl/130.
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UniquePtr<ERR_SAVE_STATE> err_state(ERR_save_state());
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ssl_send_alert_impl(ssl, level, desc);
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ERR_restore_state(err_state.get());
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}
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int ssl_send_alert_impl(SSL *ssl, int level, int desc) {
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// It is illegal to send an alert when we've already sent a closing one.
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if (ssl->s3->write_shutdown != ssl_shutdown_none) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PROTOCOL_IS_SHUTDOWN);
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return -1;
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}
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if (level == SSL3_AL_WARNING && desc == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) {
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ssl->s3->write_shutdown = ssl_shutdown_close_notify;
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} else {
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assert(level == SSL3_AL_FATAL);
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assert(desc != SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY);
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ssl->s3->write_shutdown = ssl_shutdown_error;
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}
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ssl->s3->alert_dispatch = true;
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ssl->s3->send_alert[0] = level;
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ssl->s3->send_alert[1] = desc;
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if (ssl->s3->write_buffer.empty()) {
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// Nothing is being written out, so the alert may be dispatched
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// immediately.
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return ssl->method->dispatch_alert(ssl);
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}
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// The alert will be dispatched later.
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return -1;
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}
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int tls_dispatch_alert(SSL *ssl) {
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if (SSL_is_quic(ssl)) {
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if (!ssl->quic_method->send_alert(ssl, ssl->s3->quic_write_level,
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ssl->s3->send_alert[1])) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_QUIC_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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return 0;
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}
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} else {
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size_t bytes_written;
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int ret =
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do_tls_write(ssl, &bytes_written, SSL3_RT_ALERT, ssl->s3->send_alert);
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if (ret <= 0) {
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return ret;
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}
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assert(bytes_written == 2);
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}
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ssl->s3->alert_dispatch = false;
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// If the alert is fatal, flush the BIO now.
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if (ssl->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL) {
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BIO_flush(ssl->wbio.get());
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}
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ssl_do_msg_callback(ssl, 1 /* write */, SSL3_RT_ALERT, ssl->s3->send_alert);
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int alert = (ssl->s3->send_alert[0] << 8) | ssl->s3->send_alert[1];
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ssl_do_info_callback(ssl, SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT, alert);
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return 1;
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}
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BSSL_NAMESPACE_END
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