David Benjamin
89973806bc
https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/79267 will bump the PKCS5_SALT_LEN constant to 16. To avoid some confusing results from that: 1. Don't bother using a constant for EVP_BytesToKey (a generalized PBKDF1). It's not really doing anything there, since the public API just says 8 anyway. 2. Fix the structure citation from PKCS #5 (RFC 2898, now RFC 8018) to PKCS #12 (RFC 7292). This is actually the PKCS #12 version of the structure, which has no constraint on the salt length. See https://crbug.com/416889523#comment4 Bug: 416889523 Change-Id: I1aded3bf93c2ffc281b71013a6ea4135d39e28d9 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/79287 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com> Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com> Auto-Submit: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
107 lines
2.5 KiB
C++
107 lines
2.5 KiB
C++
// Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
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//
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// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
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// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
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// You may obtain a copy of the License at
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//
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// https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
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//
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// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
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// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
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// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
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// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
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// limitations under the License.
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#include <openssl/cipher.h>
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#include <assert.h>
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#include <openssl/digest.h>
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#include <openssl/mem.h>
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int EVP_BytesToKey(const EVP_CIPHER *type, const EVP_MD *md,
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const uint8_t salt[8], const uint8_t *data, size_t data_len,
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unsigned count, uint8_t *key, uint8_t *iv) {
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uint8_t md_buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
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unsigned addmd = 0;
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unsigned mds = 0, i;
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int rv = 0;
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unsigned nkey = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(type);
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unsigned niv = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(type);
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assert(nkey <= EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH);
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assert(niv <= EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH);
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if (data == nullptr) {
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return nkey;
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}
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bssl::ScopedEVP_MD_CTX c;
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for (;;) {
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if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(c.get(), md, nullptr)) {
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goto err;
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}
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if (addmd++) {
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if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(c.get(), md_buf, mds)) {
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goto err;
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}
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}
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if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(c.get(), data, data_len)) {
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goto err;
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}
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if (salt != nullptr) {
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if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(c.get(), salt, 8)) {
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goto err;
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}
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}
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if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(c.get(), md_buf, &mds)) {
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goto err;
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}
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for (i = 1; i < count; i++) {
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if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(c.get(), md, nullptr) ||
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!EVP_DigestUpdate(c.get(), md_buf, mds) ||
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!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(c.get(), md_buf, &mds)) {
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goto err;
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}
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}
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i = 0;
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if (nkey) {
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for (;;) {
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if (nkey == 0 || i == mds) {
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break;
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}
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if (key != nullptr) {
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*(key++) = md_buf[i];
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}
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nkey--;
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i++;
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}
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}
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if (niv && i != mds) {
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for (;;) {
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if (niv == 0 || i == mds) {
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break;
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}
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if (iv != nullptr) {
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*(iv++) = md_buf[i];
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}
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niv--;
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i++;
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}
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}
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if (nkey == 0 && niv == 0) {
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break;
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}
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}
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rv = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(type);
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err:
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OPENSSL_cleanse(md_buf, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
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return rv;
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}
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