From e24f686e31e40013f7222e745facd9f18e56f4de Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Matt Caswell Date: Thu, 24 Jul 2014 23:54:28 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] Same fix as in dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message. MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Applying same fix as in dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message. A truncated DTLS fragment would cause *ok to be clear, but the return value would still be the number of bytes read. Problem identified by Emilia Käsper, based on previous issue/patch by Adam Langley. Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper (Imported from upstream's 3d5dceac430d7b9b273331931d4d2303f5a2256f) Change-Id: Ibe30716266e2ee1489c98b922cf53edda096c23c Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1437 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley --- ssl/d1_both.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/ssl/d1_both.c b/ssl/d1_both.c index a5a7aeb55..2430a7ca6 100644 --- a/ssl/d1_both.c +++ b/ssl/d1_both.c @@ -670,7 +670,9 @@ dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok) /* read the body of the fragment (header has already been read */ i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, frag->fragment + msg_hdr->frag_off,frag_len,0); - if (i<=0 || (unsigned long)i!=frag_len) + if ((unsigned long)i!=frag_len) + i=-1; + if (i<=0) goto err; RSMBLY_BITMASK_MARK(frag->reassembly, (long)msg_hdr->frag_off,